China enhances position as Central Asia’s economic overlord

China enhances position as Central Asia’s economic overlord
The Khorgos Gateway dry port on the Chinese-Kazakh border. Trade with Kazakhstan accounted for nearly half of China’s turnover with Central Asian states in 2024. / gov.kz
By Eurasianet January 29, 2025

Top Trump Administration officials have set countering China’s growing global influence as a top foreign policy priority. In Central Asia, US officials will face an uphill struggle in trying to reduce Beijing’s expanding economic footprint.

Beijing has reinforced its position as the dominant economic player in the region, which sits on China’s western border, recording almost 5% in trade turnover growth in 2024, according to data published by the General Administration of Customs of China (GACC). China has muscled Russia aside as the region’s top trade partner.

The figures show that the balance of 2024 trade leans heavily in China’s favour. Overall turnover with Central Asia reached $94.8bn, up from $89.4bn the previous year. Chinese goods and services exported to Central Asia were worth $64.2bn, accounting for more than two-thirds of trade. Most of the $30.6bn that China imported from Central Asia last year comprised of natural resources, including oil, natural gas, rare earths, precious metals and minerals. Another major import item was fruit and other foodstuffs.

Kazakhstan remained China’s largest trade partner in the region, with bilateral trade turnover reaching $43.8bn, marking a near-7% increase over the previous year’s total. Kazakhstan imported $28bn worth of goods and services and exports totalled $15.9bn.

Kyrgyzstan achieved the greatest percentage gain year-on-year with China, with bilateral turnover  increasing by about 15% to $22.7bn. The most notable aspect is that Kyrgyzstan grew its exports to China by an astounding 3,270%, from a relatively paltry $80mn in 2023 to $2.8bn last year. Nevertheless, Kyrgyzstan ran a massive trade deficit with China in 2024 as imports reached $19.9bn.

Trade with Turkmenistan, China’s third-largest trade partner in the region, was flat at $10.6bn. But Turkmenistan remained the only Central Asian state to record a trade surplus with Beijing. Ashgabat’s exports totalled $9.6bn, while imports were limited to just over $1bn. The Turkmen surplus is far from an anomaly. The country’s favourable balance of trade with China dates back at least to 2014, which is as far back as GACC data goes.

Uzbekistan experienced a marginal decline in Chinese trade by about 2% to just under $13.8bn, with exports to China amounting to $2bn and imports $11.8bn. 

Tajikistan also saw a decline in bilateral turnover by nearly 2% to about $3.9bn. While Dushanbe’s exports to China grew by almost 40% year-on-year to $350mn, Tajik imports stood at just over $3.5bn. 

Meanwhile, China’s economic influence in the South Caucasus also is on the rise, with trade turnover with the region’s three countries reaching $6.5bn in 2024, up from the previous year’s total of $5.4bn, an increase of 22%. As with Central Asia, the balance of trade overwhelmingly benefitted China: the South Caucasus states’ imports were worth $5.3bn, while exports amounted to $1.1bn.

Azerbaijan accounted for the largest share of the region’s trade turnover, at nearly $2.5bn, and showed the most growth: more than 43% year-on-year. But growth was driven exclusively by imports from China that soared by 55% to $2.4bn, while Baku’s already negligible export total plummeted by 64% to $61mn. 

Georgia’s trade with China grew by about 10% to $2.3bn. Imports remained largely flat at around $2bn. And while exports grew by about 142%, the grand total was still a relatively modest $276mn. 

Armenia’s bilateral turnover increased by 15% to $1.8bn. But, as with Azerbaijan, it was the expanded flow of goods from China that accounted for virtually all of the growth: Chinese imports skyrocketed by over 75% to exceed $1bn, while exports shrank by around 22% to $768mn. Prior to 2024, Armenia had run positive trade balances with China dating back at least to 2014. Yerevan’s efforts to dramatically reduce its economic dependence on Russia likely helped push the country’s trade balance with Beijing into negative territory.

This article first appeared on Eurasianet here.

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