In Kazakhstan, it is considered common knowledge that the result of the upcoming October 6 referendum on whether the country should construct a nuclear power plant (NPP) can only go one way—and not for edifying reasons. The way the authorities have in recent weeks cracked down on dissenting voices against the construction has cemented this perception. 

“Many experts believe the outcome of the upcoming referendum is largely predetermined, as the Kazakh government has already made statements emphasizing the need for nuclear power. The government recently conducted a series of public hearings and polls, which indicated that 53% of the population supports the idea,” Kuat Dombay, director at the Centre for Central Asia Studies “C5+” and a former career diplomat at the Kazakh Ministry of Foreign Affairs, wrote in an opinion piece for TGP.

The latest state-run nationwide survey of public sentiment on the nuclear power issue, conducted by the Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies, found that 72% of 1,200 respondents expressed support for building the NPP.

It seems more or less safe to assume that a referendum result in favour of adopting nuclear power is a foregone conclusion. What is not a foregone conclusion is whether or not prospects that will stem from the plant’s construction will truly bode well for the country’s future and whether or not Russia—or, more specifically, it’s state-run atomic energy corporation Rosatom, promoted heavily by the Kremlin—will be the one to build the plant. 

Energy gap

First off, Kazakhstan currently runs 220 power plants with a total output of 20.4 GW, including 2.8 GW from renewable energy sources. In a recent statement, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev outlined the goal of doubling the nation's GDP by 2029, which would necessitate a significant increase in energy capacity.

Projections suggest that by 2029, the country will require an extra 14 GW of power, of which at least 6.2 GW would ideally come from renewables, and that by 2035, total domestic energy demand will rise to 24 GW.

In expanding its green energy sector, the government aspires to stick to its commitments under the “Paris 2060” agreement and even commence exports of renewables to Europe.

Achieving this ambitious goal without the incorporation of nuclear power appears rather unlikely. 

Currently, around 80% of Kazakhstan's electricity is produced via coal-fired power plants, whereas another 15% comes from hydropower and the rest from renewables.

First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Akan Rakhmetullin wrote in a recent opinion piece published by the South China Morning Post: “Our country has several reasons to consider nuclear energy. A primary factor is the rapidly growing energy consumption. In 2023, Kazakhstan became a net importer of electricity as it struggled with a power deficit. While we continue to develop renewable energy, particularly wind and solar, only nuclear power can provide the large-scale, stable supply needed.”

“Second, Kazakhstan holds almost 45 per cent of the world’s uranium reserves, making it a leading producer and exporter. Rather than limiting its role to uranium mining and fuel pod exports, Kazakhstan aims to enrich uranium to industry standards for domestic energy production,” Rakhmetullin noted. 

Kazakh officials also contend that the country requires broader expertise to capitalise on its status as the world’s leading uranium producer, with an annual output of 21.3mn tonnes, far surpassing Canada’s 7.3mn tonnes.

“By developing nuclear energy, Kazakhstan can diversify its energy mix, reducing dependence on fossil fuels and enhancing energy security. Moreover, it would enhance Kazakhstan’s position in the global nuclear energy market, transitioning from a raw material supplier to a country with advanced nuclear technology capabilities,” James Walker, CEO and head of reactor development at NANO Nuclear Energy, told The Times of Central Asia in an interview.

Public sensitivities, environmental issues

“The idea of pursuing nuclear energy is highly sensitive in Kazakh society due to the legacy of hosting the USSR’s nuclear tests—489 nuclear explosions were conducted by the Soviet military in Semipalatinsk, Central Kazakhstan, from 1949 until 1989, leaving thousands of victims,” “C5+” centre director Dombay wrote. 

Environmental concerns further complicate the issue. Rapidly growing demand for water along China’s section of the Ili River, which supplies 80% of the water found in Lake Balkhash, jeopardises the stability of the lake, in proximity to the southern shore of which the NPP is to be built by the village of Ulken.

The additional strain of water withdrawal for cooling purposes at the nuclear plant, combined with the pollution risks the facility brings, only heightens the environmentalists’ anxieties.

All in all, the introduction of the plant could pose a serious threat to the region’s water security, especially given that the lake serves as a critical source of drinking water for Almaty, Kazakhstan’s largest city and commercial capital, which is home to over 2mn people.

Moreover, Almaty Region is infamously prone to earthquakes. The city is considered to be overdue for a major earthquake. Those Kazakh citizens who oppose the power plant’s construction fear for the safety of the power plant in the event of such an earthquake in the region.

With all of these weighty issues in mind, one would assume that Kazakhstan would look for the safest possible site for the plant’s construction, but observers generally appear to be expecting that Russia’s Rosatom will be asked to take on the mantle where safety is concerned. 

