Over $24mn was transferred from Russia to Moldova via the Promsvyazbank (PSB) app in October alone, following $15mn sent in September, Moldova's chief of police, Viorel Cernautanu, announced on October 24 at a press conference held four days after the pro-EU referendum and first round of the presidential elections.

In the wake of the October 20 double ballot, faced with unexpectedly poor results — Moldovans voted by a very narrow margin to include the country’s EU integration in the constitution — President Maia Sandu revealed that the authorities had evidence of “frauds of massive proportions”. She claimed that Russia-backed criminal groups had attempted to buy 300,000 votes – equivalent to around 10% of the country’s electorate, or 20% of those who voted on October 20.

The transfers revealed on October 24 were made “with the purpose of corruption,” Cernautanu said.

“It is important that all our citizens understand that they are being drawn into an illegal scheme,” he said.

To date, law enforcement has identified more than 520 people involved in the vote-buying operation, according to Cernautanu, who warned that those involved could face up to three years in prison or substantial fines.

Cernautanu also mentioned the existence of a Telegram channel used to instruct recipients on how to set up PSB accounts and receive money. While he didn’t elaborate on this, it appears that the payments were processed through Russia’s MIR payment system, designed to circumvent sanctions. Previous statements from the police hinted at a "gamification" aspect to the scheme, intended to obscure the true purpose of vote-buying.

Cernautanu, speaking at the October 24 press conference, added that in addition to the online payments via PSB, cash payments were also distributed through a wide-reaching network.

The overall number of Moldovans receiving such payments – whether online or in cash – “with the purpose of corruption” may have exceeded the 300,000 figure cited by Sandu, Cernautanu concluded.

Regarding cash payments, the police revealed that, on October 24, a woman was caught with MDL175,000 (€8,700), reportedly intended for use in the scheme.

Groups arriving from Moscow were also stopped at Chisinau Airport, carrying sums just under $10,000 – the legal limit for cash transfers that do not need to be declared.

While the authorities have confiscated the cash, a crucial challenge remains: the illegal nature of the scheme must be proven in court before those involved can be convicted. Although Moldovan police and prosecutors have identified dozens, if not hundreds, of individuals allegedly involved in vote-buying schemes, no information has emerged yet about any fines being issued.

Sandu voiced her frustration with the judiciary’s lack of progress in prosecuting those indicted in such cases and its failure to address corruption over the past years.

"The Moldovan judiciary has resisted reform over these years and has failed to resolve major corruption cases. Everyone knows – only the judiciary seems unaware of what was in the bag that [former president Igor] Dodon received from [fugitive oligarch Vlad] Plahotniuc. They alone don’t know who stole the billion from Moldova’s citizens. Moldovan justice failed to see how [fugitive oligarch] Ilan Shor won elections in Orhei, Gagauzia, and other localities," Sandu said.

She warned that if Moldova’s judiciary continues to turn a blind eye to fraud, the country’s future could be jeopardised for decades.

The range of payments orchestrated by Shor in Moldova is understood to be extensive and sophisticated, making them harder to detect and prosecute. Entities allegedly linked to Shor and established in Russia are reportedly financing social programmes, including top-ups for low-income pensioners in Gagauzia and educational trips for Moldovan youth to Russia. These initiatives are framed as broader programmes aimed at fostering connections between people from various former Soviet republics.

Such schemes may serve a dual purpose, potentially functioning as indirect vote-buying mechanisms. Due to their social and educational nature, these activities are more challenging to prosecute as electoral fraud, even if they could be intended to influence voters in subtle ways.