There is a preconceived idea that if a country signs up to the enlargement policy of the European Union, its foreign policy becomes uniform and "Europeanised", manifestly strictly pro-European. Thus part of the transformation that the new and old EU candidate states (currently ten) must go through is related to the assumption of the EU's external action directions. Although the 27 European states have their own foreign policy, the EU institutions located in Brussels can suggest principles of external action. The development of an external agenda belonging to the EU depends on unanimity, on the one hand, and geopolitical circumstances, on the other. However, in most cases, the EU's external agenda is set on the basis of a causal relationship with regional and global geopolitical events (the war in Ukraine, the migration crisis, the terrorist threat, etc).

However, unanimity is not always and necessarily the result of voluntary decisions, but is formed as a result of the influence of a strong majority on others. The majority influence must be behind Germany and France, including Italy and Spain, although to a lesser extent. Although the latter are the four main EU economies that have primacy, they must unite the other member states around them to galvanise cohesion in the foreign policy of the entire bloc. That is, on the basis of unanimity and cohesion, European institutions can introduce sanctions against third countries, making sanctions one of the most expressive and powerful instruments of EU foreign policy. From this point of view, the EU expects the candidate countries (including Serbia, Moldova and Georgia) to take on European sanctions, thus aligning themselves with the European foreign agenda. This also refers to the EU sanctions against Russia, which in the last two years has become the most sanctioned country internationally. Between February 2022 and June 2024, the EU initiated 14 sanctions packages, which must not be omitted in the accession process of EU candidate states. However, this differs from case to case, as some candidate countries prefer to adopt a "multi-vector" foreign policy, refusing to align themselves with European sanctions even if they are in EU accession negotiations.

Alignment with EU sanctions

Alignment with the EU common foreign policy is a necessary condition in the EU accession process, as indicated in chapter 31 (out of a total of 35 chapters). According to this provision, the candidate states must bring their foreign policy closer to that of the EU, and the main way to do this is by assuming the restrictive measures (sanctions) of the EU and adhering to the geopolitical positioning of the EU (the statements of the diplomatic arm of the EU – European External Action Service).

The relationship with Russia assumed by the EU candidate states will matter at least until 2029, when the mandate of the European Commission, currently under constitution, will expire. The future head of European diplomacy could be the current Prime Minister of Estonia, Kaja Kallas, who has become one of the main targets of Russian disinformation. Kallas is known for her robust and critical rhetoric against Moscow for its imperialist policy in relation to Ukraine, but also with the entire post-Soviet space. Given the future configuration of the European Commission, which will strengthen its geopolitical voice, including through Kallas's pragmatic diplomacy with Russia, countries such as Georgia will find it difficult to implement "multi-vector" foreign policies.

Although it has been a candidate country since November 2023, Georgia risks losing this status following the approval of the law on "transparency of foreign influence." In June 2024, the EU Council warned the authorities in Tbilisi that the adopted law will have geopolitical consequences, which from autumn will allow civil society to be included in the category of "agents of foreign influence" if it receives more than 20 % of its financing from abroad (regardless of its origin). The EU does not make a direct reference to Russia, but those who protested vehemently in Georgia (youth, NGOs, opposition, citizens in general) interpreted the approval of the law (with aspects similar to that of Russia in 2012) as an attempt of "Russification". Brussels has stressed that Georgia's accession process could be halted if the law remains in force. However, the Tbilisi government (an oligarchic type regime due to the influence of Bidzina Ivanishvili) led by the "Georgian Dream" keeps repeating that the country's European integration is not cancelled and that the goal is to achieve it (unviable) goal to the year 2030.

De facto, like Serbia under Alexandar Vucic, the Georgian authorities are pursuing a "multi-vector" policy, attempting to combine EU membership with a strategic partnership with China and the normalisation of relations with Russia. Signs of a non-exclusionary pro-European positioning are illustrated in the EU's assessment of Georgia's readiness for Chapter 31. In August 2023, Brussels identified that the Georgian side had a 43% alignment rate with the EU's declarations. EU made by EU diplomacy, lower than in Serbia (51%) and almost twice lower than in Moldova (78%). Georgia has also not joined the EU sanctions against Russia adopted after 2022 (like Serbia and partly like Moldova) and is reluctant to align itself with human rights sanctions (the EU analogue to the "Magnitsky Act").

Although the Georgian authorities are open to adopting European legislation in various technical sectors (as they did within the framework of the 2014 Association Agreement), pursuing pragmatic economic interests, they prefer broad sovereignty in the field of foreign policy. Therefore, if the EU applies individual and political sanctions for legislation targeting civil society (some of which receives funding from the EU and Member States), the Georgian authorities will most likely respond by intensifying dialogue with China, Russia and Iran. The implementation of the Anaklia port construction project (critical infrastructure) by Chinese companies exemplifies the approach that the Georgian government could apply on a larger scale if it feels isolated by the West. The critical point that will establish new political conditions in the dialogue between Tbilisi and Brussels are the parliamentary elections of October 26, 2024. The opposition is taking steps towards a mobilisation of pro-EU forces and the European institutions condition the future dialogue with Tbilisi on holding fair and free parliamentary elections.

The outcome of the elections will determine whether Georgia will move closer to Moldova (if the presidential office there remains in the hands of the current government after the Moldovan elections on October 20) or will reinforce its "multi-vector" position, Serbian style, by building selective relations with the EU in the accession process, maintaining in parallel close ties with China and at least normalised ones with Russia.

Finally, Georgia, like other states that are part of the EU's enlargement policy from Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans, must adopt a clearly pro-European policy if it wants to advance in the accession process. Otherwise, any form of "multi-vector" policy involving Russia and China may become an obstacle to achieving the conditions of accession.