Under threat from Russia and Azerbaijan, Armenia is seeking new partners and guarantees in the West. European integration or even joining the European Union has become one of the top  issues on Armenia's political agenda. 

The anti-government rallies of pro-Russian opposition forces that started in the spring have failed. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan remains in power, during whose tenure cooperation with the US and the EU has intensified unprecedentedly, peaking at a April 5 meeting in Brussels.

Now, the "Platform of Democratic Forces" uniting four pro-Western parties, is pressuring Pashinyan’s government. They are demanding a referendum on EU membership, pointing to Ukraine and Moldova, which have already begun negotiations on membership.

Pashinyan has not dismissed these demands. Moreover, on October 17, 2023, he declared from the European Parliament's podium that "Armenia is ready to be as close to the EU as the EU considers possible”. Theoretically, this should mean membership if the European Union deems it possible. 

Recently, during the "Armenian Democracy Forum" held in Yerevan, Pashinyan was more candid, stating he wouldn’t have made such a statement if he thought Armenians did not support the idea. Indeed, according to a poll conducted a few months ago by the International Republican Institute, Russia's rating has plummeted, and the country, once considered an ally, is now seen as one of three states posing political and economic threats. Meanwhile, the US, France, and the EU are perceived by Armenians as their leading security and economic partners. The West almost has no negative ratings.

Public opinion today is therefore favourable, and if Pashinyan calls for a referendum on EU membership, it will likely result in a positive outcome. However, he wants assurances that Brussels will also welcome Armenians' pro-European aspirations. Armenia needs to be confident that it will receive EU candidate status, like neighbouring Georgia. 

Pashinyan insists that he cannot say how ready the European Union is for Armenia's membership. Thus, Armenia's leader is publicly asking the newly elected leadership of the European Union and the European Parliament for an answer on whether they see Armenia in the EU. More specifically, is the EU ready to start negotiations with Armenia as it is doing with Ukraine and Moldova?

But the economic and geopolitical situation is difficult. If these problems are not overcome, Yerevan cannot be deemed a realistic candidate for the EU.

EU intensifies its focus

After four years of negotiations, Armenia's third president, Serzh Sargsyan, refused to sign the Association Agreement with the EU in 2013 and decided to make Armenia part of the Russia-led Customs Union, later called the EEU. In 2017, Armenia and the EU signed the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement, which differs from the Association Agreement only by the absence of the free trade component. 

Since 2020, the European Union has noticeably intensified its attention on the South Caucasus. Georgia has obtained candidate status for membership. Georgia's fate will be decided in the parliamentary elections in October. 

Today, Yerevan and Brussels are trying to align Armenia's economic standards with European ones, opening the doors of European markets for Armenian producers. In 2021, the EU offered Armenia a new economic and investment plan, a €2.6 billion support package. So far, €550 million of this amount has been spent and invested in the economy, mostly consisting of preferential loans supporting small and medium-sized businesses. The rest mainly concerns capital expenditures. 

The EU has also assumed a security role by deploying an observer mission in Armenia on the border with Azerbaijan. The EU also wants Armenia to participate in the Black Sea transmission cable project, contributing to the European continent's energy security.

This year, the partnership council agreed to start work on a new EU-Armenia partnership agenda. A document on high political commitment has been prepared, which should record the high level of political relations between Armenia and the European Union and agree on more concrete programmes. This is a higher-status document than the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement. Armenia should complete the implementation of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) by 2027. Currently, the agreement is 80% implemented. 

Thus, in two to three years, Armenia and the EU should summarize the implementation of the agreement and commit to raising relations to a new level. Theoretically, this could mean granting Armenia candidate status for EU membership.

Ursula von der Leyen, who is likely to continue presiding over the European Commission, has positive experience working with Armenia. The main issue at the April 5 meeting in Brussels with the participation of Pashinyan, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and von der Leyen, was increasing Armenia's resilience and economic resilience. The EU and the US intend to help Armenia mitigate risks, diversify trade, expand technological infrastructure, and strengthen economic and institutional resilience.

