Iran's annual birth rate will fall below 1mn for the first time, the Health Ministry's deputy minister announced as Iran stands at a demographic crossroads, transforming from what was once the Middle East's youngest society a mere two decades ago into one racing towards an ageing population at an unprecedented pace. The gaping birthrate situation has become so stark in Iran – so quickly – that seemingly nothing can be done. The country's age pyramid is inverting, with the elderly population rising from 4.5% in 2014 to 6.3% in 2023, while the proportion of infants under one year has declined from 0.6% to 0.4% during the same period.

"If we subtract the annual death rate from the birth rate, our population grows by only 580,000 people annually. At the current birth rate, mortality will soon exceed births," said Alireza Raisi, Deputy Health Minister, highlighting the ministry's growing concern. "I believe population rejuvenation must be among the country's top priorities. We have communicated this as the top priority to medical universities across the country," Raisi added.

The situation is particularly acute in the Caspian bordering Gilan Province, where deaths now exceed births, according to official data on February 12. In the past 10 months, Gilan recorded 14,300 births compared with 16,000 deaths, provincial governor Hadi Haghshenas told reporters at a national multiple births event in Rasht. "Gilan's population growth rate stands at just 0.08%," Haghshenas said, warning that the province's distinct ethnic groups, including Talesh, Gilak and Galesh communities, face potential demographic decline. "If each family in Gilan doesn't have at least two children, these ethnic groups will be at risk [of extinction]."

According to recent reports, Iran's population growth rate is expected to reach zero by 2041. This trajectory has not only triggered alarm bells for the country's economic and social future but also highlighted the abject failure of two decades of pro-natalist policies by Islamic leaders. Successive government attempts to reverse this trend have been both costly and ineffective. In 2021, the national parliament passed the "Family Support and Population Youth Law", which included controversial measures such as restricting prenatal screening and criminalising certain contraceptive methods. The law later sparked widespread criticism when it removed age restrictions on pregnancy under 18. This loaded law has yet to make an impact in the downward birth trends.

Despite allocating substantial resources – trillions of rials in the past year alone for fertility loans – these initiatives have failed to achieve their intended outcomes, as they were too restrictive and seen as yet another gimmick by the people wary of any move by the government while their assets cash savings continue to collapse. Meanwhile, birth rates continue to decline, with total births in the past two years reaching 1.075 and 1.058mn respectively, representing decreases of 3.7% and 1.6% year on year, and a striking 31% reduction compared to 2016. In only one year, Iran’s birth rate dropped 4.1% on 2023’s figures, suggesting that 2025 figures are only going to be worse considering the collapse of purchasing power.

The fundamental disconnect lies between government incentives and economic realities. While authorities offer marriage loans and housing deposits for families with three children, these measures appear superficial against the backdrop of severe economic challenges. The minimum monthly wage for 2024 has been set at approximately IRR110mn ($123 at current street exchange rate) for a family of three, yet the absolute poverty line stands at least at IRR30mn ($338).

"How can one expect a family spending half their income on rent to contemplate parenthood with a clear conscience?" asks one demographic researcher quoted in the report.

The policy approach has been criticised for its reductionist view of population growth. Instead of addressing complex sociological and psychological factors influencing fertility decisions – such as lifestyle changes, desire for individual autonomy, or uncertainty about the future – policymakers have relied on simplistic tools like mandatory restrictions and media campaigns.

The experience of developed nations demonstrates that higher fertility rates result from economic security, comprehensive parental support, and access to quality educational and healthcare services, rather than coercion or propaganda. Sweden and France are cited as examples where flexible working hours, subsidised childcare, and affordable housing have successfully supported family growth. But even those countries are not looking good with -1.5 y/y decline with a TFR of 1.42 in Sweden and a decline of -2.2 y/y and a TFR of 1.62 children per women in France, Birth Gauge reported.

"The decline in Iran's fertility rate isn't a choice but rather society's natural response to economic insecurity," notes one sociologist in the new Eghtesad24 report. The focus on quantitative population growth without considering quality of life could lead to a generational catastrophe – producing a cohort lacking education, employment, and hope for the future.

Projections indicate that Iran's population will reach 107mn by the end of its 20-year outlook, with over 15.5mn (14.7%) being elderly. This demographic shift threatens to create significant economic and social shocks, from empty schools to vacant university seats and a diminished workforce, Etemad reported.

The implementation of these incentives has been equally problematic. The Central Bank of Iran (CBI) reports that over 398,000 people remain waiting for promised marriage loans. These extended delays and complicated administrative processes have eroded public trust in government promises. Critics argue that many policies have been designed without consulting sociologists and demographers. For instance, the removal of mandatory prenatal screening not only failed to increase fertility but actually decreased the willingness to have children due to increased concerns about potential birth defects.

The misallocation of resources is particularly striking. Trillion of rials been spent on fertility loans in 2023-24 could have been invested in healthcare infrastructure or education. Instead, these funds were directed toward short-term schemes that primarily increased liquidity and exacerbated inflation already running at 30% in Iran.

"If we subtract the annual death rate from the birth rate, our population grows by only 580,000 people annually. At the current birth rate, mortality will soon exceed births," said Alireza Raisi, Deputy Health Minister, highlighting the ministry's growing concern. He added: "I believe population rejuvenation must be among the country's top priorities. We have communicated this as the top priority to medical universities across the country," Raisi added.

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