The number of individuals and companies in the Western Balkans sanctioned by the US – along with, to a lesser extent, the UK and other Western countries – has sharply increased in recent years. This trend has accelerated further since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

High-profile figures such as Serbia’s Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vulin, Albania’s former president and prime minister Sali Berisha and Milorad Dodik, the president of Republika Srpska in Bosnia & Herzegovina, have been among the key targets of these sanctions. 

However, the effectiveness of sanctions varies significantly across the region, according to a new report by the Global Initiative for Transnational Organised Crime.

The report highlights the limited capacity of sanctions to rapidly alter the complex political, ethnic and social dynamics of the Western Balkans. Nevertheless, in some cases, sanctions targeting individuals have succeeded in influencing the behaviour of designated persons.

“Sanctions are not a panacea. As predicted by many commentators interviewed for this study, they have not brought about swift changes in the complex political, ethnic, and social landscape of the Western Balkans. Nevertheless, they have unsteadied elements of this intricate environment,” the report says.

The report also highlights that the effects of sanctions often unfold over the long term. “Some effects may only become apparent in the long run,” it says, suggesting that sanctions frequently act as catalysts for broader events – such as corruption investigations or political shifts – rather than delivering immediate results.

Geopolitical orientation matters

The report also emphasises the influence of geopolitical alignments on the effectiveness of sanctions.

“The effects of Western sanctions vary across Western Balkan countries and are shaped by geopolitical alliances. In some countries, sanctions have led to public stigmatisation; in others, they are seen as a badge of honour against ‘malign’ Western interference,” the report observes.

It adds that in countries like Albania, ruling politicians have discreetly distanced themselves from sanctioned colleagues or hidden their collaboration. Conversely, in Serbia, sanctioned individuals have even risen to senior ministerial positions.

“Real-world results tend to fall a bit short,” Ruggero Scaturro, co-author of the report, “On Target? How effective are sanctions in the Western Balkans?”, told a recent webinar organised by Global Initiated. He said that the motivation of sanctioned individuals often plays a key role, as they may seek to unfreeze assets, restore reputations and regain international mobility.

For politicians, reputational damage can be particularly significant. Scaturro pointed to examples from North Macedonia, where political parties have distanced themselves from sanctioned individuals to safeguard their image. However, this is not universal. “Ethnic identity and geopolitical alignment shape responses,” he said, pointing out that ethnic Albanians, who tend to have a strong pro-US stance, respond differently compared to groups less influenced by Western pressure.

Cultural perceptions further complicate the picture. “Many view designated individuals as victims rather than perpetrators,” Scaturro added, which undermines the impact of sanctions and makes systemic change more challenging to achieve.

Sharp increase in sanctions 

The use of sanctions in the Western Balkans dates back to the wars accompanying the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Initially broad measures targeting entire states, sanctions have since evolved into more targeted tools aimed at individuals and entities. This shift reflects lessons from earlier experiences, where blanket sanctions often caused unintended humanitarian consequences and failed to achieve their objectives.

The report traces this evolution, noting that sanctions in the 1990s focused on insurgent factions and separatist movements threatening stability. By the 2010s, the emphasis shifted to addressing corruption and organised crime, with the US leading efforts to link these issues to broader national security concerns. This strategic pivot highlights the growing recognition of corruption as a destabilising force in the Western Balkans and beyond.

“Between 2014 and 2024, 166 sanctions were issued, targeting 108 individuals and 58 companies in the Western Balkans, predominantly on grounds of corruption, organised crime, and political destabilisation,” the report said. Bosnia & Herzegovina received the most designations, with 56 sanctions, followed by Serbia with 51.

The report’s co-author Fatjona Mejdini noted a shift in the rationale for sanctions. “Sanctions aimed at preventing destabilisation were reintroduced but increasingly focused on corruption and organised crime. This was driven by the US’s growing recognition of corruption as a serious threat to national security,” she said. However, Mejdini added that while the US became more active, multilateral institutions like the EU have been “largely absent” in the past decade, despite Western Balkan countries intensifying efforts to join the EU.

Since 2022, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has added another dimension, with sanctions increasingly addressing Russian influence in the region. This trend reflects a broader global pattern, as sanctions have become a key tool in countering transnational crime and corruption.

Challenges in implementation

The most sanctioned individual in the region, Dodik is a prime example of the challenges sanctions face. Despite significant financial restrictions imposed on him, his family, and associated businesses, Dodik continues to call for secession of Bosnia’s Serb entity, underscoring the resilience of entrenched political actors.

Vulin’s case further illustrates the limitations of sanctions. Designated by the US for alleged corruption and ties to Russian destabilisation efforts, Vulin resigned in 2023 but re-emerged in 2024 as Serbia’s vice-prime minister.

By contrast, in Albania, sanctions against former prime minister and president Sali Berisha have had more tangible effects. Berisha returned as leader of the opposition Democratic Party, but at the cost of splitting the party. A corruption investigation linked to the sanctions led to Berisha’s house arrest, casting uncertainty over his political future.

Global Initiative’s recommendations

The report concludes by urging policymakers to refine sanction strategies, advocating for locally tailored approaches. While sanctions alone cannot dismantle entrenched networks of corruption and organised crime, they remain an important strategic tool. To maximise their impact, sanctions must form part of a cohesive strategy for regional stability.

International cooperation and capacity-building are essential. The report calls for investments in local expertise and fostering regional collaboration to bolster the implementation of sanctions and support long-term reforms in the Western Balkans.