In the last five years, Azerbaijan has explicitly shifted its traditional foreign policy strategy by making inroads into regions far beyond the post-Soviet space, including the Balkans, Middle East, and more recently Sub-Saharan Africa, often through energy projects led by its well-known State Oil Company (SOCAR).

A revelation about the extent of Azerbaijan’s regional diplomatic outreach came during the annual conference in ADA University in Baku on April 9, when Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev commented on numerous issues regarding the geopolitical landscape, including on Azerbaijan’s stance toward the ongoing Israel-Turkey standoff. Commenting on the confrontation between two friendly nations — both Israel and Turkey are strategic allies of Baku — Aliyev for the first time revealed that Baku once successfully mediated the Israel-Turkey reconciliation in 2022, resulting in a re-opening of embassies after several years, even though shortly after the breakout of the Gaza War relations were repeatedly put on hold. 

Despite major political disputes between two states, Azerbaijan opted to maintain a pragmatic approach in partnership with both Israel and Turkey during the war in Gaza, even at the cost of criticism from Ankara. Azerbaijan’s neutral stance on the Gaza issue undoubtedly gained appreciation in Israel, resulting in a more comprehensive defence/security partnership. 

Azerbaijan views Israel and Turkey as its main gateways for making additional inroads into the Middle Eastern region through soft power tools considering the current regional security architecture. 

Hence, Aliyev’s remarks regarding Israel-Turkey at the conference signaled Baku’s willingness to continue mediation efforts between the two partners, notwithstanding the tectonic shifts in the region in light of Israel’s incursion into Lebanon and Syria, renewed airstrikes against Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen, and risks of a joint US-Israel operation against Iran. 

Considering Israel’s ongoing military operation on the Syrian soil and the long-time Turkish military presence in this country, Azerbaijan apprehends the risks of a potential armed standoff between the two countries, which might put a heavy burden on the country’s strategic partnership with both countries. In this vein, a day after Aliyev’s speech at ADA University regarding Israel-Turkey reconciliation, state media reported that Azerbaijan hosted the first technical meeting between Israel and Turkey on establishing a deconfliction mechanism for Syria. The meeting came after Israel launched airstrikes the previous week on Syrian airfields in the Palmyra area, which Ankara had intended to bring under its control. As such, Baku managed to provide both sides with a neutral platform to avoid a large-scale confrontation between two main regional actors. Given that Ankara and Tel Aviv did not reach final agreement on the issue, Baku will likely arrange the next meeting in the same format soon, boosting its soft power influence. 

Regional outreach 

Elsewhere in the region, SOCAR has sealed a number of deals, at the same time reinforcing Azerbaijan’s diplomatic presence. 

For example, in 2022, SOCAR signed a partnership agreement with the Iraqi Drilling Company to provide drilling and oil-field services. In 2023, the leader of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region Nachirvan Barzani conducted a historic visit to Baku to meet Aliyev and discuss investments in the oil-rich autonomous region. In January 2025, SOCAR acquired additional stakes in Israel’s offshore Tamar field, one of the largest and most strategically important gas fields in the Mediterranean basin. 

The Gulf region remains the cornerstone of SOCAR’s strategic portfolio, commanding the most significant share of its regional investments and partnerships. Specifically, Azerbaijan established long-term partnerships with wealthy companies like Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) to collaborate on low-carbon hydrogen production and carbon management initiatives, thus enabling the country (and SOCAR) to position itself as a proactive participant of the global energy transition. 

Indeed, the energy factor paved the way for the steady rise of Azerbaijan’s soft power diplomacy in the Middle East, particularly in the last two years. Azerbaijan became one of the few non-regional countries that established formal diplomatic relations with the new Syrian government following the collapse of the Assad regime and provided humanitarian aid during the very critical transition period. The positive narratives between Baku and the interim Syrian government resulted in Aliyev’s first-ever face-to-face meeting with the Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa on the sidelines of Antalya Diplomacy Forum on April 18. 

During the meeting, al-Sharaa officially emphasised the country’s willingness to cooperate with Azerbaijan’s SOCAR to restore Syria’s oil and gas sector after a devastating decade-long war and Israel’s continuous air strikes. Although Syria’s kinship in attracting foreign investments is an attempt to restore its ruined economy and infrastructure, al-Sharaa’s personal request to his Azerbaijani counterpart might not be a simple coincidence. It is likely that the new Syrian authorities, in acknowledging the strategic partnership between Azerbaijan and Israel, are confident that the SOCAR-sponsored energy infrastructure and exploration works on Syrian soil will not be targeted by Israeli forces. In addition, to al-Sharaa’s statements, Azerbaijan expressed readiness to participate in Syria’s reconstruction process in the post-war period. Undoubtedly, such prospects for Syrian-Azerbaijani partnership would further cement Baku’s pivot toward the Middle East, while boosting soft power diplomacy tools. 

Meanwhile, the successful secret talks in Baku between Israel and Turkey, greenlighted by the Trump administration, are of strategic importance for all three countries. They are important for Israel, considering the mounting confrontation around Iran and its proxy forces in the close vicinity. As for Turkey, the country eyes to establish long-term presence in Syria, which requires a certain level normalisation with Israel. In this regard, it is likely that in the coming weeks, Azerbaijan will arrange the next round of face-to-face talks on its soil, continuing mediating efforts and receiving additional acknowledgement of the Middle Eastern countries. 

Fuad Shahbazov is a policy analyst covering regional security issues in the South Caucasus. He was a research fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies and previously a senior analyst at the Center for Strategic Communications, both in Azerbaijan. He was also a visiting scholar at the Daniel Morgan School of National Security in Washington, DC. He tweets at @fuadshahbazov.