As Syrian opposition groups and Damascus engage in negotiations over the country's political future, one relationship appears set to endure regardless of the outcome: Syria's deep economic and military dependence on Russia.

The ties binding Damascus to Moscow have only strengthened in recent years, creating a web of interdependence that any future Syrian leadership would struggle to unravel, according to regional analysts and trade data.

In recent years Syria has become increasingly dependent on Russia for two things: wheat and arms.

Syria needs Russian wheat imports to feed its war-weary population. Syria imports between 1.2 and 1.5mn tonnes per year (tpy) of wheat from Russia, making food security a powerful lever of Russian influence. The significance of this dependence is particularly stark given that the original spark of the Syrian revolution in 2011 occurred when climate change destroyed crop yields in Aleppo, Homs and elsewhere, forcing unemployed people into cities.

"The wheat trade alone gives Moscow significant leverage over Syria's future," said a Middle Eastern food security analyst who requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of the topic. "Any leadership in Damascus, including opposition groups, would need to maintain cordial relations with Russia simply to keep bread on Syrian tables."

Previously, Russia with Ukraine dominated the international business in tradeable wheat, but since the war in Ukraine started, Ukraine’s role has been greatly diminished leaving countries in the Middle East and Africa, which import large amounts of their wheat, increasingly dependent on Moscow for food.

Military collapse of the new regime

Russian arms imports mushroomed following the outbreak of the war in Syria in 2011, but after Israel just destroyed almost all of the Syrian Arab Armed Forces (SAAF) materiel in the last few days, the new government of Syria’s need to rearm just took on a new urgency. Russia will be the main source for all the tanks, planes, guns and ammo that the government needs to re-equip its armed forces.

Israeli strikes have destroyed over 90% of Syria's surface-to-air missile stockpiles, according to Israeli military statements, and obliterated what was considered one of the Middle East's most robust air defence networks.

The strikes also destroyed multiple Syrian fighter squadrons, including two squadrons of Russian-made Su-22 and Su-24 jet fighter bombers at Damascus-area bases, along with military helicopters, drones, cruise missiles and radar installations.

Israel has also moved to secure positions in the Golan Heights buffer zone that had separated Israeli and Syrian forces since 1974, with Prime Minister Netanyahu describing it as a "temporary defensive measure." With Iran stepping back from its traditional support role following Assad's departure to Russia via Abu Dhabi, the security situation has deteriorated rapidly.

"The destruction of Syrian military assets by Israel creates an immediate need for replacements, and Russia stands as the de facto arms supplier," said a defence analyst based in Beirut. "With Western sanctions blocking traditional arms markets and few countries willing to risk diplomatic fallout, Moscow has become Syria's arms dealer of necessity, not just choice."

Russia has historically been Syria's primary arms supplier, providing 78% of Syria's weapons imports between 2007 and 2012. It would take a Herculean effort now for Turkey to replace Russia as arms dealer du jour, considering the massively fragmented state of the ruling Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its bandit-like allies now rein over in the country.

The situation poses particular challenges for the new "Islamist-lite" government backed by HTS. Despite historical wariness of Russian influence, the need for security guarantees has become paramount as various actors, including Israel, seize territory in the southern Damascus countryside and Mount Hermon region.

Reconstruction challenges

Beyond military hardware, Syria desperately needs construction materials and industrial equipment to rebuild its war-torn infrastructure. Here again, Russia has positioned itself as an essential partner, supplying steel, iron and industrial machinery. Western sanctions on both countries have pushed them closer together, with Russia seeing Syria as a valuable market for goods it struggles to sell elsewhere – now the question remains whether the EU and the US pull sanctions overnight off the country. If Iraq next door is anything to go by, the US took years to remove sanctions from the country after the fall of Saddam Hussein (despite ruling the country for several years); that timeframe and historic so-called “sanction drag” do not bode well for the rag-tag nature of the current regime.

"The reconstruction requirements are enormous, and with Western sanctions in place, Russia becomes not just the preferred partner but often the only viable option," said a Damascus-based economist speaking on condition of anonymity to bne IntelliNews.

He added: “What we need now is a complete removal of sanctions, banking connections to be reconnected to SWIFT, a return of the country’s assets frozen in several countries and loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and others to rebuild the economy,” he noted. “I genuinely believe that we are going to struggle to get any of those things in order when we are still in a long ‘de-Baathification’ period. 

While the West is happy to see Assad go – regime change in Syria has been a long-stated goal of US foreign policy – Washington will be nervous about offering unfettered support to the HTS-backed regime, due to the group’s passed Al Qaida ties. That means the lifting of sanctions will be a long and tortuous process, if it happens at all.

This economic reality poses a particular challenge for opposition groups like HTS, which have historically been wary of Russian influence. Yet pragmatism may well override ideology, as any future government needs to maintain access to Russian wheat, military equipment and reconstruction materials.

"The opposition groups understand that governing requires practical solutions," said an analyst based out of Berlin. "They may not like Russia's role in the conflict, but they cannot ignore the economic realities that have developed over the past decade. Like many of Russia’s allies that have emerged in the last two years as part of Putin’s “multipolar world order” they will try to sit on the fence, accepting Russia’s trade, but at the same time try to avoid becoming a vassal state.”  

Strategy for Russia

For Russia, maintaining influence in Syria serves multiple strategic objectives, with its military bases at Tartus and Khmeimim being particularly crucial. "Do these Russian bases pose any threat to Syria's new leadership? The answer is unequivocally no," said Vasily Korchmar, a former Russian Foreign Ministry envoy. "While rental fees for the bases may increase, there's currently no discussion of closing them." Russia signed a 49-year lease deal with Assad on the bases.

Amongst the dangers is the potential break-up of the country into fiefdoms under the control of various military fractions, as has happened in Libya where the country has been split into two under competing regimes after the Nato-backed ousting of Muammar Gaddafi.

Syria's territorial fragmentation has already begun, with multiple international actors carving out spheres of influence. "Syrian territory has become an arena of geopolitical confrontation, where each actor seeks to strengthen its interests," said Sawsan al-Abtah, a political analyst quoted in Asharq Al-Awsat. It remains to be seen if the HTS-backed interim government can prevent the complete break-up of the country and reimpose unified control from the centre.

Despite public statements suggesting distance from the Syrian conflict, the US maintains a key coordinating role. "Turkey and Israel's military operations in Syria are carried out in close coordination with the American leadership. There are tacit agreements on the delimitation of zones of influence, including Kurdish territories," al-Abtah noted.

Russian officials, meanwhile, have signalled a pragmatic approach to the transition. Deputy head of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev notably attributed the fall of Assad's regime to "mistakes made in governing the country," suggesting Moscow's willingness to work with new leadership.

The question may no longer be whether Syria will maintain its partnership with Russia, but rather how future Syrian leaders will negotiate the terms of this relationship. "The first priority of any new government will be rebuilding the economy, social sphere, returning refugees and other critical issues of restoring state functions," Korchmar noted.