The Baltic defensive line is beginning to take shape. Using their boosted defence budgets, the Baltic states are building extensive fortifications on their borders with Russia and its ally Belarus. Estonia is testing bunkers, Latvia is putting up  "dragon's teeth" obstacles, and Lithuania is acquiring mines.

Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Baltic states’ security posture has also been significantly strengthened by a variety of strategic initiatives, such as the planned deployment of new Western troops, the establishment of a German ammunition production facility, and the development of drone capabilities. The accession of Finland and Sweden to Nato has also given hope of resupply from across the Baltic sea.

But would all this be enough on Day X to withstand an attack by their belligerent neighbour, Russia, until the rest of Nato comes to their rescue?

Retired General Valdas Tutkus.

“The endurance of Baltic defence forces in the event of an attack depends on several factors, including the nature of the assault, the readiness of local forces, and the speed of Nato’s response. Mobilising and deploying [Nato] troops would take time,” General Valdas Tutkus, who served as the Lithuanian defence chief from 2004 to 2009, told bne IntelliNews.

The Baltic states are geographically exposed, lying on the front line of Nato's eastern defence perimeter. This makes them highly vulnerable to potential aggression from Russia. The weakest point on the whole Nato eastern flank is arguably the Suwalki Gap, the narrow tongue of land connecting Lithuania and Poland, which could quickly be cut by hostile forces from Belarus and Russian Kaliningrad, leaving the Baltic states isolated from the rest of the Nato alliance.

Strategic analyses estimate that the Baltic states could withstand a full-scale Russian assault for just a few days without external reinforcements. A RAND Corporation analysis estimated that without immediate Nato reinforcement, Russian forces could reach Riga, Tallinn, or Vilnius within 36–60 hours under a rapid assault scenario. This would give Moscow the opportunity to conquer the Baltic states before Nato reacts, casting doubt on whether Nato would risk a world war to retake them.

Nato plans aim to reduce the response times to send reinforcements from 72 hours to 48. However, Tutkus warns: “Well, do not forget that Nato is an organisation of 31 member states. Although approval from all Nato member states is not required to trigger Article 5, however, the decision to invoke it is made collectively by Nato, and some members may not hasten to give its nod.”

Holding out

Yet the Baltic states’ strategists believe localised resistance, fortified defences, and early warnings could extend the time they can hold out until Nato can come to their aid.

In October, Edmundas Jakilaitis, a prominent Lithuanian journalist and producer, head of the "Strong Together" organisation, presented a groundbreaking study on Lithuania's defence capabilities. 

Conducted by the Washington-based "New Generation Warfare" centre in collaboration with Lithuanian military experts, the study simulated two military conflict scenarios to predict the outcomes of a potential Russian attack on Lithuania in 2027.

The simulations focused on the first 10 days of conflict, after which Nato allies were assumed to intervene. In one scenario, Lithuania successfully defended its territory, minimising losses and inflicting significant damage on the enemy. In the second scenario, Lithuania invested €10bn in defence over four years, achieving greater success by avoiding substantial territorial losses and outperforming Russian forces.

“By strengthening our armed forces with HIMARS, Apache helicopters, artillery, mechanised forces, tanks, and anti-tank systems, Lithuania could halt four Russian armies after six days of fighting. However, this requires €10 billion, a sum equivalent to 20% of Lithuania’s GDP,” Jakilaitis stated at the Lithuanian Business Forum.

The then Minister of National Defence Laurynas Kasciunas praised the findings, emphasising Lithuania's ability to defend itself under specific conditions, and the need for autonomous military planning.

However, Tutkus casts doubt on the findings: “The study paints too rosy a picture, relying heavily on defence spending while overlooking many other critical factors. We need to include a dozen ‘ifs’ in the report, keep in mind that Russia has learned lessons from the Ukraine war. When it comes to the defence of Lithuania and the other Baltic states, it will never be enough.”

Looking to the longer-term, Lithuania is building up its arms industry to deepen its defence capabilities. Most significantly, Rheinmetall is planning to launch production of 155 mm artillery ammunition in Lithuania in mid-2026.

This year, Lithuania has introduced significant legal reforms aimed at attracting more defence investments. In April, the Lithuanian parliament passed amendments to legislation, creating a more favourable environment for major Western arms and ammunition manufacturers, including Rheinmetall, to set up factories in the country. 

