Moscow’s expanding presence in Africa has largely unfolded in silence, but the shift it represents is profound. Like in the game of Risk, Africa’s sheer size and its treasure trove of untapped raw materials is becoming increasingly important as the world shifts from the unipolar hegemony dominated by the US to a transactional multipolar world model where no single country is in charge.

Africa has gone from a peripheral foreign policy pastime for Moscow to a central plank of its global ambition to build an anti-Western platform to stand up to Western pressure as part of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s split with the West and a big bet on the Global South century.

The west is in retreat in Africa Russia has moved in in a big way to fill the expanding vacuum. The Kremlin is pushing at an open door, as African resentment of the colonial-era remains raw, a theme that Putin constantly harps on and that resonates increasingly loudly.

Colonial powers like France have had a rough reception when touring their former colonies and the US’ lack of diplomatic investment in relations, coupled with sanctions imposed on numerous regimes, has come back to bite and an increasing number of countries reject Western offers of partnership. Russia’s active economic and military support of some unsavoury governments has paid dividends, and it continues to reap the rewards of Soviet-era ties where many of the leaders were educated in Moscow and Soviet support during their various independence struggles.

The US position has been further undermined after it lost the high moral ground in recent years. The US rhetoric of being a “global policeman” that is a bastion of the liberal international rules-based order has been shot to pieces after its one-sided support of Israeli unrestrained aggression in the Middle East and the proxy war it has fought against Russia in Ukraine. A bne IntelliNews survey of MENA countries found that most African countries see the Ukraine conflict as a “European problem” that should be solved by Europeans and are unwilling to be drawn into the dispute or cut ties with Russia.

There is a pragmatic aspect to the rise in importance of Africa too. As the trade war between China and the US escalates, access to critical minerals and rare earth metals (REMs) is becoming increasingly important. Africa is home to the same untapped cornucopia of raw materials that Russia is and control over these deposits now has now taken on a major strategic importance. For example, a military coup in Niger last year cut its supplies of uranium to France, needed to run the latter’s fleet of nuclear power plants (NPPs).

The BRICS+ countries collectively control some 44% of global oil deposits, 55% of gas and 60-70% of critical minerals. China alone controls the supply of some 90% of the world REMs production. The estimates for Africa’s share of these resources is less certain but it is believed to be home to 9% of oil reserves (Libya, Nigeria, Angola, Algeria and Egypt), 9% of gas (Libya, Algeria, Nigeria, Egypt and Mozambique), as well as significant deposits of critical minerals:

• Cobalt: Africa holds over 70% of global reserves, with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) alone accounting for more than 50% of global production.
• Platinum group metals (PGMs): Africa, particularly South Africa, holds ~90% of global reserves of platinum and ~80% of rhodium.
• Manganese: Africa controls ~40% of global reserves, with South Africa leading production.
• Chromium: Over 40% of global reserves, largely in South Africa.
• Bauxite: Africa has ~30% of reserves, especially in Guinea.
• Graphite, lithium, rare earths: Present but less dominant. Zimbabwe and Namibia are emerging in lithium and rare earth development.

The Kremlin is playing a long game through a calculated combination of military partnerships, political support for juntas and a restructured regional security order. Unfettered by adherence to a values-based system, Russia is reshaping the African security landscape – pushing westward from the Sahel to the Atlantic coast.

The departure of US troops from Niger, following France’s forced exit from Mali, Burkina Faso and Senegal, signals the effective collapse of Western military infrastructure in the Sahel region. In its place, Russia has stepped in with speed and purpose using its Wagner PMC (private military company) and arms supplies as its political coin. Russia now accounts for 40% of Africa’s weapons imports and is the continent’s leading arms supplier.

Russia has been wooing African leaders since before the global pandemic with its first Russia-Africa summit in Sochi in 2019 that brought together all but a handful of the 54 African states. Little noticed at the time, as the Western world continued to largely ignore Africa, Putin’s investment into building up ties in Africa was a testament to his concern that Russia would eventually clash with the West. Putin first warned of a potential Russian pushback to Nato expansion as early as in his famous Munich Security Conference (MSC) speech in 2007 and then started rearming Russia from 2012 in preparation for the current war.

