Demographic data paint an alarming picture of Ukraine’s collapsing demographics, a problem that will be made worse by the fact that as time passes, fewer and fewer of the some 8mn Ukrainian refugees outside the country are likely to come home after the war, according to a study by the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS).

Ukraine has the worst demographics in the world, with mortality three times higher than birth rates. An estimated 7mn Ukrainians now live outside the country, most of them in the EU, with 30% to 40% of them being women in their prime and children, according to SCEEUS.

Ukraine’s population was growing between the end of WWII and the end of the Soviet-era, peaking a little later in 1994 at 51.7mn. Since then, there was a sustained and substantial decline down to 43.3mn following the collapse of the USSR, due to low fertility, high mortality and emigration, similar to what was happening in most of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries.

“Ukraine’s population losses between 1991 and 2022 were substantial at 16%, but far from the greatest, with Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova and Georgia suffering twice as great losses of around 30%,” SCEEUS said. “Several newly acceding EU member states saw large-scale surges in emigration at the time restrictions were lifted, with Lithuania seeing the largest share of its population (3.3%) leaving for the EU between May 2004 and December 2005.”

But Russia’s invasion three years ago has knocked Ukraine for six and turned an already serious problem into a catastrophe. A total of 7.8mn Ukrainians have fled to the rest of Europe, including 2.8mn going to Russia and 4.8mn registering under the Temporary Protection Directive of the EU and similar schemes of Norway, Switzerland and the UK.

“This first activation of the Temporary Protection Directive was itself an impressive act of solidarity of member states, with standard basic conditions for residence up to three years with provision of housing and access to public services including health and education and the right to work, although the details can vary greatly as between different member states,” SCEEUS said.

The Ukrainian refugees reaching the EU have on average been young (29.4 years), and the adults are almost exclusively women. Men between the ages of 18 and 60 have been barred from leaving the country since the start of the war. Children have been an even mix of boys and girls, whereas elsewhere such as Africa, refugee children tend to be predominately male.

An astonishing 30% to 40% of all Ukraine’s children have left the country with a caregiver and a similar share of all Ukraine’s women up to the age of 44 have gone. By contrast, only about 5% of Ukraine’s men have left.

“Post-war family reunion will be the first objective for most of these families, but the open question is how far the men will join their women and children abroad as soon as they are free to move, versus how far the mothers and children will move back home,” asks SCEEUS.

The answer remains a matter of speculation, but SCEEUS speculate that as time passes, the lower the number of those choosing to return home will be. Already refugee families have started new lives, found housing, jobs and schools for their children. After only a year most children have learnt the language of their host country and have made new friends, settling into a new routine.

“The longer the war lasts the balance will be tipped increasingly in favour of the men moving abroad,” says SCEEUS.

SCEEUS produced a population pyramid that distinguishes between the distribution of men and women by age and also accounts for those living in exile and those remaining at home.

“The persistence of anything like the distorted demographic structure portrayed in the figure would be truly disastrous for the post-war recovery of Ukraine’s economy and above all its society,” says SCEEUS.

The authors of the study constructed four scenarios as a basis for projections of how far Ukraine’s long-term demographic structure may evolve, with a range of results which depend crucially on how long the war lasts. From the 2022 starting population of 43.4mn, by 2052 the total population is expected to decline by between 21% and 31% as a result of the conflict and other demographic problems. The assumed refugee return rates take into account the Balkan experience following the post-Yugoslav wars, where there was an overall 75% return rate, says SCEEUS. For Ukraine the study assumes a return rate range of between 50% and 80%.

The strategic options for the EU include the following options, according to SCEEUS:

Pushing return: upon the end of temporary protection the migrants would face the choice between returning or applying for asylum. This is the default option under current EU policy. Given the systemic insufficient incapacity of member states to handle millions of cases, this option would be getting close to enforced return.

Facilitating stay: large-scale regularisation with access to long-term work and residence permits. A clear and in principle feasible scenario for doing this would be to extend the three years of temporary protection to be dove-tailed with a revised long-term residence directive, with deletion of its present exclusion of the temporary protected.

Mix and mess. Whereas the first two options would have strong core EU policy basis, in a third scenario there would be primary reliance on a complex variety of individual policies of member states, with differing priorities as between return or stay, and an overall lack of clarity and transparency.