Then, in May, the parliament approved the Law on Defence and Security Industry, proposed by the Ministry of National Defence. This new law is designed to promote the growth of the industry, advance national security, enhance defence technology, and increase Lithuania’s competitiveness in the global defence sector. It also encourages industrial cooperation, requiring foreign defence manufacturers to make investments in Lithuania as part of their contractual obligations.

“As a result, we see a big boost in the defence sector. We see never seen defence commercialisation, tapping the huge potential of our mil-techs and individuals,” Lithuania’s former deputy Defence minister Edvinas Kerza, now managing partner at Vilnius- based ScaleWolf, a unique defence venture capital fund, told bne IntelliNews.

Defence splurge

Building up the Baltic states’ defence capabilities ultimately comes down to money. Lithuania has significantly increased its defence spending in recent years, particularly in response to security concerns arising from the Ukraine conflict. In 2023, Lithuania allocated about 2.8% of its GDP to defence​. For 2024, the defence budget rose to 3.2% of GDP, marking a continued commitment to security amid regional tensions​. 

Following the Social Democrat victory in October’s general election, Dovile Sakaliene, Lithuania's incoming defence minister, has  indicated that the proposed defence budget for 2025, set at 3.03% of GDP, is insufficient for the country’s needs. She believes that the baseline should be 3.5% of GDP to meet national defence objectives and hinted that the country may borrow for defence, even if it means breaching the EC monetary rules.

There is also a debate about priorities. The country’s goal of creating a fully operational military division by 2030 is unlikely under current conditions, with projections extending to 2036–2040. The delay is said to be partly due to phased procurement of German-made Leopard 2 tanks, prioritising air defence systems like NASAMS instead.

The outgoing defence minister, Laurynas Kasciunas, recently said that he believes that Lithuania should not rush to buy tanks for a newly established battalion without first ensuring that its armed forces are adequately equipped with air defence systems.

For neighbouring Latvia, defence spending in 2023 was set at 2.25% of GDP, amounting to approximately €2.3 billion. For 2024, Latvia was on track to increase its defence budget further to 2.4% of GDP and it expects to raise it to 2.5% of GDP in 2025, marking a record high in Latvia's history. 

Estonia's defence spending was approximately 3.21% of the country's GDP in 2023, equating to €1.3bn. Estonia's defence spending this year rose to an estimated 3.43% of GDP. And the tiniest Baltic state is ready to hike defence spending to between 3.5% and 3.7% of GDP in 2025.

Estonia is prioritising the development of its military readiness, particularly through the acquisition of systems like the K9 self-propelled howitzers and loitering munitions, which will enhance its combat capabilities. The planned defence expenditure from 2023 to 2026 is projected to be more than €3.8bn.

In the event of a conflict, Estonia’s main defensive force will include two Estonian brigades and one British brigade. However, it seems that the United Kingdom has been hesitant to fully commit to a brigade-level presence in Estonia despite previous agreements, with the process already taking two years. The UK and Estonia have recently signed a cooperation agreement at a Nato defence ministers' meeting to assign a dedicated British brigade for Estonia's defence.

However, the significant increase in the Baltic states’ defence spending is already starting to strain their economies. Their governments are already struggling to bring down budget deficits, while growth struggles to revive. 

Estonia has been in recession for over two and a half years now, the outlook of Latvia in 2025 looks bleak and, in Lithuania, some ring alarm bells that the country’s defence budget can pose a  big strain on the national financial system. Although each of the Baltic states remain united in wanting to resist Russian aggression, the cost is already being exploited by populist politicians.

“When it comes to the war, in Estonia, there is no ambiguity about who was right and who was wrong for it – the name of the aggressor and the victim are clear. However, we hugely overspent for Ukraine and became unsafe ourselves, as we’ve given nearly all our artillery and ammunition to Ukraine.  Considering the tense geopolitics, it is wrong,” Estonia’s radical rightwing EKRE leader Martin Helme told The Baltic Times earlier this year.

There nevertheless remains a real concern that for small countries like the Baltic states, with such a dangerous neighbour, whatever is spent will never be enough to make a difference.

Andrius Butkevicius, the first defence minister of a free, post-1990 Lithuania and now a consultant in Ukraine, told bne IntelliNews: “If [Russia] finds a weak link and can it bite off or rip off, it will certainly do. In terms of our defence, it will never be enough.”

Darius Antanaitis, a prominent Lithuanian defence expert, reserve Major of the Lithuanian Army, and a participant in military missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, gave bne IntelliNews an equally bleak message: “I am afraid we are on the brink of multiple new wars in Europe and beyond.”