While Armenia remains locked in difficult and daunting diplomatic negotiations with Azerbaijan, there is a renewed sense of movement in the process of “normalisation” between Armenia and Turkey.

This renewed engagement has been marked by a resumption of direct talks between Armenian and Turkish officials, in a meeting held on the closed Armenian-Turkey border on 30 July.  That meeting, the first official engagement after a two-year hiatus, failed to deliver any practical results, but was still a step forward in regaining some momentum.  

And with a personal meeting between Armenian Prime Minster Nikol Pashinyan and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in September, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, there does seem to be a more positive environment conducive to progress between these two neighbouring countries in pursuit of a “normalisation” of relations.  

Defining normalisation

Although Armenia has consistently sought to engage neighbouring Turkey in repairing relations, the long-standing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with neighbouring Azerbaijan has prevented any real breakthrough.  Nevertheless, Armenia and Turkey did succeed in negotiating and signing two diplomatic “protocols” in October 2009.

That Swiss-mediated process quickly faltered, however, after Azerbaijan interceded to oppose any improvement in relations and successfully pressured Turkey to scrap the protocols.

Diplomacy between the two countries has focused on “normalising” relations with two main, yet minimal objectives.  First, normalisation involves the reopening of the closed Turkish border with Armenia.  First closed by Turkey in 1993 after Armenian military gains in the war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia has sought to overcome and end the isolation and economic vulnerability from that sealed border.

The second element of this normalisation process is related to diplomatic recognition and a correction to the aberration of Turkey’s withholding of even basic diplomatic relations with Armenia.

Earthquake diplomacy

A further opportunity for a return to rational thinking came in February 2023 in a new opportunity stemming from “earthquake diplomacy”.  In this case, Armenia’s quick response to a devastating earthquake in Turkey in that February represented more than simply a gesture of humanitarian goodwill.  

Rather, the Armenian rush to aid and assist Turkey was particularly significant for several reasons.  First, and most practically, it triggered an immediate breakthrough with the decision by the Turkish government to re-open the long-closed border with Armenia.  Despite the fact that the decision by Turkey to re-open the border was driven by the necessity to facilitate the urgent delivery of the Armenian aid, it demonstrated that both countries are ready to manage cross-border trade and transport.

A second important development in this “earthquake diplomacy” was the context of Armenia in Turkish domestic politics.  With the Turkish presidential elections later in 2023, the Armenian aid redefined the political narrative by removing the toxicity and sensitivity of the Armenian issue in Turkey’s political discourse. 

And third, the Turkish leadership demonstrated an important degree of independence in reopening the border and accepting Armenian assistance with no move to solicit the approval of Azerbaijan.  Given Azerbaijan’s power and pressure over Turkey, this display of independent foreign policy in Turkey’s options toward Armenia was an important turning point.  It also marked a display of Turkish frustration that its role as Azerbaijan’s powerful “patron state” has steadily eroded, into a position whereby Azerbaijan limits Turkey’s regional policy options in the South Caucasus.

More specifically, Turkey’s long-standing strategic alliance with Azerbaijan has become entrenched, defined by close cultural and a deepening of linguistic ties that translated into a shared Turkic identity.  Over the past three decades, this shared identity was expressed and embraced as a concept of “one nation, two states” . More recently, however, the past 20 years have demonstrated a transformation of this relationship, with the gradual emergence of asymmetry, as Azerbaijan amassed economic power and energy-related influence in Turkey.

Nevertheless, any sustained opportunities from “earthquake diplomacy” were squandered once Turkey re-sealed the border with Armenia later in February 2023. 

Important Imperatives

Despite this seemingly positive mood in recent months, there are now two outstanding imperatives necessary to sustain the momentum.  The first two of these  imperatives stems from Armenian expectations about Turkey, and centre on the Turkish failure to fulfil commitments and promises first reached in 2022, as well as the necessity to reject any preconditions or prerequisites in the process. 

But it is the second imperative that is most challenging.  As Turkish officials have consistently warned, Turkey will not and cannot do anything that undermines its relationship with Azerbaijan.

This requires diplomatic progress between Armenia and Turkey’s ally Azerbaijan, in order to provide the Turkish government with the political “cover” to justify the normalisation of relations with Armenia.  Without success in meeting these imperatives, however, the normalisation process remains potential rather than reality, especially as Armenian patience should not be taken for granted forever.

What Next?

Against that backdrop, the outlook for progress in the Armenia-Turkey normalisation process depends less on the Armenian or Turkish sides but rather, critically requires the consent of the Azerbaijanis.  In practical terms, this only reconfirms the dominant role in the Armenia-Turkey normalisation process and reaffirms the rather humiliating reality that Turkey is ever more a hostage to Azerbaijan.

It seems clear that for the Turkish leadership there can be no implementation of normalisation with Armenia without some notable progress in Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations.  For the all-important “political cover” and justification sought by Ankara, a breakthrough between Yerevan and Baku over a peace treaty is essential.

Yet recent months have greatly undermined any likelihood of real progress in the diplomatic negotiations over a bilateral Armenian-Azerbaijani peace treaty.  Much of the diplomatic deadlock stems from an Azerbaijani position that has only become more entrenched and stubbornly maximalist, further emboldened by heated threats and aggressive rhetoric.  

Thus, it seems painfully evident that both Armenia and Turkey remain prisoners of Azerbaijan, with little room to manoeuvre and even less flexibility to engage with each other.  And that makes it even more vital to normalise the current “abnormality”.

Richard Giragosian is the director of the Regional Studies Center (RSC), an independent think tank in Yerevan, Armenia.