CENUSA: The “Georgescu phenomenon” in Romania

CENUSA: The “Georgescu phenomenon” in Romania
Calin Georgescu broke all electoral forecasts and took the lead in the first round of Romania's presidential election on November 24.
By Denis Cenusa in Germany November 28, 2024

The first round of the presidential election has caused a wave of shock in Romania and abroad. On November 24, Calin Georgescu, a sustainable development specialist and former member of the far-right Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), broke all electoral forecasts and came in first with 22.9%. In the second round, he will face Elena Lasconi, leader of the liberal political party Union Save Romania (USR), who took 19.1% of the vote. 

Between Trump, Orban and Putin

Sometimes compared to a “meteorite” for his sudden emergence as a prominent political figure, Georgescu presented a very simple proposal to the electorate. He opposes the establishment political forces, presenting himself as a newcomer with no overt ties to political or economic groups within Romania. In his pre-election statements, he devalued Nato’s defence capability and praised Russian President Vladimir Putin for showing dedication to national interests at any price. 

His foreign policy thinking resembles US president-elect Donald Trump’s “America First” approach, which also questions Nato’s efficiency in security matters. On the other hand, when it comes to domestic policy, Georgescu is more aligned with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s traditional values. 

What also brings him closer to Trump and Orban is his promotion of any kind of peace in Ukraine (even if it is beneficial to Russia), not least because that would reduce the costs to the Romanian state of hosting Ukrainian refugees.

Conspiracy theories and religious messaging 

But these are not the only aspects of Georgescu’s messages to the Romanian electorate, which enabled him to take the majority of votes both at home (2.1mn votes) and abroad (346,103 votes). 

Conspiracy theories about the inefficiency of vaccination, the engineered character of the COVID-19 pandemic and the health dangers of 5G exposure were deeply instilled in his public discourse prior to the first round of the presidential elections. 

Georgescu manifests a strong connection with the church, interweaving references to God in almost every public appearance. He is a dedicated supporter of traditional family values. Georgescu’s marriage with the church echoes to a certain extent Putin’s political approach towards the Russian Orthodox Church, which after February 2022 was converted into a religious proxy of the Kremlin that is legitimising the aggression against Ukraine. 

There are limits to the similarly of his rhetoric to that of the Kremlin, however, because Georgescu assessed positively the “legionary movement” in WW2, when Romania sided with Nazi Germany during the reign of Marshall Ion Antonescu (1940-1944). This dimension of Georgescu’s views creates a degree of incompatibility with Russian narratives about the alleged revival of “Nazi” sentiments in Europe and the “de-Nazification” of Ukraine through the means of full-scale military aggression. 

The diversity of Georgescu’s populism reflects the complexity of his political profile, which has helped him reach out to the most skeptical segment of Romanian society. He was able to crack the codes of citizens’ grievances across all political, religious, socioeconomic and geopolitical social divides.

His rapid rise is indicative of a turning point in the profile of the “two Romanias”: one that is staunchly pro-Western and sticks to liberal values ​​and another that holds conservative, revisionist and anachronistic views. The latter Romania cast a protest vote against the existing political system, which is perceived as corrupt, outdated, alien to the public and inefficient. 

Surprisingly, Georgescu’s political agenda is favoured by large numbers of diaspora Romanians residing in Western states. Despite the prosperity achieved through direct interaction with the West, Georgescu's voters, both at home and in the diaspora, are leaning towards a more "sovereigntist" political course for Romania, similar to that promoted by Trump and Orban.

The “TikTok” effect

The main factor to which Georgescu’s success in the first round is attributed is the use of the TikTok platform, on which almost 9mn Romanians have accounts. Unlike Facebook, which is the most popular social network in Romania, TikTok content is loosely regulated and can be used by political actors with less scrutiny. Romanian law enforcement and security institutions overlooked TikTok’s potential to catapult a politician with less than 1% recognition to a top position in the presidential election. 

The clever use of hashtags and the explosion of pro-Georgescu accounts have not yet been sufficiently investigated for it to be possible to draw a clear conclusion as to whether Russia used the TikTok platform to facilitate quick visibility for Georgescu.

The public attraction to him sparked debate about whether TikTok is sufficiently regulated. Both the Romanian military and special services have been criticised for allowing Georgescu to manipulate the public using viral hashtags and promotion through authentic TikTok accounts.

Cordon sanitaire 

It is difficult to know whether the 2.1mn votes in favour of Georgescu came from his TikTok audience. However, this result encouraged systemic political forces, mainly liberal ones, to start both online and offline mobilisation against Georgescu, who was labelled as a “pro-Russian” candidate seeking a “Romexit” from the EU and Nato. In part, Georgescu’s supporters are using the negative campaign against him to portray themselves as victims of liberal forces. Some narratives even drew a parallel with the presidential election in Moldova, where Alexandr Stoianoglo was dubbed as the “Russian Trojan horse” to mobilise citizens to vote for the main pro-EU candidate, incumbent President Maia Sandu. Consequently, Stoianoglo lost in the second round on November 3 due to around 272,000 people from the diaspora voting in favour of Sandu.

To counter the negative image given to him by his political adversaries, Georgescu has decided to retract his previous statements, which put him in a vulnerable spot. He denies that he has proposed leaving Nato or the EU and rejects accusations of sympathy towards Putin, which were attributed to him following his previous interviews and public statements. 

The tactic of softening his controversial views is not aimed at his electorate, which is deeply skeptical and disillusioned with conventional political parties. However, this approach could serve to stop the mobilisation effort of opposition forces and civil society organisations to recruit disinterested citizens to form a “cordon sanitaire” against Georgescu, following the French model used in recent electoral cycles against Marine Le Pen.

An anti-Georgescu common front may also influence the vote in the parliamentary elections that take place seven days before the second round, scheduled for December 8. Georgescu's electoral success is being capitalised on by AUR, which has already declared its support for Georgescu for the second round. AUR’s leader George Simion, who shares Georgescu’s far-right views, won 1.2mn votes in the first round of the presidential election.

Russian techniques 

Although it is not easy to identify Russian interference, there are indications that Georgescu and his entourage, made up of alleged “volunteers”, employed some Russian techniques of foreign interference in the field of anti-establishment narratives, fake TikTok accounts and information manipulation strategies. 

Georgescu denies having any ties to Moscow, but his election advertising is reminiscent of Putin’s image as a strong leader. Moreover, pro-Kremlin ideologue Alexandr Dugin endorsed Georgescu after the first round. This contradicts the traditionally critical stance of Romanian society towards Russia, mainly related to World War II. However, the current political and socio-economic situation in Romania seems to increase the level of tolerance towards the Russian-inspired narrative and decrease vigilance about malign Russian interference. Meanwhile, Romanian-language Telegram accounts, including those run by Moldovan citizens linked to the group of fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, has been amplifying pro-Georgescu narratives.

Georgescu is not a typical Russian proxy, but his populism appeals to the “left behind” and conservative electorate, which may make him the future president of Romania. With Georgescu in a top office, the number of Eurosceptic leaders in the EU will increase, paving the way for an alignment of Romania with Orban’s Hungary and Robert Fico’s Slovakia. Such a scenario will have a chilling impact on both Ukraine and Moldova, which have benefited greatly from Romania’s solidarity in infrastructure connectivity, maritime navigation and security assistance during the ongoing war in Ukraine.

Denis Cenusa  is an associate expert at think-tank EESC in Lithuania and Moldova, and a PhD candidate at Justus-Liebig-Universität in Germany. He tweets @DionisCenusa. 

Opinion

Dismiss