There is consensus in Georgia and outside it that the October 26 parliamentary elections will be truly pivotal for the country. The main issue at stake is the choice between the European or the Russian way, which also implies a choice between democracy and autocracy. The Georgian Dream (GD) government represents the latter option, though it vehemently denies this; the opposition is divided between four major blocs but united around the pro-European agenda.  

Just a few years ago, it was presumed that Georgia’s choice in favour of Europe and the West was as good as cast in stone. Public support for European integration, as measured by polls, was high and steady at around 70-80%. All political parties of any consequence competed in expressing their allegiance to the cause. In 2017, this commitment was even written into the Georgian constitution. 

At that time, the problem was seen as lying on the other side: while the Georgians were adamant in their aspiration to join the EU and Nato, the West was divided and equivocal. Some supported Georgia’s bid, but others were skeptical, mainly for fear of alienating Russia and reluctance to take responsibility for the security of a country removed from the “core Europe”. 

Still, Georgia had important achievements in its European integration policies; the 2016 Association Agreement with the EU, as well as the visa-free regime for its citizens traveling to Schengen zone countries, were the most important among them. Together with Ukraine and Moldova, Georgia was considered part of a ‘Trio’ of the most committed aspirant countries in Eastern Europe. When it came to carrying out reforms harmonising domestic legislation and practices with the EU norms, Georgia was even deemed the leader among them. Nevertheless, the 'Trio' countries felt geopolitically stuck: the next logical step, the EU membership perspective, was not coming due to the reluctance of major European powers. 

The Russian invasion of Ukraine changed everything. The EU recognised the European vocation of the three countries and soon granted them EU membership candidate status. Georgia was the last one among them to get it in autumn 2023. 

However, at this point, there is a full consensus in the EU that if the GD stays in power, any prospects of accession are indefinitely shelved. This is repeatedly expressed by European officials of different levels. The ‘Trio’ is no more. 

What happened? Why did the GD government change course? Can Georgia’s European accession policies get back on track? 

The GD government started its evident drift from the West around 2020, but the process accelerated following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Whatever the reasons, they must be sought in the mind of a single man, Bidzina Ivanishvili. This reclusive billionaire who made his fortune in Russia, the founder and leader of the GD and now its honorary chairman, fully controls the government agenda; those in formal positions of power, including Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, are nothing but his lieutenants. The only exception is Georgia’s ceremonial president, Salome Zurabishvili, who keeps a firmly pro-European stand, finding herself in an open conflict with the government. 

The reasons for Ivanishvili’s turnaround might be linked to rational security calculations. Russia’s unhinged behaviour is threatening to Georgia, which Russia had already invaded in 2008. Ivanishvili could have decided that appeasement of the aggressor is the best available policy. And nothing would appease Russia more than Georgia’s estrangement from the West.   

But there is nothing rational about a preposterous conspiracy theory that has become the backbone of government propaganda. According to it, Western governments are run by a “Global War Party” that is bent on dragging Georgia into a war with Russia. The domestic opposition, including all government critics in civil society, serves as a fifth column of the said “party”. Ivanishvili is portrayed as standing between the Western warmongers and their aims, so they are keen to destroy him, the propaganda goes. 

Hence the foreign agents’ law that follows the model of similar Russian legislation and was adopted in the spring over huge anti-government protests: It declares all civil society and media organisations that receive Western funding effectively enemies of the country. The same applies to the opposition parties, which GD promised to ban after the elections. The government also took its first steps to pressure universities whose students and professors are prone to protesting government policies. 

Oddly, the same government keeps promising to sort out all its problems with the West soon and even lead Georgia into the EU by 2030. It is also careful not to advertise its closeness to Russia – although almost never criticises it. This obvious specimen of political schizophrenia has its reasons: even many GD supporters prefer Europe to Russia. Some of them may be fooled that Ivanishvili in his infinite wisdom has calculated everything. But the main reason why so many people (about 30-35% of the electorate, according to polls commissioned by the opposition-friendly media) still support GD may be that people are genuinely scared of the possibility of Russian aggression and are receptive to the GD’s peace-first message. 

Ivanishvili genuinely believes that if, following the elections, the Europeans and Americans see that he is firmly in charge and there is nobody else to deal with, he will be able to reach an understanding with them. 

“They also need us,” he reiterates, probably having in mind Georgia’s role in various infrastructural projects: after all, the West deals with a much more autocratic Azerbaijan. Maybe some transactional relations will indeed be restored. But the EU negotiating Georgia’s membership with the GD government is pretty much beyond imaginable. 

If the opposition wins, it will be a completely different story. Rekindling the process of European integration is its main unifying idea. The opposition blocs expressed their commitment to it by signing the Georgian Charter, a document initiated by President Zurabishvili. Statements of the EU leaders suggest they will be responsive to a pro-European Georgian government, which would probably imply starting the membership negotiation process (as is already the case with Ukraine and Moldova). 

But can the opposition win? If elections are free and fair – yes. The electoral system is fully proportional and, according to the available polls, GD is well below 50%. However, we know from experience that the elections will not be fully fair. The question then is: how unfair? The opposition can win partly unfair elections but there are limits. There exists a cautious sense of optimism among Georgia’s pro-European society, but no full confidence. The country is holding its breath.  

Ghia Nodia is professor of politics and director of the International School of Caucasus Studies at Ilia State University in Tbilisi.