Trade between Central Asia and Afghanistan has been expanding since the Taliban returned to power in Kabul in August 2021.

When the Taliban first ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, there was no Central Asia-Afghan trade to speak of. The Central Asian states, with the exception of Turkmenistan, took the view that the Taliban were a direct threat.

Engagement in business is thus a new thing to the parties involved—and there were bound to be some problems.

Substandard fuels
In mid-August, Kyrgyzstan’s National Statistics Committee reported that the country exported 2.53mn litres of gasoline to Afghanistan in June. That was more gasoline than the 2.49mn litres Kyrgyzstan sent to Afghanistan throughout January to May.

Kyrgyzstan is not blessed with great quantities of oil. It is a long way from being a major exporter of petroleum products, so it seemed odd that Afghanistan would be importing gasoline from the Kyrgyz.

In Central Asia, it is Kazakhstan that is known for having vast oil reserves, while Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have significant amounts. All three also have sizeable reserves of natural gas, especially Turkmenistan, which has the world’s fourth largest gas reserves.

It’s likely that Afghanistan also has substantial reserves of oil and natural gas, but 40 years of war made it difficult to do much surveying and international sanctions on the Taliban regime have scared most international investors away from projects in Afghanistan.

A spate of reports have told how the Taliban have been sending back poor-quality fuel exported to Afghanistan, but it would seem that more gets through than is sent back (Credit: pahjwok).

For oil, gasoline and natural gas (either liquefied or compressed), the Taliban turns to Central Asia and neighbouring Iran, but the deals involved have seen some difficulties.

In late May 2023, Afghanistan’s National Standards Authority (ANSA) returned 19 tonnes of gas to Uzbekistan, citing low quality.

In June 2023, ANSA returned 324 tonnes of fuel shipped from Kyrgyzstan, with poor quality again the concern. Also, on two occasions in July, it sent back liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies obtained from Turkmenistan.

In early August 2023, Afghanistan sent back 67 railway tanks of Uzbek petroleum products due to quality concerns. That time, Uzbekistan’s state oil and gas company Uzbekneftegaz defended the quality, saying it met European standards, but the Taliban still refused to accept the shipment.

In late August, Afghanistan returned 45 truck tankers of “substandard” oil from Iran. On November 22, 21 more tankers were sent back to the Iranians and on November 29, another 24 trucks of oil were put back on the road to Iran.

It looks like some businessmen in Iran and Central Asia believe the Taliban are an easy mark for dumping low-quality petroleum products. The number of shipments of inferior oil, gasoline, LNG and other fuels from neighbouring countries that make it onto the Afghan market is likely equal to or higher than the number that are sent back.

The problem continues. In April, Afghanistan returned 120,000 litres of gasoline sent from Russia through Uzbekistan, and 19 fuel tankers sent from Iran.

Suspect Afghan pomegranate pop
Inferior-quality goods also go north across the Afghan border.

Afghanistan exports a pomegranate carbonated drink called “Golden Life” to several Central Asian countries.

At the start of July, Kyrgyz authorities banned the sale of Golden Life throughout the country. Kyrgyzstan’s Health Ministry said tests showed the drink contained dye E122 Azorubin, a red dye approved in the European Union for use in some food products.

There are claims that it can produce negative effects in children such as attention deficit disorders and for that reason the Kyrgyz authorities ordered the product to be pulled from stores.

Uzbekistan’s Committee for Sanitary-Epidemiological Welfare and Public Health moved quickly to inspect shipments of the Afghan beverage after Kyrgyzstan’s announcement, but did not detect any toxic or harmful substances.

Kazakh health authorities, meanwhile, decided to test all Afghan pomegranate-flavoured drinks on sale in Kazakhstan.

The Kazakh Committee for Sanitary-Epidemiological Control also found E122 Azorubi and recommended a sale ban.

The committee also objected to improper labelling that failed to list all ingredients (there was no mention on labels of E122 Azorubi as an ingredient), a date for when the drink was produced, or an expiration date. The labelling was found to violate Kazakhstan’s customs regulations.

It is not clear if the Kazakh authorities went ahead and imposed a ban on the sale of Afghan pomegranate-flavoured drinks. The seeming silence on this issue from Kazakh officials might have had something to do with a desire not to strain diplomatic ties ahead of a key announcement.

On August 21, the Kazakh Foreign Ministry stated that it was officially recognising a Taliban diplomat as the Chargé d'Affaires at the Afghan embassy in Astana (though the move did not extend to formally recognising the Taliban government. The Taliban have no such diplomatic recognition worldwide).

There was already a good reason for some wariness from Central Asian when it came to Afghan pomegranate drinks.

In Uzbekistan, in May 2023, border guards searched a truck coming from Afghanistan that was bringing some 18 tonnes of pomegranate drink. A few boxes were marked with the letter “M” and the colour of the liquid inside the bottles in these boxes was different than what was seen with the liquids in the other boxes.

It turned out that the guards were dealing with energy drinks that were, one might say, on an entirely new level.

Forty-eight suspect bottles were tested. The results showed they contained methamphetamines.

Uzbekistan’s anti-narcotics agency determined that the buyers of the shipment planned to evaporate the liquid in the bottles and retrieve the methamphetamine residue.

The border guards estimated the seized shipment was worth tens of millions of dollars.

Buyer beware
Economic relations can be seen as the foundation of the evolving ties between the Central Asian states and the second Taliban administration of Afghanistan.

The economic links strengthen fragile spoken guarantees given by Taliban officials on not allowing any of the disparate militant groups in Afghanistan to plot attacks on neighbours.

This is an important consideration for the Central Asian countries. Among the militant groups are some who are opposed to the Taliban, whose ranks include Central Asian citizens. The ultimate goal of these citizens of Central Asia is to overthrow the governments of their homelands.

Peace before quality
Issues of product quality regularly come up in bilateral trade between countries.

However, there is no friendship behind the business and other ties between the Central Asian states and the Taliban. The two sides tolerate each other as, seeing benefits that are in everybody’s interest, they attempt to solidify relations.

In such a situation, there will be some who view shipments of bad oil or tainted beverages as signs of bad faith on the part of the other party. But in themselves, these issues are easily pushed to one side.

If tensions do arise, these seemingly small matters can take on a more sinister character. They will be remembered and added to the lists of complaints.