As accusations of Russian interference follow successive elections in Emerging Europe, the Kremlin appears to have intensified its efforts to destabilise young democracies in the region.

Four countries in Russia's near neighbourhood – Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova and Romania – held elections this autumn, all of which have been marred by claims of interference to varying degrees. In several of these countries, the elections have been followed by either protests or crippling political instability. 

Nightly mass protests have erupted in Georgia, pitting the pro-Western opposition and ordinary Georgians, who overwhelmingly back EU membership, against the ruling Russia-friendly Georgian Dream party. Romania abruptly cancelled its presidential election while suspected Russian funding for far-right candidate Calin Georgescu is investigated. Bulgaria’s latest general election, marred by widespread fraud allegations, produced yet another fragmented parliament, continuing nearly four years of instability. In Moldova, large-scale Russia interference failed to prevent the re-election of President Maia Sandu, but her ruling Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) will struggle to hold onto its majority in next year’s general election. 

Separate reports by the Moldovan police, Romania’s Supreme Council of National Defence (CSAT) and independent Bulgarian cybersecurity company BG Elves all suggest that tens of millions of euros were spent by Russia to sway the local electorates towards far-right and/or pro-Russian candidates in their respective countries. 

Similar claims have been made by Sandu and Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili, as well as from politicians outside the region. 

Michael Roth, head of the German Bundestag's Foreign Affairs Committee, commented on X (formerly Twitter): “Ukraine is facing a war of annihilation. Moldova is facing a hybrid war. Georgia's free and fair elections are being stolen. Russian imperialism is behind it all. It wants to destroy the young democracies in Eastern Europe.” 

Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski made a similar point on the social network. “Russia is waging a hybrid war not only against Poland or the West as a whole. It tried to influence the outcome of the referendum in Moldova with bribery and information aggression, and is now doing the same in Georgia,” he wrote. 

Protesters rise up in Georgia 

Georgia’s October general election triggered a political crisis marked by protests and accusations of electoral fraud, with the opposition and international observers alleging Georgian Dream manipulated the vote to secure victory. Widespread reports of ballot stuffing and voting irregularities fuelled these claims. 

It’s unclear to what extent Russia was involved in the election. President Salome Zourabichvili, the pro-Western head of state, explicitly claimed Russian interference, describing the vote as a "Russian special operation" designed to maintain Georgia within Moscow’s sphere of influence. While she later tempered her accusations of direct Russian involvement, she cited methodologies resembling Russian interference tactics. Opposition leaders echoed these claims, accusing Russia of aiding Georgian Dream in undermining Georgia’s democratic processes. 

A report by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) linked Georgia’s election to a broader Kremlin strategy of hybrid warfare aimed at consolidating influence in the region. The ISW accused Moscow of employing tactics to sway the outcome in Georgian Dream’s favour. An investigative report by Bloomberg published ahead of the election highlighted Russian spies’ alleged infiltration of key institutions. 

Despite these reports, concrete evidence of Russian election meddling remains elusive. bne IntelliNews’ reporters found Georgian Dream has a solid support base in the regions in particular.

Still, the party has taken clear pro-Russian steps, inflaming tensions within the country. Georgian Dream announced a suspension of Georgia's EU accession process at the end of November. This followed the ruling party’s passage of the controversial “foreign agents” law, mirroring Russian legislation, that was adopted earlier this year. 

There are no signs of the situation in Georgia calming down. On December 14, Georgian Dream pushed through the election of its choice of president in a single-candidate election. With Zourabichvili refusing to step down because she says the electoral college that appointed far-right ex-footballer Mikheil Kavelashvili as her replacement is illegitimate, Georgia has been plunged into a deep constitutional crisis. 

Romania’s far-right ‘meteorite’ Georgescu  

Unlike its neighbours in Southeast and Central Europe, Romania had been relatively exempt from the rise of radical right or illiberal parties. As a non-Slavic nation, Romania also lacked historic and cultural ties with Russia. That made it all the more surprising when far-right, pro-Russian candidate Calin Georgescu swept in to take the largest share of the vote in the first round of the presidential election in November. 

