Moldova will certainly not provide free gas to separatist Transnistria region, government spokesperson Daniel Voda said on January 8 at one of the press conferences held daily since Gazprom cut gas supplies on January 1. 

However, sending small amounts of free energy to the region — which is suffering from a growing, and partly self-imposed, energy and humanitarian crisis — might not be a bad idea given the circumstances. Otherwise, the ongoing energy crisis threatens to undermine confidence in the pro-EU government in Chisinau, paving the way for a pro-Russian party to take power after the 2025 general election. 

Gazprom cut gas supplies on January 1, when Ukraine ended the transit of Russian gas through its territory, though the Russian gas giant blamed the cutoff on Moldova’s failure to pay a disputed gas bill. As Transnistria produced electricity for the whole country using gas it received for free from Russia until the end of 2024, this has an impact on the rest of Moldova, where electricity prices have risen by 65-75%. 

There is speculation Moscow is preparing the ground for a major crisis, which would eventually settled by a Moldovan pro-Russian politician (to be decided), selected by Russia and propelled by Moscow to become the leader of a future Eurosceptic parliamentary majority to be formed in Chisinau after elections this year (if Russia’s plan succeeds).

Transnistria has so far refused help from Chisinau, effectively imposing an energy blockade, leaving its own population without heating or hot water, and with hours-long rolling electricity blackouts. 

At the start of the year, the European Union and Moldova’s development partners strongly criticised Russia for “weaponising” natural gas and waging a “hybrid war” to influence Moldova’s upcoming parliamentary elections.

However, this energy crisis is less about hybrid warfare or weaponising energy and more a reflection of Moldova’s long-standing vulnerabilities. Over the past few decades, Moldova has failed to develop its domestic energy generation capacities and interconnectors with Romania, despite having pro-EU governments in power since 2014. Instead, the country relied on cheap electricity from Transnistria, which in turn benefited from free gas supplied by Gazprom. Corruption — encouraged discreetly by Moscow and prevalent in both Tiraspol and Chisinau — hindered the implementation of critical infrastructure projects that could have mitigated the current crisis.

While international support remains critical, providing humanitarian aid to Transnistria — a region within an EU candidate country — might prove more effective in countering Russia's influence. For decades, Moscow has provided substantial annual subsidies to keep Transnistria under its control.

“Thanks to EU support, Moldova remains resilient and well-connected to European energy networks,” tweeted EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas after a phone call with Moldova’s Prime Minister Dorin Recean.

However, Kallas’s statement overlooks the multidimensional nature of hybrid warfare. Beyond energy, another critical front is propaganda. Tiraspol and Moscow have launched a disinformation campaign blaming Chisinau for the energy crisis. This propaganda machinery, fine-tuned during Moldova’s last presidential elections, is now operating at full throttle.

Returning to the idea of providing free gas to Transnistria, Voda was not alone in dismissing the option. Sergiy Sydorenko, the co-founder of Ukraine’s European Pravda, argued that such a move could yield strategic benefits for Ukraine. Sydorenko suggested that Ukraine might consider supplying small amounts of natural gas to Transnistria to stabilise the situation.

For an estimated 60mn-70mn cubic metres of natural gas — a relatively minor portion of Ukraine’s current reserves and potentially funded by the EU — Ukraine could help prevent Russia from destabilising Moldova and installing a pro-Russian regime in Chisinau. This cost pales in comparison to the geopolitical and economic consequences of a pro-Russian parliamentary majority in Moldova, which could indefinitely delay EU accession negotiations.

Unlike Moldova, Ukraine has the capacity to provide limited free energy to Transnistria without facing significant backlash from its population. Chisinau, on the other hand, would likely face harsh criticism if it pursued such a policy.

According to Sydorenko’s scenario, Russia’s plan involves humiliating Moldova’s pro-EU leadership, including President Maia Sandu and her ruling Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS). A pro-Russian politician — potentially former president Igor Dodon, ex-Gagauzia governor Irina Vlah or fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor — could visit Moscow, secure the resumption of gas supplies to Transnistria, and resolve Moldova’s electricity crisis. While Shor’s 15-year sentence for the $1bn bank fraud scandal complicates his candidacy, Dodon or Vlah could lead the effort with fewer obstacles.

Tentative steps have already been taken towards helping Transnistria out. On January 8, the presidents of Moldova and Ukraine discussed the energy crisis in Transnistria during a phone call. According to Moldova’s presidency, they considered a proposal to supply coal to Transnistria under a humanitarian scheme. This approach could keep the MoldGRES power plant operational, sustain Transnistria’s energy needs, and provide limited electricity to the rest of Moldova if necessary.