As it steps up its engagement with Central Asia, China will likely stop short of having its armed forces assume an open role in the region, according to an analyst.

At the mid-May Xian summit in China, which for the first time brought together Central Asia’s five leaders with Chinese President Xi Jinping without Russia being invited, Xi said: “China is ready to help Central Asian countries improve their law enforcement, security and defence capability construction.”

Stefan Hedlund, a professor of Russian Studies at Sweden’s Uppsala University, in a June 19 commentary for GIS, looked at what this statement might mean given Russia’s weakening role in Central Asia.

Wrote Hedlund: “Having long been a hegemon in Central Asia, Russia is fading into irrelevance as a source of investment and a provider of security. To China, this is an important turning point. The long-standing division of roles, with China as the driving force in the economy and Russia in providing security, is no longer relevant. But to what extent Beijing is interested or even welcome in providing security is unknown.”

Russian forces in Tajikistan are based in the western part of the country. They have therefore not become involved in providing security in the eastern part, the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO), the home of the Pamiris. “The challenge for Beijing,” noted Hedlund, “has been that this part borders both China and the Wakhan corridor, a strip of Afghan land that separates Tajikistan from Pakistan. Fearing infiltration by jihadist terrorists, it has opted to take security into its own hands.”

The problem for Beijing, continued Hedland, is that if it did “decide to raise its military posture in Central Asia, it would run the risk of ‘mission creep,’ of being drawn into conflicts it would rather stay out of.

“Opting for an open military presence in Tajikistan could stir up local nationalists exploiting animosity to Chinese debt-trap diplomacy. The country is estimated to have racked up a $2 billion debt to the Middle Kingdom and has already ceded territory.

“Opting for closer cooperation with Uzbekistan, which does have a serious military force, would mean getting involved in animosities between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, at a time when relations between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are the best in a long time.”

China has alternatives, said Hedlund, namely outsourcing security to private contractors, as it has done in Pakistan, with moderate success, or remaining content with anti-terror drills within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), though that brings Russia back into the picture.

“The likely outlook,” concluded Hedlund, “is that Beijing will remain cautious in showing off its military might, hoping that lavish spending and a boost in trade will win Central Asian hearts and minds, in the process also defusing the danger of destabilizing influences. If this ambition remains a halfway house, it is a gamble that could backfire.”