With the 16th BRICS summit under way in Kazan, Russia, Kazakhstan is on the receiving end of mixed reactions from its northern neighbour as regards its recent communication that it has no plans to seek membership in the economic-cum-geopolitical bloc in the foreseeable future.  

Kazakhstan's spokesperson for the presidency, Berik Uali, explained last week that the country, an emerging middle power, intends to keep its focus on the United Nations as the primary international platform for addressing global challenges.

Astana’s choice not to join BRICS deals a setback to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attempts to position the bloc as a counterbalance to Western influence, as seen in established intergovernmental platforms such as the G7 (the forum that was named the G8 from 1997 to 2014, the year Russia was expelled from the group following its annexation of Crimea) and the sanctions imposed since early 2022 over Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. 

Initially, Russia’s reaction to Kazakhstan’s position on BRICS seemed tame. Putin’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov described Kazakhstan as a "friend and strategic partner" and noted that Moscow was still expecting Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to attend the summit in Kazan, where he will participate in extended meetings as a guest.
However, it wasn’t long before Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, in an interview with Argumenty i Fakty newspaper, called for clarification on Kazakhstan's BRICS standpoint.

"We need to clarify this position," Lavrov said. 

Emphasising that Kazakhstan is actively involved in several other international organisations, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), Lavrov noted that Kazakhstan's participation in these groups does not prevent it from engaging in global platforms like the UN.

Said Lavrov: "The organisation pays great attention to representatives of our Central Asian allies and strategic partners. None of this prevents either Kazakhstan or other Central Asian countries from actively participating in the United Nations, which is a universal structure, but which is currently experiencing a crisis through no fault of our own.

“It seems to me that ultimately our southern neighbours, allies in the CSTO, in the EEU [Eurasian Economic Union], first of all, will see for themselves the direct benefits of rapprochement with the BRICS. It is not necessary to join, but there is no doubt to cooperate in the implementation of specific projects [is possible]. This is in the interests of all of us."

Lavrov’s comments would appear to respond to Uali’s statement in terms of Kazakhstan’s focus on the UN as the primary international platform, a position that puts some distance between the country and Russia-led geopolitical blocs. His response would seem to remind Kazakhstan that as an ex-Soviet state it is still part of many Russia-led groups and that it is still in Astana’s interests to fall in line with BRICS-run projects. Lavrov’s tone, unlike that of Peskov before him, indicates that the Kremlin is not too pleased with Kazakhstan’s choice when it comes to BRICS.

For more evidence of Russian displeasure with Tokayev, some observers point to an expanding set of import bans lately applied by regulators in Russia on agricultural products coming from Kazakhstan.  

Tensions over growing trade battle

Russia's safety watchdog on agriculture, Rosselkhoznadzor, has lately imposed temporary bans on importing wheat, tomatoes, peppers, fresh melons, flax seeds and lentils from Kazakhstan. 

Kazakhstan, claimed the regulator, was guilty of failing to address certain phytosanitary concerns. Industry insiders saw Rosselkhoznadzor’s move as a response to a ban on importing Russian grain implemented by Kazakhstan until the end of this year to defend the interests of its own grain farmers.

Yet if this is a tit-for-tat, the timing of it in the run-up to the BRICS summit and in the wake of Uali’s statement, is bound to invite speculation that Moscow is serving a reminder to Kazakhstan that it is still very much economically dependent on its old strategic partner Russia (even as stories spread of Astana’s efforts to build up wheat exports to China). 

It is no secret that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led to the Central Asian states treading cautiously in ties with Russia. Kazakhstan in particular attempts to walk the line between remaining friendly to Russia and respecting sanctions on Moscow at least to the point where continuing trade with Russia does not prompt Western capitals to hit Astana with secondary sanctions.

Among Russian imperialist and nationalist ideologues, Moscow’s claim to northern parts of Kazakhstan once part of the Russian Empire have been heard since the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union. 

Astana’s efforts to remain unquestionably neutral on Ukraine are, on the one hand, configured to keep Russia calm and non-antagonistic, while, on the other, they are meant to keep the West happy enough to give Kazakhstan an easy time when it comes to any international decisions on Russia that could harm its economy, the largest in Central Asia. 

Michael Rossi, a faculty member in the Department of Political Science at Long Island University, wrote in an opinion piece for Geopolitical Monitor: “Kazakhstan’s decision on BRICS membership should not be seen as a rejection of its relationships with China and Russia.” 

“Ultimately, Kazakhstan’s decision on BRICS is pragmatic. While the Central Asian country enjoys strong trade and economic ties with both China and Russia, joining BRICS could compromise its position as a neutral state in global affairs,” Rossi noted. 

Kazakh political observer Gaziz Abishev shares similar views to Rossi. Abishev recently told local news agency Tengrinews that “BRICS is in some ways positioned as a counterbalance to the collective West and is used as an argument in the confrontational rhetoric of ‘hawks’ in the Eastern bloc. In this sense, Kazakhstan's joining BRICS would raise a number of additional questions regarding its peaceful multi-vector [foreign] policy, which could otherwise be converted into some form of diplomatic capital.”

"There is no hostility towards BRICS in Kazakhstan, quite the opposite. However, joining this organisation means either actively participating in its projects aimed at forming alternative global systems or becoming a barrier to their development. Neither of these options is of particular interest to Kazakhstan at this stage," Abishev concluded.

What remains unclear is whether Russian authorities understand Kazakhstan's decision as an attempt to remain neutral—a stance that frankly in the end-analysis is of considerable benefit to Russia, especially as it relies on Kazakhstan to lay on non-visible re-exports that help its economy, including its war economy, evade sanctions—or view it as an act designed to put more distance between the Kazakhs and their former colonial master. Kazakhstan must ensure that the Kremlin does not come to consider that it has a minor betrayal on its hands.