The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states – Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman – are increasingly backing Russia in its geopolitical and economic standoff with the West, but they have stopped short of allying with the Kremlin, argues Nikolay Kozhanov, a Research Associate Professor at Qatar University, in a paper for Riddle.

The relationship between the Kremlin and the Persian Gulf Arab monarchies is more than a marriage of convenience but less a full-blown partnership. Since they became competitors with the US in global oil markets, the GCC nations are trying to establish themselves in the middle ground between East and West and become autonomous players on the international geopolitical stage while also plugging into the broader Muslim culture of Russia.

The perceived closeness between the GCC and Russia stems from the obvious economic benefits derived by Gulf states from their dealings with Moscow, including cooperation within the OPEC+ framework to stabilise oil prices, which the Kremlin studiously ignored for years until signing up in December 2016 after the international sanctions regime following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s annexation of the Crimea two years earlier. Putin has gone out of his way to woo the Arab states, notably the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), as he attempts to rebuild Russia’s international relations, focusing on the Global South. That has been welcomed by the GCC countries looking for a counterbalance to the US, as their relations with Washington have soured since the shale revolution in 2016.

However, while embracing Putin’s vision of a “multipolar world” that he laid out in his recent Valdai speech, the GCC is also careful to hold the Kremlin at arm’s length.

Economic pragmatism over alliance

Economic ties between Russia and key Arab Persian Gulf states have expanded since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. Russian-UAE trade surged from $5.3bn in 2021 to $11.2bn in 2023, while Russian-Saudi trade increased by $1.1bn during the same period. Beyond trade, those countries have leveraged Russia's economic pivot to Asia to enhance their food and energy security. Russian hydrocarbons, agrarian products and IT have found a receptive market in the region, underscoring a pragmatic rather than ideological partnership.

“Russia has become more involved in ensuring the food and energy security of the Gulf since 2022,” noted in November.

The Gulf’s role in the International North-South International Transport Corridor (INSTC), mainly through Iran's Chabahar and the UAE's port of Fujairah, has also been critical for Russia's access to Asian and African markets. Multilateral cooperation, such as the UAE joining BRICS in 2024 and strategic dialogue within OPEC+, underscores the alignment of economic interests but stops short of solidifying a formal alliance.

A calculated neutrality

On the geopolitical front, the Arab GCC nations navigate a delicate balance. While Saudi Arabia and the UAE avoid openly criticising Moscow, Kuwait and Qatar have condemned Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Diplomatic circles in the Persian Gulf continue to prioritise their alliance with the United States, demonstrating restraint in sanction circumvention when US pressure mounts. As Kozhanov highlights, “The GCC does not see Ukraine as ‘their’ conflict.” Instead, economic stability, energy security and the reshaping of US regional influence dominate their calculus.

The GCC’s policies towards Moscow are shaped by the region’s shifting relationship with Washington. Limited US responses to regional security crises and threats like the NOPEC bill have pushed Gulf states to diversify their partnerships while maintaining strong US ties. This balancing act extends to Russia, with GCC nations willing to engage economically, provided it does not harm relations with the West.

The fear of sanctions mechanisms, such as the EU’s price cap on Russian oil, being replicated against them also aligns Gulf monarchies with Moscow’s positions. Yet such alignment remains tactical, aimed at maximising economic benefit and minimising exposure to global energy volatility.

Not allies but strategic partners

Essentially, the GCC’s interaction with Russia demonstrates strategic pragmatism rather than an attempt to form alliances and follows that of Iran, which has also become closer to Moscow in recent years with its observer member status in the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and membership of BRICS along with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Economic and political collaboration is based on mutual advantages rather than ideological similarities. It is improbable that this relationship will develop into a strong partnership or an alliance, as both sides know the more considerable geopolitical limitations and their individual national interests.

Future changes will hinge on developments in global energy patterns, the shifting role of the US in the Gulf region and the capacity of both parties to adjust to a more multipolar global landscape. While the GCC may continue to act as a “fellow traveller” alongside Russia, the relationship is expected to remain pragmatic, transactional and limited.

 

Nikolay Kozhanov is a Research Associate Professor at Qatar University and a non-Resident Scholar at the Economics and Energy Program of the Middle East Institute (Washington DC).

These comments first appeared in Riddle here. Riddle is an independent media outlet focusing on independent analysis of Russia and a bne IntelliNews media partner. Follow on Twitter @RiddleRussia