Both Georgia and Moldova held pivotal elections in late October, each framed as a litmus test of the strength of their pro-European aspirations against Russia’s lingering influence. When the results came in, the pro-EU share of the vote was considerably lower than expected. What went wrong? 

Ahead of Moldova’s October 20 referendum on the issue of embedding EU integration into its constitution, people questioned by bne IntelliNews in Chisinau — from government officials to analysts to business representatives and international investors — saw the vote as a foregone conclusion, expecting a resounding ‘yes’ from the population. 

Instead, it was an unexpectedly close vote. The ‘yes’ camp won with just 50.35% of the vote, as confirmed by Moldova’s Constitutional Court on October 31, and this outcome was swayed by the Moldovan diaspora’s strong pro-EU vote; within Moldova, a majority of voters opposed the constitutional change. 

This outcome raises questions about the resilience of Moldova’s pro-EU trajectory, as incumbent President Maia Sandu — the main driving force behind Moldova’s EU accession progress in recent years — could struggle to hold onto her post in the second round of the presidential election on November 3 against moderate pro-Russian opponent Alexandr Stoianoglo. The outcome is unclear. As in the referendum, if Sandu does secure victory, polls indicate she will only do so with the help of the diaspora. 

“Sandu won by far the most votes in her campaign for reelection, with 42.5% against 26% for her nearest rival. But there remains a substantial Russia-friendly vote in the country and her victory in the second round is by no means assured. Some analysts believe she may lose,” wrote Olga Lautman, a non-resident senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), on October 30. 

In Georgia, meanwhile, the October 26 parliamentary election ended in victory for ruling Georgian Dream (GD), which took 54.23% of the vote, while the main opposition parties took a combined total of only 37.44%.

“The results align with pre-election polls which predicted that Georgian Dream would win the election and garner the most votes. The ruling party’s victory therefore came as no surprise. What does raise questions is the scale of its success,” wrote Wojciech Górecki, senior fellow at the Warsaw-based Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), in a comment on the election on October 28. 

“These results probably differed from the figures reported by the Central Election Commission because independent and opposition-affiliated polling centres underestimated the party and had difficulties measuring the impact of administrative leverage and various forms of pressure on citizens.”

What went wrong? 

Politicians in both countries — from Sandu’s ruling Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) and the Georgian opposition — have explicitly blamed Russia, accusing it of both helping sway public opinion through disinformation, and of outright interference in the elections. 

Moldovan authorities have pointed to substantial Russian financial transfers aimed at manipulating the vote. Police chief Viorel Cernautanu said after the referendum and first round of the presidential election that over $39mn had been funnelled into Moldova from Russia via Promsvyazbank in recent months, allegedly with the goal of swaying voters in favour of Moscow’s interests. Cernautanu argued that “frauds of massive proportions” took place, with Russia-backed groups purportedly trying to buy up to 300,000 votes.

This was backed up by Renato Usatii, the third placed candidate in the election. Usatii claimed that Moscow pressured him to back Stoianoglo. He alleged Russian officials had threatened him with criminal charges if he didn’t align with Moscow’s preferred candidate. 

In Georgia, an investigative report by Bloomberg published ahead of the election highlighted Russian spies’ alleged infiltration of key institutions, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the central bank. President Salome Zourabichvili described the vote as a “Russian special operation” orchestrated to undermine Georgia’s European aspirations. She joined the opposition in condemning GD, accusing the party of “stealing” the vote and Georgia’s future.

International observers including from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) have strongly criticised the vote in Georgia. Their concerns have been echoed by Western politicians such as European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who have called for an independent investigation, a concern also raised by 13 individual EU member states. 

Some Western politicians have gone further, echoing Zourabichvili in explicitly blaming Russia for the outcomes of the votes in both countries. 

“Russia is waging a hybrid war not only against Poland or the West as a whole. It tried to influence the outcome of the referendum in Moldova with bribery and information aggression, and is now doing the same in Georgia,” wrote Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski on X (formerly Twitter). 

Michael Roth, head of the German Bundestag's Foreign Affairs Committee, also commented on X: “Ukraine is facing a war of annihilation. Moldova is facing a hybrid war. Georgia's free and fair elections are being stolen. Russian imperialism is behind it all. It wants to destroy the young democracies in Eastern Europe.” 

Parallel histories

There are some obvious parallels between Moldova and Georgia — both are small post-Soviet countries, and both have part of their territory occupied by Russian-backed separatists (Transnistria in Moldova; Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia). 

For both, their post-1991 history has to a large extent been defined by their positioning towards Russia: they are on the new geopolitical frontline between Russia’s influence and the West’s, with their political centres of gravity sporadically shifting from one to the other. 

Russia is not just the regional great power, with military and financial clout at its disposal, it has also ensured it has long-term leverage over both countries by helping separatist leaders to take over parts of their territories. 

But there are also some clear differences, chiefly in their leadership. While Moldova has made significant strides towards EU accession under the leadership of Sandu, Georgia’s trajectory has been murkier. 

Sandu has been a steadfast advocate for EU integration. She achieved EU candidate status for Moldova in 2022 and recently initiated accession negotiations. Her PAS has advanced reforms, further boosting Moldova’s credibility in Brussels. 

