Moldova’s twin elections to determine its geopolitical future

Moldova’s twin elections to determine its geopolitical future
Moldova has become a key battleground in Russia’s struggle for influence against the West. / bne IntelliNews
By Clare Nuttall in Chisinau October 17, 2024

In downtown Chisinau, there are few visible signs that Moldova is on the verge of two historic elections that could shape its future for decades. On October 20, Moldovans will vote in a referendum on the country’s commitment to its EU accession path, while also participating in the first round of the presidential election that will determine whether incumbent pro-EU President Maia Sandu remains in office.

The posters that usually dominate election seasons in this region, featuring oversized portraits of candidates, are notably absent. Instead, there are just a few campaign booths on Chisinau’s central Stefan the Great Street, one, picturing Sandu, encouraging voters to turn out for the referendum, and others promoting various opposition candidates running for the presidency.

Yet the lack of outward signs of the upcoming votes belies the intensity with which the campaigns are being fought — not only by Moldovan politicians, but also by the high-profile European leaders who are pushing for a 'yes' vote in the referendum, pitting their influence against Russia’s arsenal of hybrid tools from disinformation to outright bribery.

Russia’s interference was confirmed on October 3, when Moldovan anti-corruption prosecutors revealed they were investigating an organised group suspected of transferring money from Moscow-based Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor to influence the two votes. In September alone, police recorded transfers exceeding $15mn.

Then on October 17, police in Chisinau announced they have uncovered a scheme involving the training of hundreds of Moldovan citizens in Russia to prepare them to incite riots and civil disorder.

"Russia is using a range of hybrid tactics to derail Moldova’s EU accession and influence the outcomes of both the referendum and the presidential election," said Sandu’s foreign policy adviser Olga Rosca at a briefing with bne IntelliNews in Chisinau. "Law enforcement has documented $15mn in illegal funds entering Moldova for voter bribery in September alone. We believe this is a monthly sum, and estimates suggest Russia could spend up to $100mn to sway these elections."

Geopolitical battleground 

Situated between Ukraine and EU member Romania, the small former-Soviet republic of Moldova has become a key battleground in Russia’s struggle for influence against the West. In the decades since independence, Moldova has long been torn between aligning with Russia or the West. Part of its territory, east of the Dniester River, broke away in a brief war in the early 1990s. An illegal separatist regime backed by Russia has controlled Transnistria ever since.

However, since Sandu’s election as president in 2020 and the rise of her Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) to power in 2021, the situation has changed. Chisinau has taken decisive steps toward EU integration. It has been helped by European politicians, spurred on by the new sense of urgency created by the war in neighbouring Ukraine, which transformed Europe’s security landscape. Moldova was granted EU candidate status in 2022, and the green light to open accession talks soon followed in December 2023, with the first intergovermental conference marking the formal launch of accession negotiations in June 2024.

"The upcoming referendum is a historic moment for Moldova," said Rosca. "In the president’s words, it is Moldova’s most important decision since independence. It would send a clear message that the Moldovan people want to live in peace, freedom, and democracy, where human rights are respected. It also promises prosperity for our people."

‘Yes’ vote expected  

Polls in Moldova suggest that the probable outcomes of the upcoming votes will be a ‘yes’ for continued EU integration in the referendum, and a second term for Sandu, most likely in the runoff on November 3.

Sandu has benefited from Moldova's rapid progress toward EU accession — Chisinau is discussing a possible 2030 accession date, and its achievements so far are in stark contrast to Western Balkan nations that have been working toward membership for years, in some cases decades. 

The president’s re-election campaign thus focuses on Moldova’s geopolitical direction. Her platform highlights her efforts to address Russia’s hybrid security threats as well as the achievements on Moldova's EU path. 

She has also benefited from the lack of a unifying opposition candidate. While a large field of candidates is contesting the October 20 election, a notable absence is former president Igor Dodon, Sandu's main rival in the 2020 presidential race. Dodon’s absence significantly reduces the threat to Sandu’s re-election prospects.

However, Moscow-backed politician and businessman Shor remains active in trying to undermine Sandu and the PAS government, continuing to influence events from abroad. Without a strong presidential candidate to back, Shor has shifted his focus to the referendum rather than the presidential race.

