Either curb your trade in American-origin chips and other parts vital to Russia’s war machine, or face consequences. That, reportedly, was the message lately delivered to Turkey by Washington amid tensions over how US commerce department data show the country ranks as the world’s second-biggest source, behind China, of high-priority, US-origin goods sent to Russia.

“We need Turkey to help us stop the illicit flow of US technology to Russia,” Matthew Axelrod, assistant commerce secretary leading US efforts to keep sensitive technology out of the hands of America’s adversaries, said in a statement to the Financial Times, reported on August 7. “We need to see progress, and quickly, by Turkish authorities and industry or we will have no choice but to impose consequences on those that evade our export controls,” he added.

The UK financial daily said Turkey’s trade ministry declined to comment on the situation as presented by the US.

Turkey is seen as having emerged as a key hub via which Western-made “dual-use” electronics, including processors, memory cards and amplifiers, find their way—often via third countries falsely represented as the “final destination”—into Russian missiles and drones in violation of export controls. Illicit flows of machine tools that arrive in Turkey but end up trans-shipped to Russia are another major concern.

Turkey, a Black Sea neighbour to both Russia and Ukraine that maintains amicable relations with Moscow as well as Kyiv, has not joined the Western sanctions programme imposed on the Kremlin but has said it respects the application of the sanctions in its foreign goods trade with Russia.

One argument put forward by Turkey, a Nato member, for its stance is that by remaining on good terms with both the Russians and Ukrainians it could potentially serve as a mediator in any future efforts at ending the Ukraine war. However, located as it is at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East and Eurasia, Turkey is a past master at playing one side off against the other, profiting from its dealings with both sides in the process.

This is not the first time the US has grown irritated by Turkey’s trade in military-linked goods with Russia since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

US Treasury under-secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence Brian Nelson made clear his frustration over the goods exports and re-exports when he visited Turkey in February and November last year.

Days after the February visit, amid sanctions tensions, there was a furious outburst from then Turkish interior minister Suleyman Soylu aimed at US Ambassador to Ankara Jeffry Flake, in which he said: “Take your dirty hands off of Turkey. I’m being very clear. I very well know how you would like to create strife in Turkey. Take your grinning face off from Turkey." Analysts saw the outburst as amounting to angry rhetoric that Soylu thought would play well ahead of national elections that were then fast approaching.

The US commerce department has so far placed 18 Turkish companies on its “entities list” over the trade, meaning American companies have to obtain rare licences to sell sensitive parts to the firms. Though there appears to have been some easing in flows to Russia from Turkey of military-connected goods since the highs recorded last year, a US commerce official told the FT that “you can expect to see more of that going forward unless and until there is progress”.

In weighing up the extent of the problem, sanctions enforcement officials include assessments of what is referred to as the “ghost trade”. This is made up of goods that go missing and never arrive in the markets of their apparent destinations. In Turkey’s case, Turkish exports of sensitive goods are usually earmarked for dispatch to countries in the South Caucasus or Central Asia, such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, but then never turn up in the official import data of those countries. The usual suspicion, of course, is that the items have been moved on to Russia.

Late last year, US President Joe Biden issued an executive order under which his administration’s officials can treat any foreign financial company transacting with a sanctioned Russian entity as if it is working directly with Russia’s military-industrial base. This appears to have brought some real progress in halting sanctions-busting trade with Russia, while also driving up costs Moscow must pay to access sensitive items, but the US is clearly still far from satisfied with the level of the impact on Russia’s war effort delivered by Western sanctions.