Georgescu was relatively little known on the political scene, even in comparison to other far-right rising stars such as Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) leader George Simion or MEP Diana Sosoaca. Once a marginal figure in Romanian politics, Georgescu’s ascent was likened by bne IntelliNews columnist Denis Cenusa to a political “meteorite”. He had, however, become a phenomenon on video-sharing site TikTok and other social media channels, reaching out directly to Romanians disillusioned with traditional politics with a mix of far-right politics, conspiracy theories and praise for the WW2-era fascist Iron Guard. 

Given his political orientation, rumours of potential Russian involvement started to swirl as soon as the results came in. Romania’s CSAT and other government agencies started to probe Georgescu’s campaign funding. The role of a foreign “state actor” was highlighted. Overall, Georgescu’s campaign reportedly benefited from as much as €50mn in funding, a large portion of which was used to amplify his presence on TikTok. Investigations revealed that Russian-linked entities like AdNow played a significant role in promoting Georgescu and spreading far-right narratives, further complicating the political landscape.

The US State Department also expressed grave concerns over the allegations of Russian interference, urging Romanian authorities to investigate thoroughly and safeguard the integrity of future elections.

A win for Georgescu would clearly have been an about-face for Romania, until now an important part of Nato’s Eastern flank and a country aspiring to achieve deeper integration with the EU. His platform combined extreme nationalist rhetoric with critiques of Nato, a call to ban Ukrainian grain exports via Romania and a broader re-evaluation of the country’s defence policies.

Instead, the second round of the presidential election was cancelled by Romania’s Constitutional Court just days before it was due to take place. 

After this setback, Georgescu stepped up his rhetoric and promotion of conspiracy theories. He put forward an elaborate theory that the Constitutional Court decision was instigated by the incumbent US President Joe Biden, in an attempt to involve Nato in the war against Russia in Ukraine, thus allowing him to remain in office after his term expires. 

Another claim was that Romanian army had moved tanks onto the streets to round up all men aged 18-35 and send them to fight in Ukraine, according to messages circulated on thousands of TikTok accounts on December 8. The Ministry of Defence was forced to release a statement denying the rumour. 

Horatiu Potra, a private security services entrepreneur, and his collaborators were detained by police while heading from various parts of the country, carrying weapons, to Bucharest on the morning of December 8 – when Georgescu was calling on his supporters to go to the polling stations, despite the election being cancelled. Georgescu initially said he didn’t know Potra, but later admitted he had hired him for private security services.

So far, the rise of Georgescu appears to have had the effect of bringing together – albeit somewhat shakily – the mainstream parties in Romania to head off the threat from the far right. Yet the outcome of the re-run presidential election, which has yet to be scheduled, is very hard to predict. 

Pro-Western forces win in Moldova … for now  

As the events of late November and early December unfolded in Romania, they sparked a number of wry comments on social media that Russia had succeeded in Romania after failing in neighbouring Moldova. 

Maia Sandu, Moldova’s pro-EU president, secured a second term in the run-off on November 3, defeating Alexandr Stoianoglo, her moderate pro-Russian rival. 

However, the election was marred by allegations of interference. Pro-Russian groups, reportedly orchestrated by fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, sought to disrupt voting among the pro-EU diaspora while facilitating pro-Russian votes. Incidents included organised voter transportation, incentives like meal tickets for diaspora members in Moscow, and coordinated cyberattacks on election infrastructure. Bomb hoaxes were reported at Western European polling stations.

Moldovan authorities have pointed to significant Russian financial involvement in the election, with over $39mn allegedly funnelled into Moldova via Promsvyazbank to sway voters in favour of Moscow’s interests. Police chief Viorel Cernautanu described “massive frauds” aimed at buying up to 300,000 votes. Renato Usatii, the third-place candidate, said he had been under heavy Russian pressure to align with Stoianoglo. 

However, the struggle to keep Moldova on its pro-EU course is by no means over. Sandu’s Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) faces a critical test in next year’s parliamentary elections, where polls show maintaining a majority or building a broader coalition will be harder than holding onto the presidency.

As in Georgia, Russia continues to wield influence through its hold over the separatist Transnistria region, although this has diminished since the start of the war in Ukraine. A looming energy crisis, assuming Ukraine ends its transit of Russian gas from January 2025, is likely to put further pressure on the Moldovan authorities. 

Bulgaria’s persistent political crisis  

The lengthy political crisis that has persisted for close to four years in Bulgaria shows no sign of abating. The country has held seven general elections since spring 2021, each one leading to short-lived, unstable coalitions or caretaker governments. 

