Hikmat Hajiyev, assistant to Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev, held a face-to-face meeting with Israel’s President Isaac Herzog and Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar in Jerusalem on December 9. This visit surprised many as the Jewish state continues to fight on several fronts against its enemies, including Hezbollah remnants repeatedly hitting more than 300 sites in Syria in recent days.   

While Hajiyev’s trip came unannounced, it also came at a very critical and specific time in light of the overthrow of Syria’s Bashar Assad following 13 years-long bloody civil war. Although analysts for many years claimed that Bashar Assad “won the civil war” with the help of Iran and Russia, he prolonged the war, giving rise to a more solidified and regrouped opposition, which ultimately kicked out Iran’s fighters and the top-flight of the Syrian regime.

The destructive impact of the Islamic Republic's influence on Lebanon and Syria, as part of its Axis of Resistance, became one of the primary triggers of the Israel – Gaza war since 2023, with the spillover effect into broader territories. Ironically, Tehran’s strategy of prolonged war against Israel and its Western partners led to the systematic collapse of its two major partners in the Levant in less than six months.

In this regard, the offensive led by Hayat Tahrir-al Sham (HTS) demonstrated the limitations of Assad's regime and its armed forces without Iran's support, which resulted in his ousting in just ten days. Hence, considering the rapid change in internal political dynamics around Iran, Turkey, and Israel, Azerbaijan is likely to have deeper security ties with the latter despite uneasy relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv amid the Gaza war.

Seemingly, boosting closer ties in security with Tel Aviv and Iran’s potential assertive policy toward its immediate neighbourhood, particularly Shi’ite Azerbaijan, in light of the loss of its Syrian card could be a primary reason behind Hikmat Hajiyev’s recent high-level meetings in Israel. Indeed, a military partnership between Israel and Azerbaijan is not a new phenomenon, as after the second Karabakh War in 2020 with Armenia, arms exports to Azerbaijan surged significantly. Unsurprisingly, Iran’s political establishment and state-run media frequently attempted to capitalise on this factor against Baku by launching an anti-Azerbaijani campaign with the usage of bellicose rhetoric and public threats between 2020-2023.

Moreover, Iran's heavy reliance on proxy warfare strategy emboldened Iranian-backed proxies to threaten secular Azerbaijan, namely the notorious Hosseyniyun group founded by the late General Qassem Soleimani. Although such threats did not yield significant results yet, they led to more intensive diplomatic dialogue between Baku and Tel Aviv. 

As such, by publicly acknowledging its partnership with Azerbaijan in the last three years, Israel has now managed to contribute to the elimination of the central link of the so-called Axis of Resistance, thus disrupting its long-term integrity. Since the outbreak of the brutal civil war, Syria steadily became an outstanding Iranian proxy outpost, strengthening Tehran's leverage over the region and its ambitions toward immediate neighbours, including Azerbaijan. Nonetheless, the collapse of Assad's regime, followed by Iran’s strategic regional failures, will likely force Tehran to be more cautious toward regional partnerships in the Caucasus and the Middle East, namely the Azerbaijan-Israel partnership and Turkey's cemented influence in Syria.

Therefore, taking into account the new regional geopolitical order, Hikmat Hajiyev's main agenda during the most recent trip to Israel might have potentially included mediation attempts between Ankara and Tel Aviv through "quiet diplomacy," as in the case of the 2021 diplomatic rapprochement. Moreover, the fact that Hikmat Hajiyev decided to go public regarding his meetings with Israeli officials hints at the idea that Baku is quite confident regarding its strategic partnership with Israel despite ongoing volatility in the Middle East and threats stemming from Iran's proxy groups.

On the other hand, Baku's and Tel Aviv's visions of regional security architecture in the post-Assad period vary. Both states have traditionally taken cautious stances against Islamist groups, seeing them as a source of threat. Consequently, the rapid rise of HTS to power and its geopolitical repercussions could pose some risks for Azerbaijan—Israel's strategic partnership, although not long-term.

With no options left, the Iranian authorities will likely tighten their grip over the country and domestic dissent to neutralise potential riots and protests in light of heavy losses in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza. The lack of a long-term strategic vision and clear agenda, including relatively stable relations with neighbours like Turkey and Azerbaijan, emboldens Iran to seek new fronts for its hybrid strategy to prevent further demise of influence. However, with the incoming Trump administration and Israel’s explicitly growing upper hand in the Middle East, Iran’s traditional hybrid/warfare strategy may backfire and result in another major defeat in the remaining soils like Houthi-ruled Yemen.