China’s failure to show up for Ukraine’s Swiss peace summit in mid-June was a major setback in Kyiv’s attempts to set a new benchmark for the international support of its military struggle with Russia and an attempt to rally the Global South to its cause.

Rather than increase Russia’s isolation, the summit highlighted the increasing polarity amongst the world’s nations and drove more of the Global South more clearly into the Sino-Russian camp.

The peace summit in Switzerland was envisioned by Ukraine as an event for heads of state (or at least senior officials) from all over the world, not just Ukraine’s traditional partners in the West.

The aim was to strengthen international pressure on Moscow to force it to the negotiating table. For this reason, Kyiv was hoping the leaders of countries who don’t usually try to exert pressure on Russia would show up. Many didn’t come, including those with the most leverage over Russia such as China, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Brazil, Pakistan and many other leading Global South countries.

“Above all, Kyiv wanted China to attend. To tempt Beijing, Ukraine even agreed in advance to take some of the most sensitive questions off the table – such as the withdrawal of Russian troops from internationally recognised Ukrainian territory. In the end, three points from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s 10-peace plan [presented to the G7 in November 2022] were discussed: nuclear safety, food security, and prisoner exchanges. Two of these are of crucial importance for China, and all three feature on China’s own peace plan for Ukraine [presented on the first anniversary of the start of the war],” said Temur Umarov, a fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Centre in a recent paper.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has urged European leaders to prioritise nuclear safety and food security amidst the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. This comes as Beijing shows growing concern over issues affecting its own national interests, particularly food security.

President Xi raised the nuclear safety issue with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, highlighting the potential dangers posed by the conflict.

China's heightened interest in food security stems from its position as the primary recipient of grain under the Black Sea grain deals established during the initial stages of the war. The stability of these agreements is crucial for China, which relies heavily on the import of grain to meet its domestic needs.

"Prisoner exchanges are such a straightforward humanitarian issue that they shouldn’t be a problem for China," Umarov noted.

However, China’s participation was ruled out from the start, despite Bankov’s vigorous lobbying. Russian President Vladimir Putin was also assiduously lobbying Chinese President Xi Jinping, travelling to Beijing a few weeks before for another high-profile meeting with the Chinese leader to strengthen their already “no limits” relationship.

While Beijing also lobbied delegates to the Swiss summit to put real peace talks on the agenda, while it is at the same time facing escalating pressure from the US over its support of Russia and rising tensions in the South China Sea, Beijing has made the strategic choice of siding with Russia in the growing geopolitical crisis.

“But China refused to take part at all. All the efforts of Germany, France and Ukraine were in vain – and Russia emerged looking like the winner,” Umarov said.

Beijing gave three reasons for its decision: that the format was not recognised by both parties to the conflict; Russia was not invited; and the summit only discussed points from Zelenskiy’s peace plan, ignoring other peace initiatives (in other words, China’s peace proposals).

“Xi has also talked about four other demands when it comes to ending the conflict: not pursuing self-interest, not pouring oil on the fire, not allowing escalation and reducing the negative consequences for the global economy. China’s meaning is clear: Western countries are selfishly unwilling to [put] pressure [on] Kyiv, and continue to provide political cover for Ukraine’s maximalist demands,” said Umarov.

China’s failure to even sit on the fence has led Ukraine to toughen its rhetoric; for the first time since the start of the war, Ukraine directly criticised China in June during the IISS Shangri-La summit attended by Zelenskiy.

The Swiss “peace” summit has been ridiculed as German Chancellor Olaf Scholz admitted that peace was not on the agenda at all. All the substantive items in Zelenskiy peace plan that dealt with bringing the conflict to an end were removed from the agenda and no alternative peace plans were considered.

“Beijing realised that it was Ukrainian officials setting the agenda in Switzerland, and that participants were supposed to simply nod along in agreement,” Umarov said. Xi earlier suggested in a meeting with Scholz that Russia’s participation in the peace summit was a point of principle for Beijing.

According to Umarov, Beijing believes it has already gone as far as it needs to. In recent meetings with senior US officials, including US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, Xi has emphasised the need for compromise and reconciliation, but was met with aggressive rhetoric and threats of sanctions and trade tariffs. Beijing’s efforts to lobby the Swiss delegates to expand the agenda also fell on deaf ears.

“China is convinced it has done enough work when it comes to advancing the cause of peace in Ukraine: that the appointment of Li Hui and the publication of a peace plan is sufficient. Now it believes it’s up to the West to pressure Ukraine to sit down and negotiate with Putin,” says Umarov.

The stonewall that Beijing faces in the West means that Xi has turned its attention to moving closer and better coordinating the Global South countries. Although many of these are not happy with Russia’s open aggression, they share the “multipolar” world view of Beijing and Moscow and are unhappy with Washington’s proclivity to pursue openly aggressive economic policies embodied in the “America First” rhetoric.

It is notable that the 78 countries that signed off on the watered down Swiss final statement is well down on those that voted to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at the various United Nations meetings in 2022; the first vote in the UN in March 2022 was almost unanimously against Russia, with only five voting against and 35 abstaining.

The next step will be for China to organise its own, more inclusive, peace summit where Russia will be invited to attend. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi called for just such a “real” peace conference at a recent BRICS summit held in Russia.

“Beijing is likely to seek out countries in the Global South that hold positions similar to its own. China has already released a joint statement with Brazil on resolving the conflict that it claims is “approved by a growing number of countries.”

If China goes ahead with an attempt to organise its own peace summit then the tables will be turned as it will be Beijing’s turn to lobby Zelenskiy to attend, which will be difficult to do. Nevertheless, even if this effort fails, Beijing is a winner in almost all scenarios, which will only earn it more credits, particularly in the Global South, where its main foreign policy interests lie today.

“Almost any outcome allows Beijing to portray itself as a “responsible” global power that, unlike the hypocritical West, is seeking real peace. That angle will find a receptive audience in many countries of the Global South,” says Umarov.