A ‘yes’ vote in the referendum would firmly position Moldova in the European camp. Political analysts, local businesspeople, and representatives of international financial institutions (IFIs) interviewed by bne IntelliNews in Chisinau unanimously stressed the referendum's importance for investor confidence.

Still, there remains a strong pro-Russian contingent among Moldova’s approximately 3mn population, with pro-Russian sentiment fuelled by Russia-basked disinformation campaigns and the efforts of Shor and his allies. 

Moscow has been particularly targeting the Gagauzia region, where the governor is closely aligned with Shor. Residents have been offered free Russian gas and other incentives in the lead-up to the election. "Russia is investing a lot of effort and resources specifically in Gagauzia. I think Russia relies on Gagauzia to be an ally and really slow down Moldova’s EU aspirations," commented Natalia Otel Belan, director of the Europe and Eurasia Division at the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE). 

Nor is Moldova’s geopolitical orientation the only concern of the country’s population. Moldova has faced a series of crises over the past four years, driven largely by external factors, placing immense pressure on the government. The pandemic hit first, followed by the war in neighbouring Ukraine, which severely impacted Moldova’s economy. As the country was beginning to stabilise, a Russia-manufactured gas crisis triggered one of the highest inflation rates in Europe.

Although the economy is recovering, inflation and poverty remain significant challenges. Furthermore, despite the government’s efforts, judicial reforms and the fight against corruption have been slow and met with intense internal resistance.

A fundamental change 

Long torn between Russia and the West, Moldova has been gradually moving toward the latter in the decades since independence, though its allegiances often shifted with changing governments. Since Sandu and her PAS came to power, many believe the situation is different, largely due to the significant strides Chisinau has made toward EU accession.

"European integration has been part of our lives for about 15 years, but President Sandu has been an incredible driver for EU integration," said Rosca. "She’s built trust and shown the Moldovan people that, with hard work, the necessary reforms for EU accession can happen. Sandu has also demonstrated that European capitals are open to Moldova. Now, Moldova has to do the hard work."

Analysts interviewed by bne IntelliNews echoed this sentiment. Belan highlighted the "sense of hopelessness" that previously gripped Moldova, shaped by the "trauma" of Russian influence throughout the 21st century.

"Before 2020-21, it felt inevitable that Moldova would fall back under Russian control. But under President Sandu’s administration, there has been a clear shift toward EU integration," she said. "Moldovans are beginning to see themselves as part of Europe. While there’s still a lot of work to do, people believe Moldova’s future lies within the European family of democracies. They understand very well that deviating from this path means no future for them."

Lucjan Kubica, an expert on Russia and Eastern Partnership countries at the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (HybridCOE), commented: "For the first time in Moldova’s independent history, this is a genuinely pro-European government. People are fed up with corruption and a non-functioning state. Many of those voting for EU integration or PAS are doing so because they believe it will bring about a functional state. That’s the shift,” he said. 

This change in sentiment is so significant that no candidate in the current election openly supports an anti-European or pro-Russian agenda. Instead, opponents of Sandu such as Alexandr Stoianoglo, backed by the traditionally pro-Russian Socialist Party (PSRM), call for for neutrality in their campaigns, and to balance EU integration with maintaining relationships with other powers, notably including Russia.

Relentless opposition

Those striving to transform Moldova into a functioning European state face relentless opposition from Russia. Moscow’s efforts include disinformation campaigns, cyber-attacks and financial backing for certain political actors. These efforts are part of Moscow's broader strategy to undermine pro-European initiatives and destabilise the government.

There have also been more overt efforts at destabilisation. In February 2023, Sandu revealed that Ukrainian intelligence intercepted a Kremlin plan to destabilise Moldova through orchestrated protests, prompting her government to adopt a firmer stance against perceived threats. She told the nation that the next steps would have involved "diversionists with military training, camouflaged in civilian clothes, who will undertake violent actions, attacks on state buildings, and hostage-taking. Through violent actions masked by opposition protests, the change of power in Chisinau would be pursued”. 