For its part, the United States is committed to enhancing Armenia's food security and facilitating the flow of agricultural products across Armenia's borders. The US and Armenia have a preliminary agreement on constructing an American nuclear power plant. The US has also included Armenia in the Middle Corridor project connecting Central Asia to Europe and Nato countries, but its implementation is tied to the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement.

The document agreed upon at the April 5 meeting lays serious groundwork for preparing Armenia's economy to shift toward Europe. Armenia has significant homework to cut off its economic dependence on Russia and move closer to the EU. This is a challenging task. Armenian businesses do not exert much effort to sell goods in the Russian market, as low-quality and cheap goods are easily sold. Armenian exports to Russia amounted to $7-8 billion in 2023. This is a significant share of Armenia's economy but has also created an unhealthy dependence on the Russian economy.

On April 5, the US and the EU essentially committed to supporting Armenia in raising its economic standards and entering European markets. Yerevan and Brussels are currently working to establish laboratories in Armenia to allow certified Armenian products to be exported to Europe without hindrance. Economic sector officials promise to ensure a positive outcome in trade route diversification in the next 1-2 years, as 3,000 Armenian companies have already modernized their equipment.

Economic risks

However, it will not be easy to sever Armenia's economic dependence on Russia, especially since Armenia's economy has doubled since 2020, nearing the $25 billion mark. A significant portion of this growth is due to exports to Russia. Armenia is one of the world's leaders in economic growth, but if Yerevan wants to join the European Union, it must take risks and leave the EEU. Armenia cannot be a member of two economic unions.

The Armenian government has indicated that it has calculated the economic and political sanctions Russia might impose in case of a sharp turn towards to the EU. To prevent Armenia's economy from collapsing due to Russian sanctions, the new EU leadership must be decisive in supporting Armenia. Only with economic guarantees will Pashinyan's government take the step of shaking up economic relations with Russia, knowing that it will create new security threats. 

To reduce energy dependence, the American side is supporting the Armenian government in developing and implementing a diversification and liberalization strategy.

High-ranking Armenian officials candidly admit off the record that politically, Yerevan will easily decide to join the EU. The idea of EU membership is popular in Armenia. However, they want Armenia's economic resilience to increase and get closer to European standards. In the case of Russian sanctions, Armenian producers must be ready to transition to European markets.Today, Armenia's economy is preparing for such a scenario. However, the process's efficiency can only be assessed at a critical moment. 

Pashinyan's government will likely take practical steps to apply for EU membership in 2026 during the parliamentary elections. It can be expected that the "Platform of Democratic Forces" and the "Civil Contract" will compete in 2026 to be the flagbearers of the European integration agenda. 

The loss of Nagorno-Karabakh and the periodic military attacks planned by Azerbaijan and Russia have undermined the Pashinyan government's positions. He needs to give voters a new reason to vote for the Civil Contract party. He will likely announce before 2026 that if Armenians want to see concrete steps towards EU membership, they must choose his political team. 

But if Brussels responds positively to Pashinyan’s raising of the issue in the coming months, the process of obtaining candidate status for the EU could accelerate.

The escalation of security threats against Armenia may also prompt Pashinyan to speed up the process. There is a prevailing view among Armenia's political elite that Azerbaijan will not dare to start a war against a country with EU candidate status.

Handling Russia

There is a perspective that Armenia is forced to maintain a balance or ambiguity between Russia and the West to increase its leverage. This might have worked until February 24, 2022. Pashinyan's government is now convinced that Russia threatens Armenia's independence and sovereignty. Moreover, Pashinyan has accused two CSTO member states, Belarus and Russia, of supporting Azerbaijan in preparing for war against Armenia.

