Ukraine lost more territory to the advancing Armed Forces of Russia (AFR) in the second half of 2024 than at any time since the initial invasion in 2024.

“Although the worst-case scenarios didn’t materialise in 2024, it was the most difficult period since spring 2022. There were positive developments, and bright spots, but the current trajectory is negative,” says leading military analyst Michael Kofman, a senior fellow specialising in Russian military affairs in a post on social media.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) relinquished control of over 3,600 square kilometres of territory in 2024, marking a sharp increase in territorial losses compared to 2023, when around 540 square kilometres were lost.

The most intense fighting is currently in the Donbas region, as the Kremlin largely ignores other operations, hoping for a breakthrough and control over Ukraine’s key frontline logistical centre of Pokrovsk. November alone saw an average AFU daily loss of 20.3 square kilometres.

The Kursk incursion is also going badly, after the AFR recaptured half the territory it lost in August, partly thanks to the help of a reported 12,000 elite North Korean troops that have arrived on the battlefield. On January 5, the AFU launched a large counter offensive in the Russian region to push back the AFR and the Kremlin reportedly has been forced to move some of its own elite troops to the region to shore up defences.

The Russian assault has been extremely expensive in terms of the loss of life, losing as many as 1,500 men a day, according to reports, but the assault has continued relentlessly in the Donetsk and Kharkiv regions, according to Ukraine military outlet, Militarnyi, citing data from mapping Telegram channel Deep State.

“Yes, Russian losses are significant, but the current RF contract rate is still providing replacements and enabling rotations. Russian payouts and bonuses have grown astronomically, raising questions on how long they can keep this up into 2025. Eventually, no amount of [money] will be enough,” says Kofman.

The most intense fighting continues near Pokrovsk, where the AFR are only a few kilometres from the centre after months of slow advances. The Ukrainian General Staff has reported over 100 clashes between the warring armies in the last few days. Russian shelling of the city from across the border is intense and has also targeted settlements in Sumy and Kharkiv, including Oleksandrivka, Pokrovka, and Vidrodzhenske around Pokrovsk.

However, while Russia gained the initiative with the fall of Avdiivka on February 17 it has not been able to decisively capitalise on its advantage. In March, Russia launched a massive missile barrage after the US ran out of money for Ukraine at the start of the year, and Ukraine subsequently ran out of air defence ammo. Since then, Russia has destroyed or damaged the majority of Ukraine’s non-nuclear power and heat generating capacity – about half the total installed capacity – leading to rolling blackouts and freezing apartments as temperatures plunge to sub-zero with months of winter left to go.

“What’s different about the current dynamic? Russia lacks a decisive fire advantage, and there is parity in tactical strike drones. In some areas Ukraine is advantaged in UAS. Yet Russian progress has been increasing over the past six months,” says Kofman. “Russian forces have not been able to convert their material advantage into operationally significant breakthroughs. This is partly due to force quality issues. They assault in a way that presses the front line, but is not conducive to achieving major breakthroughs.”

However, on a positive note, Ukraine’s production of domestically made drones and new long-range missiles has come on by leaps and bounds. In the second half of 2024 Ukraine’s drone production overtook that of Russia for the first time, which have played a significant role in slowing the AFR advances.

“Ukraine’s own long-range strike capacity has grown immensely, holding RF infrastructure at risk. As production of drones and ground launched cruise missiles grows, in 2025 it will be far less dependent on Western strike capabilities, or dealing with associated restrictions,” says Kofman.

The EU also finally delivered the promised 1mn artillery shells giving the AFU parity in the artillery battle for the first time since the start of the war. Additionally, in December, US President Joe Biden finally signed off on permission for Ukraine to use Nato-supplied missiles on targets inside Russia – albeit with caveats.

Military outlook

“Although the worst-case scenarios didn’t materialise in 2024, it was the most difficult period since spring 2022,” said Kofman. “The current trajectory is negative.”

Kofman highlighted the strain on Ukrainian forces, noting persistent manpower shortages and a decline in mobilisation rates after the summer. Despite early gains in 2024, including the stabilisation of some fronts, Ukrainian infantry units have been significantly depleted due a growing manpower shortage.

“Mobilisation and force management remain critical challenges,” Kofman said, adding that Western-supplied equipment alone cannot address the deficit of experienced personnel at the front, as Kyiv struggles to recruit fresh forces. “Consequently, across the front [AFU] units are being detached and attached to others short of men, leading to a steady fragmentation of the defensive effort and loss of cohesion. This patchwork groupings of forces must hold the front,” says Kofman.

