Kazakhstan’s Tokayev’s regime “has learned how to create the illusion of change while doing little of substance”, according to two analysts.

“Big ideas—like that of a ‘new Kazakhstan’—have turned out to be simply efforts to fill the vacuum left by years of political stagnation. Genuine reform would entail the introduction of meaningful constraints on the power and privilege of Kazakhstan’s rulers. But the regime is obviously not ready for such a step,” write Aliya Tlegenova and Serik Beysembaev, in an assessment published by Carnegie Politika.

Despite his pledges of change, Kazakh president of five years standing Kassym-Jomart Tokayev increasingly appears to be “embracing the role of an authoritarian, patriarchal leader”, suggest Tlegenova—a researcher at Paperlab Research Center in Astana, Kazakhstan, and a political scientist who specialises on themes such as the politics of development, protests and civil society in Central Asia—and Beysembaev—director of Paperlab and an analyst who specialises on governmental politics, public opinion and violent extremism prevention in Kazakhstan.

The dawning of 2022 marked a critical crossroads for Kazakhstan. The “Bloody January” civil unrest that spread across the country posed a serious threat to Tokayev’s hold on power. In response, he launched both a violent crackdown and a programme of reform.

“But little has actually changed in Kazakhstan,” say the two analysts. “As Tokayev has succeeded in consolidating his grip on power, he appears unafraid of tightening the screws even further. Society has descended into apathy that has been fostered by fear and disappointment.”

Tokayev was handpicked by his predecessor, Nursultan Nazarbayev, who had served as president for three decades since Kazakhstan gained its post-Soviet independence. As noted by Tlegenova and Beysembaev, he only became a powerful figure in his own right after the 2022 unrest, during which demonstrators demanded the full removal of Nazarbayev from the political scene. Tokayev grabbed the chance to take himself out of the former president’s shadow, purging those who were considered close to him.

“No one,” say Tlegenova and Beysembaev, “now questions Tokayev’s authority. He is firmly in control of Kazakhstan’s ‘power vertical,’ and all top officials are loyal to him personally. However, in order to cement his victory, Tokayev was also obliged to seek a degree of popular support.

“To this end, he announced a program of reforms in March 2022 to deliver a ‘New Kazakhstan’. The plans included the liberalization of Kazakhstan’s party system, electoral reform, and limits on the powers enjoyed by the head of state. They were supposed to foster democratization and rid Kazakhstan of Nazarbayev’s toxic legacy.”

At the time, the analysts observe, Tokayev emphasised that he was pursuing the path of reform despite officials and experts urging him to preserve the status quo. As his stock centered on promises of a “New Kazakhstan” rose, he even gained something of a reputation as a reformer in the West.

But, say Tlegenova and Beysembaev, “it would have been naïve… to expect systemic change. Real democratic reforms would have undermined Kazakhstan’s authoritarian system—the main beneficiaries of which are Tokayev and his inner circle.”

There has been, they say, no meaningful shake-up of serving officials. “Almost all cabinet ministers and heads of local government have been recruited from managers trained during the Nazarbayev era. The current prime minister, Oljas Bektenov, is a veteran official who most recently spent five years as head of the Anti-Corruption Agency. Many of the current heads of security and law enforcement agencies previously served in more junior roles in the same agencies. External appointments (like that of Kanat Sharlapaev to the Industry and Construction Ministry) are exceptions to the rule that do not change the overall picture.”

Also lacking so far in the Tokayev regime are any genuine redistribution of authority within the political system, they add.

Tlegenova and Beysembaev conclude: “At the start of his presidency, Tokayev appeared pliable and modest. But he has evolved into a typical autocrat-patriarch, and there are signs his regime could become more authoritarian still. In 2023, the opposition activist Marat Zhylanbayev was jailed for seven years for ‘financing an extremist organization.’ The journalist and activist Duman Mukhammedkarim, whose blog became popular after the 2022 unrest, was sent to prison for seven years for the same offense in 2024. And Janbolat Mamai, the leader of the Democratic Party of Kazakhstan, was handed a six-year suspended prison sentence for ‘organizing mass unrest’ in 2023, and banned from taking part in any public activities.

“It seems that now that Kazakhstan’s new authorities feel more confident, they are more willing than ever to use both rhetoric and repressive tactics that are familiar from the Nazarbayev regime.

“Seeking to justify the underwhelming achievements of the reform program, senior officials have been suggesting that the system is impossible to change overnight. Surveys carried out by polling agency Paperlab in April 2024 show that this explanation has been widely accepted. Many Kazakhs blame inept implementation at the local level, and external factors (the war in Ukraine, natural disasters, and others) for the failure of reforms. However, many also understand the fictive nature of the reform program. ‘Only the leaders have changed; the direction of travel is the same,’ said one participant of a focus group.”