Did the latest gathering of Central Asia’s leaders feature a veiled attempt at collectively distancing the region from Russia?

Since the Sixth Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia—held in the Kazakh capital Astana and also attended by the president of Caucasus nation Azerbaijan—took place just over two weeks ago, analysts have worked overtime on trying to interpret the words of Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and fellow leaders.

The more diligent will also have considered some of the events that took place in the weeks and days leading up to the summit. Worthy of note was an event in Kazakhstan that featured a speech by the 39-year-old daughter of Uzbek President Shavkhat Mirziyoyev, who serves as a senior aide to her father. Mirziyoyeva praised the role of late 19th century and early 20th century reformist movements – Jadidists in Uzbekistan and Alash in Kazakhstan. Both, she said, helped cultivate a secular national self-consciousness for their nations.

This focus on a distinctness from Central Asia’s Russian colonial past and Russia-led Soviet past was also highlighted in an op-ed by Tokayev published by state-run Kazakhstanskaya Pravda. In it, he suggested that the region may benefit from the “creation of a regional security architecture”.

Tokayev wrote that “as a responsible member of the international community, Kazakhstan advocates strict adherence to the principles of international law, respect for sovereignty, and the inviolability of borders. I can say with confidence that there are many countries that share Kazakhstan's point of view.”

Kazakhstan’s president, a former diplomat, knows how to tread carefully with his words. He did not specify what such a regional architecture would entail, but the inherent suggestions were not the first time Tokayev has carefully played with fire—the first occasion was in 2022, when he openly affirmed that the Kremlin would not enjoy Kazakh recognition of Russia-occupied territories of Ukraine that were presenting themselves as “independent” breakaway states. 

The Central Asian states no longer see themselves as part of "Russia's backyard" (Credit: Univeristy of Texas Libraries, CIA map, public domain).

It must be noted that Tokayev’s Kazakhstan still maintains a generally supportive stance towards Russia, calling the northern neighbour its main strategic partner. However, it appears that Tokayev has been increasingly focusing on the aspect of economic cooperation with Russia, and not so much on the geopolitical.

Central Asians generally detest outsiders referring to the region as "Russia's backyard" and Tokayev is not the only Central Asian leader who has shown some defiance in comments in relation to Russia since it chose to go to war in Ukraine. For instance, Tajikistan’s Emomali Rahmon caused a stir at the Astana Summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States in October 2022, when he directly addressed Vladimir Putin with the words: “We have always respected the interests of our main strategic partner, [Russia]. We want respect, too.”

E-International Relations recently published an article by PhD researcher at University of Minnesota Otabek Akromov, which explores the nature of the erosion of Russian influence in Central Asia.  

Russia's post-invasion foreign policy focuses on mitigating its international isolation, observed Akromov. To maintain an appearance of support, Russian propagandists try to portray Central Asian countries as allies, but these nations often abstain from or avoid relevant votes, he added.

Also worthy of note is the fact that migration from Central Asia to Russia is in rapid decline. Since April, the numbers of job seekers from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in St Petersburg have dropped by 60% and 40%, respectively. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan's reliance on migrants’ remittances from Russia is lessening, with a growing share of funds now coming from Germany, South Korea, Poland and the US. This shift has further worsened Russia's demographic crisis, exacerbated by the war in Ukraine, which is straining its economy.

As such, Russia finds itself in a position of dependence on Central Asia in stark contrast to the far more exploitative position available to Moscow prior to the war in Ukraine. 

“Russia’s abuse of its dominant position in Central Asia and its subsequent invasion of Ukraine demonstrate how the misuse of crude power in the contemporary international system undermines great power status and leads to its decline,” said Akromov in his article.

“As a result of its exclusive position in the region, Russia maintained a mentality of ‘the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must’ towards the Central Asian republics. The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia, primarily advances Moscow`s geopolitical goals rather than fostering economic integration among its member states,” his article also stated. 

“Although the fundamental principles of the EEU are to ensure freedom of movement and the free movement of goods by eliminating customs duties and other non-tariff barriers, the Kremlin violates these principles whenever it deems necessary,” it added. 

Akromov further adds that “Russia also exploited its economic and strategic advantages inherited from the USSR against the region. One of the Soviet legacies that has had a detrimental influence on the sovereignty of Central Asian states is the fact that major routes and the transportation of energy resources out of the region primarily led through Russia.

“This gave Moscow a strategic advantage in utilising its transit potential to gain political concessions from the Central Asian republics by leveraging the Northern Corridor and the Central Asia-Center pipeline. Russia consistently tried to forestall any attempts to diversify trade and gas pipelines in the region and to disrupt potential integration processes among the five republics of Central Asia.”

Akromov’s argument is that this abuse of “Great Power” status in the region has led to major distrust among Central Asian states towards Russia.

This distrust appears to have only deepened after Russia invaded a neighbouring ex-Soviet state—a move seen by many in Kazakhstan, for example, as a precursor to Russia eventually trying to realise hopes to “retake” Northern Kazakhstan.     

Although the Central Asian states may never fully divorce themselves from the Kremlin, Russia’s current international pariah status has likely emboldened Central Asian leaders to assume much more bargaining power in their relations with their former colonial master.  

Tokayev’s call for a “security architecture” may not lead to an actual Central Asian military alliance, as such a move would be seen as directly challenging Moscow’s authority. Kazakhstan has been modernising its military since the start of the Ukraine invasion, but the changes so far seem minuscule and can hardly be classified as Kazakhstan preparing for a potential war with Russia. But statements akin to the one made in Tokayev’s op-ed do communicate a message that may to an extent keep Moscow on its toes with the message to the Kremlin perhaps being that winning back the region’s loyalty may entail more than a strong hand and a threatening presence.  

There are those who see Tokayev’s words as little more than posturing, but most analysts, it appears, concur that they do actually offer some subtle hints as to the potential geopolitical path ahead for Central Asia.

In comments made to RFE/RL, Luca Anceschi, a lecturer at the University of Glasgow, gave his view on the weight of Tokayev’s statements, saying: "Since the war in Ukraine began, Central Asia has had a chance to reinvent itself in a comfortable geopolitical space. They are trying to say that they are not on Russia's side in Ukraine, like Belarus is, but they are not with Ukraine either. They have ties with the West but are not pro-Western.

"But as the war goes on, as the discussion around secondary sanctions [faced by those accused of facilitating Russia in sanctions-busting] grows, perhaps the region's governments see that this space is shrinking somewhat."