And those efforts are ongoing. Russia renewed its strategic commitment to deepen its engagement with African countries and integration associations across the continent, Russian Presidential Special Envoy for the Middle East and Africa, Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov, said during the opening ceremony of the fourth "Russia-Africa Forum: What Next?" on April 23.

"Today, our country is firmly committed to the comprehensive strengthening of relations with African countries and their regional integration bodies," Bogdanov stated.

A new specialised department dedicated to partnership with Africa is going to be set up within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, scheduled for 2025, underscores the importance Russia places on this diplomatic priority.

"We look forward to the participation of many attendees in our efforts, aiming to elevate Russian-African cooperation to a new and higher level," Bogdanov added.

Putin’s renewed pledge at the Sochi summit in November last year to offer “total support to our African friends” is playing out across the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), the newly formed military bloc comprising Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Russian support has not only enabled these juntas to seize and consolidate power but is also anchoring a joint 5,000-strong regional force intended to supplant Western-backed initiatives in Africa.

What sets Moscow’s strategy apart is its operational flexibility. The Wagner Group was highly active in Africa under its late leader, Evgeny Prigozhin, who died in suspicious circumstances last year after challenging Putin, used by the Kremlin as a freelance tool to push its foreign policy. Since then the Wagner PMC has been subsumed into the Russian military and a new Africa Corps formed that carries out a very similar job. Through these military bodies the Kremlin provides security services to various juntas that are both deniable and indispensable. And it is a highly profitable business, as the forces are paid with access to minerals or diplomatic leverage, allowing Russia to entrench its position without the formal burden of traditional alliances.

The AES now functions independently of the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States, weakening regional governance structures and giving Moscow outsized influence over how instability is addressed. With the Western star in decline in Africa, the previously Western-backed bodies like Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or East African Community (EAC) are losing their appeal and Togo’s bid to join the AES, despite its historically pro-Western orientation, underscores the shifting calculus in Africa.

This transformation is also playing out along the Atlantic seaboard, where Moscow is looking for naval toeholds. In Equatorial Guinea, Russian troops were deployed in late 2024 to support President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo’s regime, securing Moscow’s influence in a territory once squarely within the Western sphere. In Mauritania, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s diplomatic outreach in 2023 elicited cautious alignment with Russia’s security narratives. Neighbouring countries such as Chad, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana are increasingly compelled to engage with Moscow, either in response to growing Russian-backed operations or to avoid regional isolation.

Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently scored a major coup after it was granted access to the Port of Sudan on the Red Sea, an asset it has been after for years and which is the toehold it needs to eventually build up a military naval base there that would control shipping through the sea that accounts for some 40% of the world’s waterborne cargoes. This adds to its base in Tartus in Syria that remade Russia as a naval power in the Mediterranean, although that position is now under threat following the ousting of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad last year, who now lives in Russia. Russian activity in coastal states, although more discreet, reflects a broader objective: creating a buffer zone of aligned governments stretching from the Red Sea to the Atlantic.

Western influence and operations on the African continent have been pushed further south, fragmented by the breakdown in intelligence-sharing and logistical access as its ties to various governments crumble. As traditional partnerships weaken, Moscow’s model of selective engagement, military backing and diplomatic cover has been highly effective and changed the form of the regional security guarantee dialogue.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov travels in Africa constantly and African top dignitaries are regular guests in Moscow for summits and meetings. By 2026, Russia intends to open seven more embassies in African countries, including Gambia, Liberia and Togo – many of which have seen declining Western presence. At the same time, Russia’s strategic coordination with Iran, especially in Niger’s uranium sector, and with China’s broader infrastructure push as part of its extensive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Africa, points to a long-term vision of multi-polar influence in Africa between the three partners.