Geopolitically, the world has shifted on its axis since Donald Trump’s return to power in the US. The state traditionally seen as the leader of the free world is now cosying up to dictators while distancing itself from its democratic allies.

This shift became abundantly clear this week with two key developments. Trump’s call with Vladimir Putin appeared to lay the groundwork for a prospective deal on Ukraine — one excludes both Kyiv and all European leaders from the negotiating table. Second, US Vice President JD Vance’s incendiary speech at the Munich Security Conference (MSC), in which he lambasted European leaders and signalled that Washington no longer aligns with their democratic values.

If confirmation were needed that the Trump administration’s allegiances lie with Europe’s resurgent far right, Vance’s actions in Europe provided it. Rather than meeting German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, he opted for discussions with Alice Weidel, leader of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD). His speech at the MSC referenced the abrupt cancellation of Romania’s 2024 presidential election, which was scrapped and rescheduled amid concerns over potential Russian interference and questions surrounding the campaign financing of far-right frontrunner Calin Georgescu.

There are clear signs that Trump and his adherents are closer politically to Putin than to democratic EU leaders. Trump has often spoken admiringly of his Russian counterpart, leading to accusations that he is too lenient on Russia (though he denies this, claiming no US president has been tougher). 

Treated as a pariah at least by the Western part of the international community since Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Putin has already secured a diplomatic win by engaging directly with Trump. Moreover, the US president appears unopposed to Russia holding onto its territorial gains from the invasion — which would set a dangerous precedent, including for Southeast Europe, where there remain multiple disputed borders since the breakup of Yugoslavia. 

Another aspect of Washington’s new foreign policy is that the US is not only slashing foreign aid, it is also backing away from its role, since WW2, of being a critical part of Europe’s security and defence. During his visit to Brussels, US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth urged European countries to take greater responsibility for their own security. Trump too has previously suggested that he may not support defending Nato members who fail to meet their defence spending obligations.

(This backing away from Europe does not, however, extend to Trump’s ideological allies. When it comes to Romania, for example, as well as Vance’s criticism of the decision to cancel the 2024 presidential election, US officials have also pressed Bucharest to release influencers Andrew and Tristan Tate, who were arrested in Romania and charged with offences including sex trafficking, rape and money laundering.)

Russia in retreat 

The abrupt shift in the US’s position from defender of democracy to champion of the far right and interlocutor with Putin has clear implications for Southeast Europe. 

Russia had long been in retreat from the region as country after country applied to join the EU and Nato. Of the 11 countries in Southeast Europe, all but four are Nato members. Four states are EU members, and all the rest are candidates or aspiring candidates. 

Even formerly close allies moved decisively into the Western camp. Bulgaria, once dubbed the “16th Soviet republic”, is now a Nato and EU member. Similarly, Montenegro is an EU candidate country, and joined Nato despite covert Russian efforts (including a failed Russia-backed coup attempt) to prevent the country once known as “Moscow on sea” from joining the alliance. 

By contrast, Romania’s links with Russia were much weaker, and the rise of the radical right in Central Europe seemed to bypass the country too — until now. 

With the rescheduled presidential election approaching in May, Georgescu tops the polls — an extraordinary development in a country that until his meteoric, TikTok-fuelled rise lacked a serious far-right presence since the interwar years, when the Nazi-allied Iron Guard, which Georgescu openly admires, was in power.

Now, support for the far right is growing in Romania, and with it support for figures like Georgescu and MEP Diana Sosoaca who openly espouse pro-Russian views. 

Elsewhere in the region, the survival prospects of Bulgaria’s right-left-populist coalition government are uncertain. The far-right, pro-Russian party Vazrazhdane is now a significant force in parliament and is waiting in the wings to enter government should an opportunity arise. Gerb, the dominant party in recent Bulgarian parliaments, has thus far resisted an alliance with Vazrazhdane, but its history of political opportunism suggests that stance could shift, particularly if a new Trump-Putin axis takes shape. 

The situation is rather different in Croatia and Slovenia, where the main rightwing parties — the ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and opposition Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) — both have strong anti-Russia, pro-Ukraine stances. By contrast it is Croatia’s newly re-elected president, Zoran Milanovic, backed by the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SDP), whose pro-Russian stance is firm enough to get him labelled an enemy of Ukraine.

Geopolitical battleground 

Beyond the EU, the six aspiring members of the bloc in the Western Balkans have long been a geopolitical battleground, with Russia competing with Western powers for influence. Moscow’s grip has weakened in recent years as successive countries have secured EU candidate status and joined Nato. 

Until now, its remaining strongholds in the region were largely confined to Serbia — where President Aleksandar Vucic carefully balances relations with Russia, China, the EU and the US, but says EU accession is the country’s foreign policy priority —and the Serb entity within Bosnia & Herzegovina, Republika Srpska.

However, the emergence of an understanding between  Trump and Putin could upend this fragile equilibrium. Serbia’s Foreign Minister Marko Duric’s visit to Moscow this week is no coincidence. At a joint press conference with his Russian counterpart, Duric spoke of Serbia’s commitment to its European path while insisting that Belgrade would not neglect its “traditional friendships” — a clear reference to Russia. 

The visit coincided with the 17th anniversary of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence — a move backed by Western powers but never recognised by Serbia or Russia. Duric referenced (but did not elaborate on) “tectonic changes in the international community” that he suggested could create new opportunities to revisit the Kosovo issue.

In Bosnia, Republika Srpska’s president, the secessionist-minded Milorad Dodik, has long been one of Putin’s most vocal European supporters. He has now added Trump to his list of heroes, penning an effusive tribute to the new US president on X (formerly Twitter), titled “A Leader Who Brings Peace and Stability to the World” — an act that is likely only partly motivated by his hopes of having US sanctions against him lifted.  

Emboldened by Trump’s resurgence and his apparent rapprochement with Putin, Dodik and his SNSD party are likely to continue obstructing Bosnia’s EU accession efforts, which have been repeatedly stymied by political infighting. In recent weeks, the state-level ruling coalition has fractured, with tensions again rising between the SNSD and its partners.

Elsewhere in the region, some countries, such as Albania and Kosovo, remain firmly anchored in the Western camp and lack the cultural ties to Russia that Slavic nations such as Serbia maintain. However, the changing geopolitical climate may already be having an impact. In Kosovo’s recent general election, negative remarks about Prime Minister Albin Kurti by US special envoy Richard Grenell just before the vote may have contributed to the loss of support for Kurti’s leftwing Vetevendosje party, which came in first place but lost its parliamentary majority. Negotiations to form a new government remain ongoing.

North Macedonia’s Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski, despite sharing ideological leanings with rightwing politicians like Orban, used his speech at the Munich Security Conference to criticise the EU for failing to open accession talks. He derided the bloc’s merit-based approach to enlargement as a “fairy tale”, though his frustration appeared more rooted in the slow progress of Skopje’s membership bid than in any intent to reorient foreign policy.

As US’s foreign policy priorities shift under Trump 2.0, the political landscape of the Balkans is once again in flux. The new Washington administration’s dismissal of its traditional democratic friends and reaching out to far-right and pro-Russian politicians in Europe has already emboldened its new allies in Southeast Europe, both within and outside the EU. This paves the way for the return of Russia to a region from which it has long been in retreat.