The Turkish government has been at it again, trampling on “Kurdish” and other opposition ballot box outcomes that stick in its craw. On January 13, it arrested the co-mayors of a municipality held by pro-Kurdish party DEM and appointed trustees.

The move concerns Akdeniz district of the city of Mersin on the Mediterranean coast. It came on the same day that the mayor of Istanbul’s Besiktas municipality was taken into custody. Besiktas was still under the control of Turkey’s main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) as the government was yet to appoint a trustee to replace the detained mayor.

Officials put forward “legal” reasons for such arrests and the seizing of municipalities. But these so-called reasons are simply for fooling the fools. The actions are political. And the decisions initiating such actions are taken by Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Since the last local elections, held in March last year, the government has seized nine municipalities, namely seven held by DEM and two held by CHP.

DEM-held Hakkari—a city and provincial centre, located on a stretch of border with Iran and Iraq—in June became the first of the nine municipalities to be seized.

In October, Esenyurt municipality—a district in Istanbul, held by the CHP—was seized.

In November, the DEM-held municipalities of the city of Mardin, located on the border with Syria, the city of Batman, found to the north of Mardin, and Halfeti, a district in Sanliurfa on the border with Syria, were taken over by the Erdogan administration.

In November, the DEM-controlled municipality of Tunceli/Dersim, a city and provincial centre in eastern Anatolia, and the CHP-held administration covering Ovacik, a town in Tunceli province, were grabbed.

Empowered after failed coup

Following the failed coup attempt of July 2016, Erdogan the next month empowered himself via a presidential decree to appoint trustees to administrate municipalities, meaning de facto that seizures were permitted.

In the 2014 local elections, the Kurdish party BDP won control of 102 municipalities. Between 2016 and the next polls held in 2019, Erdogan seized 95 of them, including three metropolitan municipalities in addition to seven provincial centres, 62 towns and 23 districts.

The Van, Mardin, Diyarbakir, Batman, Sirnak, Hakkari, Bitlis, Tunceli and Siirt ve Agri municipalities were removed from BDP control.

In the 2019 polls, the predominant pro-Kurdish party, then named HDP, won 65 municipalities. In the time prior to the next polls, in 2024, Erdogan seized 48 of them, including three metropolitan municipalities in addition to five provincial centres, 45 towns and 12 districts.

In the 2024 polls, the current main pro-Kurdish party, DEM, won 78 municipalities, namely three metropolitan municipalities, seven provincial centres, 58 towns and 10 districts.

So far, seven have gone over to enforced government control.

On June 4 last year, after Erdogan the day before seized the first Kurdish municipality (Hakkari as related above), just two months after the voters had spoken, bne IntelliNews noted: “In the coming period, Erdogan will seize almost all DEM's municipalities one by one as he did after the previous local elections held in 2019.”

Real target is Imamoglu

As is clear from the procession of events, the seizure of a Kurdish-held municipality has become a “dog bites man” story in the post-coup era. However, in the new local government cycle that began with the March 2024 poll results, the seizing of a CHP municipality has emerged as a new phenomenon.

On June 13, after the detention of the Besiktas mayor, the CHP’s leader, Ozgur Ozel, reiterated: “The real target is [Istanbul mayor Ekrem] Imamoglu.”

It does not take an Einstein to identify the real target. Even the not-so-sharp Ozel is aware of it. Imamoglu has for the past few years faced a series of lawsuits. In tandem with the cases comes more “legal reasoning” from officials, but, in common with the explanations offered for the moves against the mayors, this is just for fooling the mainstream media’s audience.

Imamoglu is not just flexible. He is liquid. This shape-shifter is able to take the form of any “pot” he wishes. Erdogan sees him as a real threat and so hangs his Sword of Damocles over Imamoglu’s head.

Talks with Ocalan

The government, meanwhile, has been holding talks with Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan, who, abducted in Nairobi by Turkish agents 25 years ago, remains imprisoned in a high-security jail on a Turkish island.

Seizing Kurdish municipalities might seem contradictory to apparent efforts to negotiate with the PKK. The mainstream media has been reporting that “the parties are aiming to solve the four-decade-old Turkey-PKK conflict”. But it seems the talks cannot be about solving the wider Kurdish question. The clashes with the Kurds also continue in Syria and Iraq.

The parties holding the talks are the same men that created the problem. They have been sending young men to kill each other.

The average age of those in the talks stands at around 80. They are all male. No-one is able to untie his own shoelaces. All of them have armed men at their disposal. These geriatric guys are the leftovers, the curse of the previous millennium that cannot be gotten rid of.

According to NewsBase, Turkey is keen to play a role in revitalising the Syrian energy sector. If Syrians solve their problem with access to electricity, the Kurdish question will also be solved. In other words, nothing will ever happen until the boomers get off their shabby rears or are no more.

Needs must

After Trump takes office on January 20—a fresh boost for the global gang of blood-thirsty boomers—Erdogan may find himself in a needs-must position that makes it necessary to recognise the de facto Kurdish regional government in northern Syria just as he recognised the Kurdish regional government (KRG) in Iraq.

Those parties that are holding talks in Turkey are getting ready for the day.