Today, Pashinyan's government is heading towards freezing relations with Moscow. Pashinyan understands that leaving the CSTO would also mean leaving the EEU. Yerevan has suspended its participation in the CSTO, and it is only a de jure a member of this alliance. Armenian officials frequently express accusatory and critical remarks towards Moscow, freezing political contacts with Russian officials. 

Receiving only threats and dangers to its independence instead of support from Russia, Armenia has made deepening cooperation with the EU and the US its main tool for protecting its statehood. Armenia is deepening its cooperation with the West at Russia's expense. 

Yet the step of joining the EU will be a major earthquake in Armenian-Russian relations, and Yerevan must approach that day in good economic and security shape. Sharp anti-Russian steps can endanger the gradual distancing from Moscow.

Yerevan has chosen a subtle, smooth, and peaceful approach to disengagement, avoiding the noisy and dangerous experience of Georgia's former president Mikheil Saakashvili. Recently, Armenia and the USA have elevated their relations to the level of a strategic partnership commission. While postponing the exercise with Georgia, the USA is conducting an exercise with Armenia. The USA is involved in the reform of the Armenian Armed Forces.

Under the leadership of President Emmanuel Macron, France broke the taboo and is selling weapons to Armenia, which still holds CSTO membership. With France's support, the European Union very quickly deployed observers on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. On April 5, crucial economic projects were agreed upon. All this might have seemed like fantasy a year ago, but today it is a reality.

However, Armenia may lose an important partner in its European integration efforts  if Donald Trump is elected US president in November. Joe Biden's administration has elevated US-Armenia relations to a strategic level, which might be cancelled by Trump.

Armenia could also lose a powerful ally in France. If the right-wing populist forces continue their triumph in France and Macron loses his political support in parliament, French support might weaken. The likelihood of forming a right-wing populist government in France could not only end Paris's activity towards Armenia but also weaken the EU as a geopolitical actor. This could endanger the EU's enlargement policy and even cast doubt on Ukraine's membership.

Strengthening Macron's position in France and Biden's reelection would accelerate Armenia's European integration process and give more confidence to Pashinyan. 

Today, it is not possible to unequivocally assert that Armenia will not apply for EU membership. This depends primarily on the policies adopted by the member states of the European Union and the newly elected leadership of the EU regarding enlargement. If the parties opposing EU enlargement continue to win at the national level, Yerevan's European course might be halted or complicated.

For a long time, Viktor Orbán's government in Hungary impeded the process of providing 10 million euros in support from the European Peace Facility to Armenia. But eventually, Hungary gave its consent. Armenia is currently negotiating with individual EU countries on visa liberalization. It is understood that Austria, with a centre-right political government, has also posed certain difficulties in negotiations with Armenia. In the next elections, the far-right Freedom Party may win in Austria. This could also jeopardize the EU's enlargement policy.

Unexpectedly positive news comes from Iran. The election of the reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian as president will be favourable for Armenia's European integration agenda. Pezeshkian is a supporter of improving relations with the West and could approach Armenia's aspiration to join the EU with understanding. For Iran, the establishment of a Western military base in Armenia is a red line, while EU membership is seen as a chance for economic cooperation with the West. 

It will also be important that the Georgian Dream party of Bidzina Ivanishvili, whose pro-Russian stance threatens the country's EU membership, does not win in Georgia in October. By controlling Georgia, Russia could also close Armenia's path to Europe.

The referendum on EU membership is purely a technical process and not the most crucial. Armenia must become European in terms of economy, energy, security, democracy, human rights, and political system. Armenia needs to carry out internal procedures of European integration as efficiently as possible. 

Theoretically, Armenia can adopt European standards without joining the EU if geopolitical conditions are unfavourable. However, if Russia weakens in the war against Ukraine, if the administrations of Macron and Biden continue to govern, and if the EU member states and the European Commission continue their enlargement policy, Armenia will apply for candidate status for EU membership. Armenia is awaiting the formation of a new geopolitical status quo, where the collective West, with global ambitions, will have a dominant role.