Meanwhile, Moscow continues to support pro-Russian sentiments within the electorate and across political parties and blocs. "Anti-EU, pro-Russia, and anti-Ukraine sentiment are constantly being pushed through the information space," Belan said. Moscow has issued warnings against Moldova transforming into an “anti-Russia", while spreading rumours that Ukraine’s military intends to seize control of Transnistria. Russia’s rhetoric questioning the legitimacy of Moldova’s government has grown more aggressive. Russian foreign ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova frequently mentions Moldova in her briefings, with comments clearly aimed at threatening Chisinau and stirring up the pro-Russian segments of the population. 

Some of Moscow’s favourite propaganda tropes include LGBT and gender issues, the potential reunification with Romania, and claims that Sandu and the PAS government have autocratic tendencies. Pro-EU reforms or efforts to remove corrupt officials and improve the justice system are framed as power grabs or attempts to marginalise the Russian-speaking population.

Russian influence wanes

Despite the various tools at Russia's disposal, its influence in Moldova has been gradually diminishing. The prospect of EU integration, rather than remaining in Russia's sphere of influence, offers a far more attractive future for Moldovans.

"Russia tends to exploit every available channel, and in Moldova, they have many due to the Soviet legacy. The country was once part of Russia's administrative and organisational system, and numerous business contacts remain from that era. Moldova has historically been dependent on Russian energy, and for years, Russia leveraged that influence," said Kubica. "However, Russia has been losing its grip, piece by piece."

Mihai Mogâldrea, deputy director of Chisinau-based think-tank the Institute for Public Policy (IPRE), agrees that Russian influence is waning. "This influence has diminished as Moldova has become more resilient, particularly in terms of security and energy. We're no longer dependent on Russian gas, as we now import from alternative sources. We have also invested significantly in national defence, especially in relation to Transnistria," Mogâldrea told bne IntelliNews. "We are now much more stable in terms of resources and our capacity to resist external influence. Our government and institutions have become more powerful in this regard."

Since Moldova signed its association agreement with the EU in 2014, trade has shifted significantly toward Europe. Trade with Russia has slumped, removing a key leverage point for Moscow, which in the past repeatedly blocked access to the Russian market for key Moldovan exports such as wine and fruit to express its displeasure about Chisinau’s actions. In 2022, nearly 60% of Moldova’s exports went to the EU, while less than a quarter were sent to members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including Russia. That year, EU-bound exports increased by a third, while exports to Russia experienced a comparable decline. Even Transnistrian producers now export overwhelmingly to the EU rather than to Russia. 

Russia’s military threats and energy blackmail have also lost much of their power to harm Moldova. The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 created a volatile situation in Moldova, which shares a nearly 1,000-kilometre border with Ukraine and has part of its territory controlled by Russia-backed separatists. Moldova not only hosted hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian refugees, its territory was also sporadically violated by Russian missiles.

For years, Russia used the Transnistrian conflict as a tool to pressure Chisinau, hinting at how easily the frozen conflict could be reignited. Early in the war, there was speculation that Russian troops could capture the Ukrainian port city of Odesa and push through to Transnistria, raising fears that Moldova would be Russia's next target. However, as Russia has become bogged down in fighting in eastern Europe, this military threat no longer looms over Moldova, and both Chisinau and Tiraspol have sought to avoid Moldova becoming embroiled in the war. 

Starting from 2022, Moldova finally diversified its energy sources, ending its dependency on Russian gas. Until recently, Moldova relied entirely on Russia for its gas and sourced most of its electricity from a power plant in Transnistria, powered by Russian gas. This gave Russia had the power to virtually shut down the country by cutting off gas supplies, a tactic it has used repeatedly since the 1990s to blackmail Moldova.

Ironically it was due to Russia’s own actions that Moldova’s reliance on Russian gas began to lessen. In October 2022, Gazprom suddenly reduced its gas deliveries to Moldova. This prompted Moldova, with strong support from its Western partners, to take steps to reduce its reliance on Russian gas, and by late 2023, it had completely stopped importing gas from Russia. Its energy sector is not wholly independent of Russia, as Russian entities still control much of Moldova's gas infrastructure, and Transnistria continues to produce electricity consumed in the rest of Moldova, but Moscow’s power to influence policy via energy diplomacy has been drastically lessened.

