Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko was quicker than many American news networks to pronounce Donald Trump the winner of the recent US presidential election. Lukashenko showered Trump with compliments, and pledged to personally nominate the US president-elect for the Nobel Peace Prize if he keeps his promise to “stop wars” overseas,” political analyst Artyom Shraibman said in a paper for Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

“It is tempting to read Lukashenko’s flattery as just another world leader wanting to start off on the right foot with the incoming administration in Washington. In fact, there is much more to it: Minsk genuinely hopes that Trump will keep his word by freezing the Ukraine war, defusing US-Russian tensions and helping anti-liberal mercantilism triumph in a once united West,” Shraibman added.

Bilateral relations with the United States hold few prospects for Minsk in and of themselves. Trump doesn’t care about small countries like Belarus and cares little for America’s role as self-appointed upholder of “freedom” everywhere. If anything, Trump’s admiration of strongmen argues that he will be more tolerant of Lukashenko than any other American leader.

But the wily Lukashenko is hoping for more. As the leader of a smallish and relatively poor country, the one thing Lukashenko excels at is playing other strong countries off against each other. Belarus remains heavily dependent on Russia but for years Lukashenko has flirted with the West to gain leverage in his negotiations with Russian President Vladimir Putin in order to extract concessions on cheap gas and soft loans with aplomb.

Lukashenko’s regime is betting on a recalibration of US foreign policy under Trump that could thaw Belarus’ diplomatic isolation – achieved without Minsk conceding anything of note on human rights or democratic reforms. Lukashenko’s gambit hinges on Trump’s potential to broker a ceasefire in Ukraine and dial back US-Russian tensions, offering Belarus a way to re-emerge as a regional actor.

“Minsk is counting on Trump to end the war in Ukraine, something it secretly wishes for. Unlike Russia, Lukashenko never publicly backed the objectives of the “special military operation” and is unlikely to have ever been interested in those objectives,” says Shraibman.

A Trump reset

Minsk’s relationship with Washington has historically been low-key, with the EU taking the lead in putting pressure on Minsk for change. Lukashenko’s disregard for human rights and democratic norms has made Belarus largely irrelevant to US foreign policy, which has never been too concerned with the fine details of Eastern European politics, says Shraibman.

Yet Minsk is pinning its hopes on Trump’s non-interventionist rhetoric, which aligns with its own preference for a cessation of the Ukraine conflict and a winding back of sanctions.

Despite supporting the Russian war and bringing down more sanctions on itself, Lukashenko’s government is still sending conciliatory signals to the West, such as pardoning political prisoners and proposing peacekeeping initiatives to try to reopen its communication with Brussels. However, as these gestures fall short of real reforms, Lukashenko has been met with a stony silence so far. The message is a good one: his formula for peace echoes the rhetoric of Global South powers like Brazil and China, prioritising the end of military aid to Ukraine, troop withdrawals, and neutrality guarantees. But he is seen as insincere and peripheral to the process of ending the hostilities.

Minsk’s path to redemption?

A new Trump presidency could end all that. Should ceasefire negotiations materialise, Belarus would aim for a seat at the table in a repetition of the role it played during the previous two rounds of the Minsk agreements to end the conflict pre-invasion. Despite Lukashenko’s tarnished reputation following his role in the 2020 Belarusian election crackdown and his material support of Russia’s invasion, he could leverage Belarus’ past as a negotiation venue during the Minsk agreements.

“Lukashenko is attempting to escape pariah status,” notes Shraibman. Even a limited role in negotiations could boost Belarus’ profile, making it a less toxic actor on the European stage.

The stakes for Lukashenko are high. A protracted war or Ukrainian collapse would extend sanctions, deepen Belarus’ isolation and complete its dependence on Moscow. Conversely, a Russian defeat could expose Lukashenko’s regime to existential threats, as Moscow’s ability to prop up his otherwise loss-making economy would end.

“Ukraine’s fall and the establishment of a puppet regime or Russian occupation would immediately create several serious problems for Lukashenko. Belarus would have to compete with Ukraine for Russian subsidies,” says Shraibman. “Plus, Ukraine’s surrender to Russia would trigger NATO’s eastern flank to militarise more actively, increasing risks for Minsk and inducing Moscow to expand its own presence in Belarus.”

Russia's defeat is equally dangerous for Minsk, as not only would it lose its main benefactor, but Minsk would also become part of the mopping up operation to end tyranny in Eastern Europe and guarantee Ukraine’s long-term security.

If there is a compromise and negotiations to find the “just peace” that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy is calling for, then Lukashenko has a good chance of being involved. Having already played the role of peacekeeper twice in the Minsk talks between Putin and former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Lukashenko was also a party to the failed Istanbul peace deal in 2022 and could well be invited to the mooted talks that may start after Trump is sworn in. Russia needs an extra strong voice at the table and Lukashenko represents a potential military threat to Ukraine as well, adding some more steel to Putin’s position in talks.

The West will not object to Lukashenko’s involvement and his inevitable demand that Belarus be included in any security arrangements agreed. “It is unlikely that anyone will torpedo the whole process just to avoid yielding to Moscow on such a trivial issue. The moment will be too critical to point out that Lukashenko is illegitimate and does not deserve a seat at the adults’ table,” says Shraibman. In this case he would succeed in using the regional reset to shed his untouchable status.

Clearly, though, Lukashenko is tired of playing second fiddle to Russia. He would much prefer a return to the status quo of before 2020 where he could act independently, playing off both sides, without damaging his alliance with Russia.

Lukashenko’s maximalist vision sees Trump heralding a broader shift in Western politics, dismantling liberal democracy’s dominance and promoting realpolitik, which is the style of politics that Lukashenko has employed for all of his 30 years in office. Yet, even a less transformative scenario could see Minsk benefiting from a transatlantic rift that lowers the bar for sanctions relief and de-emphasises the Belarusian problem.