After six months under a Russian-aligned Hungarian presidency of the EU Council, the leadership has now passed to Poland, a strong critic of Russia’s disruptive influence in Europe. Throughout the latter half of 2024, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban utilised the EU presidency to enhance Hungary's geopolitical standing in relations with Moscow. He also took it upon himself to use the EU’s voice, despite lacking a mandate, to engage on the global stage with leaders such as Donald Trump in the lead-up to his re-election and with Chinese officials. This compelled the EU to be vigilant and adopt a contingency discourse to counter Orban’s actions. The most concerning outcome of the Hungarian presidency was its potential to undermine the sense of European unity, which has been detrimental to Russia’s military strategy in Ukraine.

The conclusion of the Hungarian EU presidency brings relief to Brussels for two reasons. First, Poland is now in charge, with a clear agenda to counter Russia through three main strategies: increasing defence spending, protecting borders against hybrid threats, and combating disinformation and external interference. All three strategies are interconnected with Russia's military aggression against Ukraine. Second, Poland’s leadership of the EU Council is viewed positively, as it is one of the few large member states with a growing economy (4% GDP growth in the second quarter of 2024) and a stable political environment. The results of the October 2023 elections indicate that Eurosceptic factions are losing ground to pro-EU forces, as Poland is now governed by Prime Minister Donald Tusk, whose Civic Coalition has formed a strong alliance with the Third Way and the Left.

Three priorities of the Polish presidency in addressing Russian threats

The priorities of the Polish Presidency in the EU Council are significantly driven by the objective of addressing threats associated with Russia. Three out of the seven guiding priorities related to security explicitly reference Russia without naming it directly.

First, the primary goal is “defence and security,” emphasising that the EU must take the increase in military spending seriously. This focus will benefit the defence industry through increased funding and enhance the military capabilities of EU member states. Poland proposes that investments in the military sector should also support the modernisation of civilian infrastructure that can be repurposed for military use during times of war, as demonstrated in Ukraine. Specifically, Warsaw aims to bolster defence against Russia at two key locations: the Eastern Shield on the border with the Kaliningrad region and the Baltic Defensive Line that encompasses Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. There are high hopes that the newly established role of EU Defence Commissioner, led by Andrius Kubilius, will prioritise this aspect of the Polish presidency. However, Poland and the Baltic States face challenges in rapidly enhancing their cross-border military capabilities without support from EU structural funds.

The second priority on Poland’s agenda addresses border security and the issue of illegal migration. Warsaw emphasises that migration has increasingly become a hybrid instrument. The migration crises that arose on the borders of Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia in the autumn of 2021 prompted the EU to pay closer attention to its eastern borders before Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine began in February 2022. Authoritarian regimes in Belarus and Russia have exploited the EU’s more lenient human rights stance to undermine European borders and exacerbate public anxiety surrounding migration, which is influenced by the freedom of movement guaranteed by the Schengen area. According to Eurobarometer 2024, migration ranks among the top concerns of European citizens, alongside stability and peace. It is crucial to recognise that migration impacts the stability of democracies, particularly during election periods, and has significant implications for border security in the interim.

Finally, the Polish Presidency in the EU Council emphasises the importance of countering foreign interference as the third key priority for European security over the next six months. To combat the radicalisation of public opinion, Poland stresses the need to fight against disinformation, efforts that will enhance, and therefore protect, the democratic resilience of EU member states. Poland expresses its determination to improve coordination with the EU to combat disinformation, addressing challenges in both traditional and social media, as well as protecting the integrity of cyberspace. The country emphasises the importance of civic education and the involvement of civil society in fostering public media literacy as long-term strategies. Concerns remain about potential Russian disinformation interference in the 2024 European elections, particularly aimed at promoting pro-far-right votes, as well as during national elections in Member States like France and Romania, and in EU neighbours such as Georgia and Moldova. Russian interference in the electoral processes in Europe will likely continue into 2025. While Poland is largely resistant to Russian disinformation, it has shown some vulnerabilities, particularly regarding the amplification of nationalistic sentiments among specific professional groups (farmers) in response to “grain solidarity” with Ukraine during the 2022-2023 period.

The timing of Poland's presidency in the EU Council is advantageous for European strategic interests. Warsaw is a trusted partner for Brussels, especially when compared to Viktor Orban. Despite recent misunderstandings with the Ukrainian leadership regarding historical issues (“the Volhynia Massacre”), Poland plays a crucial role in ensuring ongoing EU support for Ukraine during the current Russian aggression.

The three priorities chosen by Poland for its six-month presidency in the EU to address Russian threats are not only pragmatic but also realistic in terms of implementation. However, the most urgent crisis that Poland must manage at the forefront of the EU is mitigating Russian hybrid attempts to exacerbate the energy deficit in Ukraine and the EU, as well as to weaponise this issue against intra-EU unity and pro-Ukraine solidarity.