Dramatic changes 

Overall, Moldova’s geopolitical landscape has changed dramatically due to the ongoing war in Ukraine. Sandu has condemned Russia’s invasion, and after its initial caution Chisinau has become increasingly assertive in calling out and combating Russian interference. 

The country has toughened its stance on Moscow, particularly after the appointment of Dorin Recean as prime minister. Recean, a former national security advisor and interior minister, reflects the government's new focus on national security. 

The Moldovan government has bolstered national security by requesting air defence systems from Nato allies and implementing a range of legal and political measures to curb Russian influence. These actions include banning Russian television channels and expanding the powers of Moldova’s intelligence agency to counter Moscow’s misinformation campaigns.

Reports of Russian-backed efforts to undermine Moldova pushed Chisinau to take a firmer stand. The government has asked the constitutional court to declare the pro-Russian Shor Party illegal for serving foreign interests. 

Chisinau has also taken a firmer stance on Transnistria. In February, the Moldovan parliament amended laws to criminalise separatism.

Russia’s actions fuelled a debate in Moldova about the state of its military, which remains ill-prepared to face significant security challenges.While Moldova officially maintains its neutrality, the government has signalled it would seek Nato assistance if tensions with Russia escalate further. There have even been hints that Moldova might consider Nato membership in future. 

Western support 

As Moldova approaches its crucial referendum, the country's pro-EU leadership has been bolstered by high-profile visits from top European leaders, including European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz.

During her visit to Chisinau on October 10, von der Leyen urged Moldovans to participate in the referendum, describing it as a pivotal moment for the nation's future. "It is your sovereign right to choose the direction of your country, and no one else should interfere," she said, standing alongside Sandu. Her visit coincided with the announcement of a major EU economic support package for Moldova, worth €1.8bn.

Scholz visited Chisinau in August, where he delivered a similar message. "We know that pro-Russian and Russian actors are trying to destabilise your country, especially in the context of the presidential elections and Moldova's accession to the EU. My most important message is that Germany stands firmly by your side, and we will support the Republic of Moldova to the best of our ability,” he said. 

Meanwhile, on October 9, the European Parliament voted in favour of a resolution calling for increased European support for Moldova during its EU accession process and in addressing security threats posed by Russia.

Destabilisation threat

Such security risks cannot be overlooked, especially if, as expected, voters favour Sandu’s re-election and Moldova’s EU integration. 

The Russian plot to destabilise Moldova, revealed by Sandu and other top officials in February 2023, showed how far Moscow is prepared to go to prevent Moldova from progressing smoothly to EU accession.

Russia’s success in bringing Georgia back into its sphere of influence despite Tbilisi’s acceptance as an EU candidate country is a cautionary tale for Moldova, as are Moscow’s recently-revealed efforts to undermine the government in Armenia. 

“There is a threat, especially in the context of the referendum and elections. If the results favour Moldova's European future, then there is a high probability of potential disruptions, instability, or provocations," said Mogâldrea. He referenced past experiences of Russian involvement in protests aimed at sparking instability. "This didn’t happen, fortunately, but this scenario could be applied again, and our authorities are prepared to deal with that. Hopefully, there will be no suffering among the people due to provocations orchestrated by Russia's proxies in Moldova."

Kubica said: "I wouldn’t be surprised if [Russia] tried something like creating unrest — it's a good opportunity. We’ve seen it before, where they bring in violent groups, like super fans or hooligans, to incite aggression among the population. We can’t rule it out, but I also note that the Moldovan authorities are aware of this and are preparing for the possibility, so they won’t be caught off guard." 

He pointed out that the majority of the Moldovan population are unlikely to get behind anti-government protests or destabilisation efforts. "The situation in the country has stabilised recently, and there isn’t deep-seated anger that would drive people to violence. While some may participate in protests, many are paid to attend and lack genuine commitment—there’s no real sense of frustration, abandonment, or humiliation that would fuel such movements.”

Features

Dismiss