The incoming Trump administration has sent conflicting signals about its approach to Venezuela, as the appointment of prominent hawks to key positions appears to clash with suggestions of a more pragmatic stance towards President Nicolás Maduro's government.

While Ohio's newly elected Senator Bernie Moreno has recently indicated that President-elect Trump “will work with Maduro” in spite of his controversial July election victory, the appointment of Marco Rubio and Rick Scott – both known for their hardline opposition to the Caracas regime – points to internal tensions over policies vis-à-vis the oil-rich socialist nation.

"At the end of the day, it is not the United States that chooses who the leaders of these countries are," Moreno stated in an interview with Radio Caracol, noting that American priorities in Venezuela would focus on stemming drug trafficking, addressing illegal immigration, and countering Russian and Chinese influence in the region.

This apparent contradiction emerges as representatives of Maduro's government pleads for new arrangements regarding oil licences for US, European and Asian companies, leveraging the resumption of migrant deportation flights. The potential deal highlights the complex interplay between Trump's bold campaign promises on immigration and the broader geopolitical considerations of US-Venezuela relations where oil plays a crucial role.

Venezuelan political scientist Iván Rojas Álvarez argues that Trump's hawkish picks could hinder any potential détente. "With Marco Rubio as Secretary of State, it is difficult for [a deal] to happen, but not impossible," he told Efecto Cocuyo, pointing out that fully positive relations between the two nations remain elusive.

Maduro, who claims to have won the July 28 presidential election with over 6.4mn votes, faces significant international scepticism about the legitimacy of his victory amid widespread allegations of fraud. No democratic country will likely recognise him as legitimate president, though this long-standing diplomatic pressure starts to show the first cracks. After procrastinating for several months, neighbouring Brazil, Colombia and Mexico have indicated they will send diplomatic representatives to his inauguration on January 10 – albeit stopping short of dispatching prominent government figures.

For his part, the Venezuelan leader has publicly welcomed Trump's election victory, calling for a "win-win" relationship between the two nations. During a special broadcast on state television following Trump's November victory, Maduro expressed hope for a reset in diplomatic ties that would "benefit both countries and the broader Latin American region."

However, the presence of anti-socialist hardliners in key positions could severely limit the scope for diplomatic engagement. Any cooperation is likely to be restricted to narrow issues such as migration and energy policy, with the possibility of Trump reversing the oil licence concessions granted under the Biden administration.

Industry observers and think tanks, including the influential Atlantic Council, have urged the incoming White House to maintain the current framework of targeted sanctions relief rather than return to blanket restrictions that characterised Trump’s first term under the banner of “maximum pressure.” According to the Wall Street Journal, a proposal being lobbied by some US oil executives and bondholders would go even further, shelving regime change plans for good and potentially allowing state-run oil company PDVSA – already operating joint ventures with Chevron under waivers issued by the Biden administration – to increase sales to US refineries in exchange for Venezuela's cooperation on deportations of illegal migrants.

But this, too, may prove to be pure speculation as Trump recently emphasised his commitment to American energy independence and floated plans to reduce reliance on foreign oil imports, boasting about the US’ own reserves.

Analysts note that Trump's ultimate approach may eventually depend on whether he views future deals with Maduro as politically advantageous, particularly regarding his campaign promises on immigration control – the US is home to over 700,000 Venezuelan migrants – and energy security. The situation is further complicated by Washington’s relationship with opposition leader Edmundo González Urrutia, recognised by some countries – including the US – as the legitimate winner of Venezuela's presidential election.

"Trump could see a negotiation with Venezuela as something feasible to help facilitate the deportation process," explained Álvarez, while cautioning that the US president-elect may be reluctant to expend political capital if the situation appears "extremely bleak for the opposition."

As both leaders gear up for their respective swearing-in ceremonies, all bets are off on what lies ahead. The competing influences of pragmatic deal-making and ideological opposition within Trump's circle suggest that any potential shift in policy towards Venezuela will be a sticking point of contention. What will come of it, more than any international outcry over Maduro’s usurpation of power or unlikely change of heart in the military, is set to make or break the future of the Caracas regime, whose main backers – China and Russia – seem no longer willing or able to actively defend.