After speaking in London earlier this week, the Saudi foreign minister, Prince Faisal bin Farhan al-Saud, was reported by the Guardian as saying he did not think the Saudis would have any additional demands as regards Iran’s civil nuclear programme than those presently outlined by the West, while adding: “I believe we can when we are at the table make it quite clear to the Iranians that this is not just a concern of distant countries, but it’s also a concern of its neighbours. Those neighbours would move into seeking better normal relations. So if we make clear that this is part of reassuring us, I think that may help them find it more acceptable to engage in such a process.”

One thing to Saudi Arabia’s advantage when it comes to relations with Iran is that Riyadh refused to join the Abraham accords that normalised relations between Israel and some Arab states in late 2020. The accords infuriated the Iranians who saw them as selling the Palestinians down the river.

Israel, meanwhile, has grown increasingly angry that Iran has been allowed to move to the point where it might soon be viewed as a nuclear threshold state. Hardly a day goes by without someone in the Israeli government warning that Israel would not tolerate such a status and would mount a military attack on Iranian nuclear facilities should it look like becoming imminent. The US is keeping its cards close to its chest on the matter, on the one hand advising all hope is not lost in terms of attempts to get talks on reviving the JCPOA back on track, but on the other hinting darkly that it would not stop short of joining bombing missions aimed at Iran if that’s what it would take to stop the Iranians from getting the atomic bomb.

For the Saudis, the decision to strike up new relations with Iran, via talks brokered by China, signals to the world that Riyadh will pursue a foreign policy independent of the West.

Prince Saud was further quoted as saying in London: “China is our largest trading partner. It is also the largest trading partner of most countries. And that is a reality that we will have to deal with. China, for us, is an important and valued partner in many areas. We have excellent working relationships across many sectors. But we have said and repeat this, always, we will look towards our own interests. And we will look for them in the west and in the east.”

With Iran already increasingly allied with Russia—sending combat drones to the Kremlin that are used in the Ukraine war and helping the Russians combat sanctions—geopolitical analysts will also look at what the new Saudi-Iranian situation might mean in terms of Riyadh potentially aligning more closely with Moscow. More cooperation between Moscow, Beijing, Riyadh and Tehran could spell trouble for Western capitals, and Ukraine.

As news of the agreement struck in Beijing came through, there were many in Iran who—possibly quite right—downplayed its significance, with some mentioning that perhaps it should be the Lebanese who are happiest of all as the deal might mean a bit more economic stability for Beirut, where the rivalry between Iranian and Saudi influences can be intense.

One analyst, who previously worked with the Iranian foreign ministry and asked to remain anonymous, concluded that the “deal is not as big as it seems,” adding that “symbolically it may sound big but strategically it doesn’t change how Tehran acts in the region”.

A former diplomat with the Iranian foreign ministry, who also asked for the withholding of his name, said: “The last Iranian leader who attempted to bridge the gap between Tehran and Riyadh was Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani [president of Iran from 1989 to 1997] and there seems to be no view that [current Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran] Ayatollah [Ali] Khamenei has changed his position on the Sunni state.”