Moldovans are expected to support the pro-EU constitutional amendment on 20 October and give President Maia Sandu a boost in the two-round presidential election, according to most polls.

Moldova’s charismatic pro-EU President Sandu is predicted to win both the referendum and the first round of the presidential election. However, key details, not fully captured by the divergent polls, will prove significant for future developments, particularly in shaping the political landscape leading up to next year’s parliamentary elections.

If the pro-EU forces secure a final victory next year (meaning a majority in parliament), they are expected to capitalise on the strong support shown by European officials and push forward the accession negotiations, formally initiated in June 2024.

Details such as the extent of support for the pro-EU constitutional amendment on October 20 and the combined results of Sandu’s main challengers, who seem to command a broader base than the incumbent, are difficult to predict. These factors will influence the actions of the pro-Russian forces between the two rounds of the presidential election.

Presidential race likely to go to a second round

Sandu is unlikely to secure a majority in the first round, and the second round may prove closely contested under certain conditions.

Four significant challengers are in the race, with two enjoying notable support in the polls. Former chief prosecutor Alexandr Stoianoglo, dismissed by Sandu on contentious legal grounds, is standing for the moderate pro-Russian Socialist Party, led by former president Igor Dodon. Independent politician Renato Usatii is also running, representing his own party, Our Party (Partidul Nostru). Notably, neither Stoianoglo nor Usatii has openly declared pro-Russian views. Usatii even supported Sandu in the second round of the last presidential election. While Stoianoglo has expressed support for Moldova’s EU accession, Usatii has yet to take a definitive stance.

Former communist politician Vasile Tarlev, who served as prime minister from 2001 to 2008, and former anti-corruption prosecutor Victoria Furtuna are closer to the Pobeda political bloc, which is backed by fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor now in Moscow. Pobeda (meaning ‘Victory’) is the visible tool Russia is using to meddle in Moldova’s electoral process. Shor’s chosen candidate was banned by Moldovan authorities. Shor himself has been sentenced to 15 years in prison for his role in the $1bn bank fraud that surfaced in 2015. He is also subject to international sanctions by Western nations.

According to some polls, the two candidates informally supported by Pobeda together command an electoral base of just over 10%, a figure comparable to those of Stoianoglo and Usatii.

A recent poll conducted by iData for IPN confirms Sandu's lead with 29.5% support, followed by Usatii on 13.3% and Stoianoglo at 11.5%. The two Pobeda-backed candidates, Tarlev and Furtuna, trail with 6.1% and 5.5%, respectively.

Possible political turmoil between the two presidential rounds

Pro-Russian forces may attempt to trigger political unrest between the two rounds of the presidential election.

Since all four rival candidates are opposed to another term for Sandu, their voters could outnumber her base in the second round. However, it is likely that some of their supporters will become disillusioned after the first round and refrain from voting in the second. Unless something significant occurs – and here is where the networks of pro-Russian activists, cultivated by Shor, might come into play.

Moldovan authorities, including the police, prosecutors and intelligence services (SIS), revealed in a joint statement on 17 October that around 300 Moldovan youths had been trained by Russian instructors in paramilitary camps in Serbia and Bosnia.

These individuals were reportedly trained to provoke social unrest and engage in violent clashes with law enforcement. The use of civilians paid through Shor’s network over the past year has apparently been ineffective, so more aggressive tactics are anticipated in the coming months. A complex system has been set up to pay members of the pro-Russian activist groups through bank cards issued by a Russian state bank, with communication coordinated via Telegram channels.

Pro-EU constitutional referendum

Failure of the pro-EU constitutional referendum in Moldova on October 20 is highly unlikely, but it would stall Moldova’s accession progress for many years if it did fail.

A recent CBS Research poll conducted for the Watchdog Community shows 55% in favour of the pro-EU amendments, 35% against, and around 10% undecided. The main concern remains turnout.

However, the Constitutional Court has lowered the threshold, ruling that the referendum will be valid with a turnout above 30%, as it does not affect key constitutional elements. The court also confirmed that a simple majority of votes cast would be sufficient to pass the amendments.

There is no need for parliament to vote on the amendments, according to representatives of the ruling Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), which holds a solid majority and could approve such a vote overnight if required.

Nevertheless, a weak turnout or a narrow majority in favour of the amendments would give pro-Russian forces ample opportunity to challenge the legitimacy of the referendum vocally.