Meanwhile, Georgia’s ruling party, while publicly supporting EU accession, has taken several steps that have raised doubts about its commitment to democratic values. Under the unofficial influence of founder and billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, the party has sent mixed signals to both the EU and its citizens. Ivanishvili, who made his fortune in Russia, remains a divisive figure whose policies have often seemed more aligned with Russian interests than European ideals.

Despite Georgia’s official position in favour of EU membership, GD has been criticised for its “foreign agents” law, echoing legislation used in Russia to stifle dissent, and for its anti-LGBTQ initiatives, again similar to Russian legislation that plays on shared Orthodox suspicion of liberal Western views on homosexuality. 

These moves have drawn scrutiny from European leaders who see them as backward steps on the path to EU accession. Even though GD hasn’t re-established formal ties with Moscow since the 2008 war, it has taken measures to facilitate closer economic relations, such as accepting the resumption of direct flights and choosing not to support Western sanctions against Russia.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, while Moldovan police and prosectors have investigated and announced the extent of Russia’s interference in the country, the Georgian authorities have shown no interest in probing whether ruling Georgian Dream was helped to victory by Moscow. 

Not the whole story 

Yet Russian interference in Moldova and alleged vote rigging by Georgian Dream do not tell the whole story. 

Commenting on the Georgian election, OSW’s Górecki said: "Three main factors have led to the ruling party’s victory – despite challenges to its legitimacy – and the opposition’s defeat. Firstly, Georgian Dream’s effective propaganda framed pro-Western forces as agents of a ‘global war party’ intending to draw Georgia into a confrontation with Russia. Secondly, the opposition is fragmented and has no prominent leaders. Thirdly, the opposition’s political manifesto failed to reach a broader electorate, including voters from smaller towns and more conservative communities.” 

For both Moldova and Georgia, economic issues often overshadow the debate on EU integration, especially in rural regions where poverty and economic instability prevail. Moldova, one of Europe’s poorest nations, has struggled to recover from recent economic shocks, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the ripple effects of the war in Ukraine. Inflation and a Russian-induced gas crisis have exacerbated hardship, leading many voters, especially in rural areas to prioritise economic survival over geopolitical alignment.

In Moldova, public disillusionment with pro-EU politicians’ failure to cushion the population from external economic shocks appears to have bled into skepticism towards the EU itself. This previously happened a decade ago, when support for EU accession in Moldova also fell, despite the signing of the Association Agreement and the economic benefits it brought.

“There are significant domestic issues at play and voter disgruntlement with Sandu and her government,” wrote CEPA’s Lautman. “Poverty has been rising since Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine (to 31% from 26%) and the country’s economy is only slowly recovering from recession. The European Union’s biggest-ever promise of $1.9bn in aid will help, eventually, but will take time to feed through.” 

In Georgia, economic concerns are also among voter priorities, particularly in the countryside where support for GD is strongest, as bne IntelliNews has reported. Again, that suggests that joining the EU may not be a primary concern among many voters. 

“The election in Georgia on October 26 constituted a stress test for the EU for the countries that, along with Ukraine, have deeper relations with Brussels in Eastern Europe … Although polls show support of over 80% for EU accession in Georgia, the parliamentary elections in Georgia have shown that the EU is having difficulty in influencing public perception in these countries,” wrote bne IntelliNews columnist Denis Cenusa in an analysis of the vote. 

Georgia is one of the countries that has arguably benefited from the war in Ukraine by boosting its trade links with Russia, as trade is rerouted through the Caucasus. Voters have seen the impact of this in their pockets and may have been worried that the pro-Western opposition would end this by taking a tougher line against Moscow.

The peace issue 

Most importantly, there is speculation post-election that a large part of Georgian Dream’s success was that by seeking to repair relations with Russia, it presented itself as the party of peace.

The peace narrative was a powerful tool in the party’s campaign, especially against the backdrop of the ongoing war in nearby Ukraine. “For many Georgians, the memory of the 2008 war is still fresh,” said non-resident fellow at CEPA Ketevan Chachava in a webinar ahead of the vote. “Peace, especially in our region, is a very tangible thing. Georgian Dream has successfully positioned itself as the party that can maintain stability.”

The struggles Ukraine has faced in securing weapons from the West to continue its fight against Russia are also likely a factor; Russia lies right next door to Georgia and has a military presence in the separatist Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions, while Georgians have seen from Ukraine’s experience that Western help is less certain. 

Similarly, there is speculation that Stoiangolo’s rhetoric of a “balanced foreign policy” has appealed to Moldovan voters, wary of severing ties with Russia. Meanwhile, Sandu and her government have become increasingly assertive vis a vis the neighbourhood great power, even mooting the idea of joining Nato — precisely the issue that prompted Russia to launch its illegal invasion of Ukraine in 2022. 

As the second round of Moldova’s presidential election approaches on November 3, voters are set to decide whether to play it safe by not antagonising their dangerous near neighbour with Stoiangolo, or to take a chance on a different future by reaching towards EU membership with Sandu.