A new mobilisation law, passed in mid-April, temporarily improved Ukraine’s manpower problem, but the number of new recruits has since fallen off again. Moreover, the quality of the new recruits is low and the AFU is increasingly plagued by low morale and a surging number of desertions.

“Not only are the new brigades inexperienced, lacking in good leadership, and generally combat ineffective, but they are also not being employed as brigades either. Instead, battalions are detached and sent piecemeal to reinforce other units,” says Kofman.

Ukraine’s decision to make new brigades, instead of replacing losses at the front line among the best and most experienced units, has proven to be one of the more puzzling force management choices given the battlefield situation and problems with mobilisation, says Kofman.

Russian forces, despite sustaining high casualties and equipment losses, have adapted their tactics. “They employ incremental advances with small groups of dismounted infantry supported by reconnaissance and strike drones,” Kofman noted. This approach, he explained, limits equipment losses but fails to deliver decisive breakthroughs.

Strategic outlook

The coming months are expected to test both sides further, with weather conditions slowing operations in December. Russian forces continue to press south of Pokrovsk, while Ukraine focuses on shoring up its manpower and leveraging technological advantages, including expanded long-range strike capabilities.

“Stabilising the front line is essential to buying time and forcing Moscow to reassess,” Kofman concluded. “But without addressing fundamental issues in training, mobilisation, and force structure, Ukraine risks further setbacks.”

Militarnyi predicts Russia will prioritise the capture of Kurakhove, Toretsk, and Chasiv Yar in 2025 while pushing towards Dnipropetrovsk. Meanwhile, the West’s continued support for Ukraine, both militarily and economically, remains a crucial factor in shaping the outcome of the conflict.

Monthly territorial losses in 2024:

• June: 100 sq km (3.4 sq km/day)
• July: 160 sq km (5.2 sq km/day)
• August: 370 sq km (12 sq km/day)
• September: 400 sq km (13.4 sq km/day)
• October: 560 sq km (18.7 sq km/day)
• November: 610 sq km (20.3 sq km/day)
• December: 510 sq km (16.45 sq km/day)

Throughout 2024, Russian forces made significant advances across multiple fronts. In the Velyka Novosilka-Ocheretyne sector, more than 2,400 square kilometres were seized, with advances reaching 45 kilometres deep. Russian troops are now less than 10 kilometres from the administrative border of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

Other hotspots include the New York-Siversk area, where over 335 square kilometres were taken, and the Lyman-Kupiansk front, where Russian forces captured at least 479 square kilometres. In northern Kharkiv, Ukraine managed to reclaim some ground after initially losing 211 square kilometres during a Russian offensive in May.

Further south, Russia seized approximately 95 square kilometres in Kherson Oblast, including areas around Krynky. In Zaporizhzhia, losses amounted to 97 square kilometres, primarily near Robotyne.

Outlook

“The front is not imploding, but Russian forces have increased their rate of gain over July-December. The most problematic area is south of Pokrovsk. Following the fall of Avdiivka, then Vuhledar, RF forces have slowly taken important anchoring positions in Donetsk,” says Kofman.

Given the worsening military situation, the possibility of ceasefire talks has increased and the incoming President-elect Donald Trump has promised to end the war “in 24 hours” after his inauguration on January 20.

Ukraine is facing the prospect of a dramatic reduction in financial support from its Western partners and a fall in arms deliveries. The outgoing Biden administration has tried to lock in as much in the form of military supplies as it can before it departs and analysts say that Ukraine will probably have enough equipment and ammo to be able to continue to fight on in 2025, but after that the outlook for sufficient support worsens.

Despite gains in drone capabilities and improved fortifications, the rising costs of maintaining a coherent defence strategy weigh heavily on Ukraine’s prospects as the conflict enters another critical year.

Kofman argues that you could view the current situation positively as Ukraine is grinding down Russian forces and Russia’s gains are small relative to costs. But Ukraine also can’t sustain more losses and the coldest part of winter is still ahead.

“But the current situation requires course correction. Spinning the prevailing dynamic as positive strikes me as unhelpful,” says Kofman. “Increased long-range strike capability alone is unlikely to compel Russia to negotiate as long as RF keeps making gains along the front, and is increasing its own strike capacity. Stabilising the front line is essential to buying time and forcing Moscow to reassess.”