The next G7 summit begins on June 13 and will no doubt generate the usual statements of wholehearted support for Ukraine, and dark warnings that a Russian victory would mean terrible things for the world. Yet one key problem — and an abiding obstacle to the creation of any kind of meaningful strategy over the war — is that we do not have any kind of a common sense of quite what ‘victory’ or ‘defeat’ really mean. As a result, there has been no meaningful public debate in the West about the likely outcomes, what we are prepared to spend and do (which means policy is often pushed by politically-motivated antics rather than consensus), and thus, what our actual strategy may be.

Definitions of victory and defeat

To some, after all, the danger is that Moscow’s legions will roll across Ukraine until they are glaring at Nato across the Romanian border. This is looking vanishingly unlikely at present. Maybe it might have been conceivable back in February 2022, but the thoughts that Russia’s present forces, numerous and not without capability, but massively degraded since the ham-fisted initial invasion, could not just break through the Ukrainian lines but turn this into a rout that would break a nation that has shown such determination is hard to imagine.

What, conversely, does a Russian defeat mean? Even if every one of its soldiers were pushed off every square inch of occupied territory — including Crimea — then this would not end the war as such, only shift the front line to the national border. Besides, while not as implausible as the putative Russian maximalist victory, this would be no easy project. Furthermore, for some, even this would not be enough. At the Riga StratCom Dialogue security forum, Latvian President Edgars Rinkēvičs set out his view that in additional to the above, as well as reparations and war crimes tribunals, a “complete victory for Ukraine” would also entail full EU and Nato membership. How many members of either alliance would currently agree – even if they may not publicly feel at this stage they can say anything, happy to kick that can down the road.

If neither notions of victory are at present plausible, then Ukraine faces either a slow slide into a gradual freezing of the conflict, which can violently defrost at any time, or something in that broad range of possibilities between each sides’ ideal outcomes. It may not be in conformity with international law, let alone basic morality, but the likelihood is that some kind of deal will end up being struck which will trade some Ukrainian territory, and maybe guarantees of neutrality, for Moscow’s no doubt grudging acceptance of Kyiv’s sovereignty and independence, and some kind of international guarantees of both. Quite what kind of deal, where the lines may be, and what kind of wider political assurances will be involved will depend on a range of contingencies, from the ebb and flow of the battlefield to the West’s continued interest and support.

The gap between rhetoric and reality

This runs counter not only to Kyiv’s own position, but also official rhetoric in the West. Ukraine’s desire to win back all its territory and sovereignty is completely understandable. Less so is the Western line, in that many (though by no means all) governments actually realise perfectly well that any resolution is likely to involve concessions by Kyiv, even though it is presently unwilling or unable to concede them.

“Of course, it is terribly sad,” one senior French official said to me, “but Ukraine cannot have a lasting peace all on its own terms.”

A German general was a little more elliptical, citing the old saw that “politics is the art of the possible.”

It was an American official who, away from a public platform, was the most blunt: “Some day, both the Russians and the Ukrainians are going to have to start haggling, which means concessions on both sides. Our job is to make sure the Ukrainians are in a position to make the fewest concessions.”

At present, of course, there is no basis for any negotiations. When Vladimir Putin says he is willing to talk, he means he is willing to listen to Kyiv capitulate. After all, he seems to believe that he can grind away at Ukrainian lives and Western will until they are exhausted. Meanwhile, Volodymyr Zelensky’s Ten-Point Peace Plan is likewise little more than an invitation to Moscow to throw in the towel. He is presumably banking on the planned 2025 counterattack to deliver the kind of salutary blow the 2023 one never did. When both sides think time is on their side, then neither is going to make any concessions.

Even if both Moscow and Kyiv are willing and able to keep spending their blood and treasure on the war, is the West? As assistance for Ukraine is becoming more extensive, with F-16s and perhaps in-country trainers on the way, and the rules of engagement for Western-supplied weapons being relaxed, the gap between official positions and public attitudes will widen dangerously.

The gap between rhetoric and policy

As well, indeed, as the gap between rhetoric and policy. After all, were European countries really to believe the apocalyptic claims that a Russian victory against Ukraine would necessarily lead to an invasion of Nato in – according to the most extreme voices – just a couple of years, would we not expect a clear mobilisation of resources? Would defence budgets not be soaring above the current 2-2.5% of GDP of most, would economies not be being re-tooled for war, as in Russia? If one goes by what is being done, rather than what is being said, this is not really Nato’s war, nor is it expected to become so.

A recent survey from the Institute for Global Affairs, part of the Eurasia Group consultancy, showed 94% of Americans and 88% of Europeans in favour of negotiations to end the war. This should not be taken at face value, since negotiation does not necessarily mean serious concessions, and polling tends to have a natural bias towards “nice” answers. Nonetheless, with more “Ukraine sceptic” parties such as Germany’s AfD making gains in the recent elections to the European Parliament, the potential for a Trump victory in the United States, and Kyiv making concessions ahead of the forthcoming Swiss Peace Summit to try and assuage concerns in the Global South, there is the potential for a disintegration or at least decay of the pro-Ukraine consensus.

None of this necessarily means that either Kyiv or the West should be making concessions to a Kremlin that has embarked on a bloody and unprovoked imperial adventure. Instead, it is to highlight two fundamental points. The first is that there is still no real shared vision of a credible future. Kyiv may cling to its maximalist vision of victory (although there are those even in government who reluctantly – and quietly – admit this may not end up being feasible), but there is certainly no consensus in the West. The view from, say, Warsaw or Tallinn is rather different from Rome and Athens, not least as from there, the greater security threats come from the Middle East and North Africa than the Russian steppe. Strategy is a plan to achieve a particular objective; in the absence of a commonly-held goal, there can be no real strategy. No wonder the West, at least, seems still at the stage of “doing stuff,” in the hope that somehow it organically brings this terrible war towards some kind of conclusion.

At the same time, the gap between rhetoric and reality in the West is dangerous because it risks establishing unrealistic expectations, which can generate a backlash when they are not met, or further opening the gap between policy and public. The struggle for Ukraine is likely to run for years, and the kind of lasting, robust consensus supporting Kyiv through this can only be built on a serious and honest public debate. To fall back on empty mantras is easy and comfortable in the short term, but potentially dangerous in the long: we – and the Ukrainians – need and deserve better.

Mark Galeotti is director of consultancy Mayak Intelligence and honorary professor at UCL School of Slavonic & East European Studies.