The latest snap general election took place on October 27, the same day as the vote in Georgia. While the latter overshadowed the election in Bulgaria in the international media, just like in Georgia the vote was marred by reports of large-scale electoral fraud. 

Video evidence surfaced showing electoral officials replacing ballots during the count, prompting widespread demands for a recount or cancellation of the vote. Nearly 60% of Bulgarians viewed the election as unfair, according to a Market Links poll. The allegations centre on oligarch and politician Delyan Peevski’s DPS – New Beginning party, which performed unexpectedly well, coming in at fourth place, considerably better than pre-election polls indicated. 

Peevski, sanctioned under the US Magnitsky Act for corruption, continues to wield significant influence in Bulgaria despite his controversial reputation. Politicians from reformist Change Continues-Democratic Bulgaria (CC-DB) have been vocal in their criticism of the conduct of the election, and have also vowed to block any government involving Peevski. 

The election fraud allegations are compounded by revelations of extensive Russian interference in Bulgaria’s political system. According to the cybersecurity group BG Elves, Russia funnelled €69mn into propaganda campaigns targeting Bulgaria and Romania. The funds, transferred in small transactions to avoid detection, were used to promote far-right narratives and sway public opinion. The group also uncovered a sophisticated digital network managed by Russian-affiliated companies that collected detailed user profiles, enabling targeted disinformation campaigns.

Whether Russia’s alleged interference benefitted Peevski’s party is unclear. There have long been rumours about connections between the controversial politician and both Russia and Turkey. Moreover, his stronger-than-expected performance in the October general election has worsened the political situation by producing the most fragmented parliament to date. However, Peevski has frequently employed anti-Russian rhetoric, and was a key member of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) which before its fracture into two separate parties unofficially backed the pro-Western government formed by Gerb and CC-DB. To the dismay of many Bulgarians, he recently received an award for services to Ukraine. 

Nonetheless, in a Facebook post on December 8, former prime minister and CC leader Kiril Petkov drew parallels between Bulgaria and Georgia. Citing a conversation with an unnamed Georgian analyst who commented: “your [Georgian Dream founder Bidzina] Ivanishvili is Peevski”, he claimed Russia’s strategy in Bulgaria is to “create a seemingly pro-Russian party that everyone watches with anxiety while parallel supporting a seemingly Euro-Atlantic but corrupt power that quietly accumulates power”. 

"The biggest risk for Bulgaria is the following scenario: a government with Gerb, where Peevski retains influence, makes [far-right, pro-Russian] Vazrazhdane the main opposition to the corruption model. Then Vazrazhdane gains support not because of its pro-Russian positions, but as an opponent of Peevski and Borissov. In the next elections, Gerb, under the influence of Peevski, forms a government with Vazrazhdane and turns east,” he wrote. 

“Lessons from Georgia show that the risk of a pro-Russian government comes not through a clearly pro-Russian party, but through the ‘Euro-Atlantic’ oligarch.” 

Turmoil ahead 

As 2024 draws to a close, none of the four countries has a stable future in sight. 

Nightly protests continue in Georgia, and are likely to be stepped up ahead of the inauguration of incoming President Kavelashvili on December 29, with incumbent Zourabichivili still refusing to leave. There is speculation Georgian Dream’s response could be to declare a state of emergency and introduce a curfew following Kavelashvili’s inauguration, essentially initiating martial law in the country. Events so far, however, have shown that the tougher the police crackdown, the more it has radicalised the protesters. 

Romania, as of mid-December, remains without a government – and the presidential election re-run is only expected to be scheduled once a ruling coalition is in place. Discussions among the four self-styled “pro-European” parties are already becoming tense, with their leaders at odds over the 2025 budget. 

Popular Bucharest mayor Nicusur Dan has put himself forward as a potential unifying presidential candidate for the mainstream parties, but it is as yet unclear whether he will gain their support. If coalition negotiations break down, the four parties are less likely to unite behind a single candidate, leaving the path open for Georgescu or another far-right candidate to make headway when the presidential election is eventually scheduled. 

Similarly, Bulgaria has no government and no immediate prospect of getting one, even though talks among the parties in parliament are underway. With each successive snap general election and government collapse, Bulgarians’ confidence in their political system deteriorates further.