Downsides of a Rosatom partnership

“Creating an international consortium with Rosatom would inevitably raise the risk of falling under the Rosatom Sanctions Enforcement Act, currently under review by the U.S. Congress. President Biden has already banned imports of Russian uranium, Finland cancelled its contract with Rosatom to build the Hanhikivi 1 nuclear power plant two years ago, and Turkey’s Akkuyu power plant, which is nearly complete [It’s status is highly debatable—Ed’s note] and set to be operated by Rosatom, is already facing delays,” Dombay observed in his opinion piece. 

Thus, given that Kazakhstan has been attempting to avoid getting hit by the West’s secondary sanctions in relation to Moscow, there is still a small chance that other international players might end up being chosen to construct the NPP.

Competitors to Russia

China National Nuclear Corporation, which has offered to construct a 1.2-GW NPP in Kazakhstan at a cost of $2.8bn, with an expected construction time of five years, is the second most likely candidate when it comes to selecting the general contractor. China’s political and economic ties with Kazakhstan very much rival those of Russia, but Beijing does not hold the same sway over the country’s uranium mining sector. Russia’s other advantage over China remains in the form of a shared Soviet past.   

In contrast, South Korea’s Korea Electric Power Corporation may have a competitive advantage in building cost-effective, high-quality nuclear reactors, but Seoul lacks the strong geopolitical connections to Kazakhstan that Moscow and Beijing have established. Walker told The Times of Central Asia that he thinks this makes South Korea a “less likely candidate” than Russia or China for the NPP construction contract. 

Also unlikely to pick up the NPP deal is, in Walker’s view, France. 

“Companies like EDF [Electricite de France] or Framatome have significant experience and a reputation for high safety and environmental standards. However, European involvement would likely come with strict regulatory requirements and potentially higher costs, which might be less attractive to Kazakhstan compared to the more financially flexible and geopolitically aligned options presented by Russia or China,” Walker was quoted saying.

So, practically speaking, what makes Rosatom the more realistic option for Kazakhstan?

Rosatom dominates with roughly 70% of the global export market in NPP construction, particularly in Global South emerging economies intent on expanding their energy production. Such countries are increasingly turning to Moscow for both nuclear plants and fuel. Russia has positioned itself as a key supplier of nuclear technology to these countries, using Rosatom as a diplomatic tool, similar to how Gazprom has been used in the natural gas sector. 

This approach, often referred to as “international clientelism,” allows Russia to strengthen ties with Global South countries. The results have been evident in UN votes on condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with various country votes made in support of the Kremlin, or held back in abstentions.

Rosatom has secured numerous contracts for reactor sales around the globe, making it an international leader in nuclear reactor construction. Three units are being built in Russia, while there are another 33 in various stages of development abroad. The company also controls around 20% of the global market for materials related to nuclear fuel conversion and enrichment. That means Rosatom remains, for now, an indispensable partner even for Western powers.

Although there has been debate about banning imports of Russian nuclear fuel in Europe and the US, both markets remain highly dependent on the supplies. Entirely severing ties would be a tall order, despite political rhetoric suggesting otherwise.

Russian sway over Kazakh uranium

In 2008, Rosatom took control of Kazakh stakes in Uranium One Group, a Canadian-based company responsible for international uranium operations. 

But Rosatom’s drive to control Kazakh uranium did not end there. The Russian firm went on to acquire a 49% stake in the Budyonovskoe deposit—the largest uranium field in Kazakhstan, previously owned by the Kazakh state— in 2022. And, notably, since 2019, Russian President Vladimir Putin has taken a personal interest in proposing that Rosatom build an NPP  in Kazakhstan. 

As a result of all these developments, Russian companies currently control about 25% of Kazakhstan’s uranium production. 

Nuclear power technology and uranium provision is clearly make up a major tool for the Kremlin in terms of maintaining Central Asia within its sphere of influence through energy. This is also seen in Uzbekistan’s awarding, earlier this year during a visit from Putin, of a commission to Rosatom to construct six small nuclear reactors that will make up Central Asia’s first NPP.

A Russian nuclear plant in Kazakhstan would obviously make Astana vitally reliant on Rosatom for maintenance and parts, ensuring Kazakhstan’s energy sector would remain tied to Russian interests. That would have a big influence on to what extent Kazakhstan would stay within Moscow's geopolitical orbit.

So, to conclude. Provided the government clears the referendum hurdle—and the sceptics scoff at any idea of it not doing so—Rosatom will likely come into full view as a logical choice in NPP delivery.

“Rosatom has been actively involved in Kazakhstan’s nuclear sector for years, including uranium mining and nuclear fuel cycle activities. This established presence, coupled with Russia’s geopolitical influence in Central Asia, makes Rosatom a strong contender,” Walker summarised.

Only time will tell whether Kazakhstan will remain bound to Russia in its nuclear power development aspirations.