The election in Georgia on October 26 constituted a stress test for the EU for the countries that, along with Ukraine, have deeper relations with Brussels in Eastern Europe. The elections in Georgia on October 26 and Moldova on October 20 were the first time since the beginning of the Russian aggression against Ukraine that sympathies towards Brussels were tested. Although polls show support of over 80% for EU accession in Georgia, the parliamentary elections in Georgia have shown that the EU is having difficulty in influencing public perception in these countries.

Although the EU warned that the fate of Georgia as a candidate for EU accession would depend on how the elections were held, the government conducted the elections with various irregularities exposed by the opposition (vote buying, repeated voting, etc.). Despite EU warnings, many Georgian voters supported the ruling party, Georgian Dream, which won around 54% of the vote. However, in the Georgian legislative elections, the voting process was marred by vote-rigging techniques pointed out by the Georgian opposition.

This electoral exercise is an opportunity for the EU to identify the reasons for its influence in a credibility crisis. The events in Georgia call into question the EU’s ability to influence the behaviour of ruling elites, who underestimate the EU’s instruments of conditionality and sanctions. Access to non-Western financial resources and external legitimacy (including Turkey, China and Russia) is used by Georgian leaders as a way to escape or reduce personal and political risks that may result from possible European sanctions.

Post-election scenarios for Georgia

The elections, marked by several cases of irregularities, place the EU in a strategic dilemma regarding this South Caucasus country. Continuing dialogue with the ruling party in Georgia, which, according to the election results, will continue to dominate the decision-making process in the country, will discredit the image of the EU. Pro-European opposition forces in Georgia are counting on the West's failure to recognise the election results in order to exert external pressure and repeat the elections. 

At the same time, the EU understands that refusal to cooperate with the Georgian authorities will lead to the preservation of relations in a frozen state. In the absence of the EU, other regional and global geopolitical players will try to strengthen their positions in Georgia, such as Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, China or Iran. On the other hand, if the EU does not take an appropriate attitude to the events in Georgia, its credibility will be questioned in other candidate countries.

Hungary's involvement in the external legitimisation of the election results in Georgia is another blow to the country's image. In addition to not consulting Brussels during his visit to Moscow, dedicated to discussing "peace solutions" without Ukraine, Viktor Orban is preparing to visit Georgia to support the government. Taking advantage of Hungary's rotating EU presidency, Orban wants to convince Georgian public opinion that the EU recognises the results. This could be used by Georgian Dream to demobilise protests in the territory, where it won the majority of votes. There is a climate of post-election protests by the opposition, and the leader who represents the voice of the opposition is President Salome Zurabishvili, who enjoys credibility in European capitals.

Non-recognition of the election results by the opposition, but even more so by the EU, could lead the country into a new political crisis. There are two main scenarios that can develop, depending on the actions of the opposition and the support of the EU. The “Belarusian” scenario after the 2020 parliamentary elections, in which Alexander Lukashenko was fraudulently re-elected, can develop if the Georgian authorities resort to violence against post-election protests. In this case, political violence could lead to EU sanctions against elites (including Bidzina Ivanishvili), cancellation of the visa-free regime and suspension of trade benefits under the 2014 Association Agreement. The most radical measure the EU can take is to withdraw Georgia’s candidate status, which is currently frozen.

A second scenario that should not be ruled out is that of the Armenian “velvet revolution”, when protests led by Nikol Pashinyan overthrew Serge Sargsyan, who was trying to hold on to power in 2018, after 11 years in power as president and prime minister. This scenario developed in a peaceful manner and not in conditions of mass polarisation like those that persist in Georgia. 

The Georgian authorities would perceive this scenario as a “Euromaidan,” which the ruling party treats as a dangerous phenomenon of Western intervention. Such a scenario requires the mobilisation of the opposition on the one hand and the support of the EU and the United States on the other. But the situation in Georgia involves the interests of regional actors, such as Russia, Turkey and Azerbaijan. The first two see no problem in perpetuating the current government, which is particularly convenient for Russia, since the Georgian government participates in discrediting the EU’s influence in the region. Azerbaijan has already supported the election results and in the past criticised the Rose Revolution, perceived as a risk to its internal political stability.

The dilemma for the EU is to support a pro-EU democratic change in Georgia without generating the Belarusian scenario. This task is complicated because Hungary, Russia and Azerbaijan support the election results. If China joins in legitimising the elections, the EU will be isolated, especially if the US hesitates due to its own concerns about the presidential elections on November 5, after which former president Donald Trump wants to return to power.

In any case, the political crisis in Georgia will remain the biggest challenge for the EU among the candidate countries. If the situation in Georgia is not resolved, another Serbia may emerge in its political neighbourhood, with a hedging foreign policy, balancing between the EU and Russia and China.