The Pokrovsk front's collapse was not sudden, and it is not yet complete, but it has been continuous and incremental since the fall of Avdiivka on February 17, when the Russian armed forces gained the initiative in the war in Ukraine. According to a detailed report by Ukrainska Pravda, published on September 17, Ukraine's defence forces have been retreating almost weekly towards Pokrovsk since then, and the fate of the city hangs in the balance.

The first problems arose when the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, holding positions near Orlivka 45km to the east of Pokrovsk and Semenivka, 65 km to the north-east of Pokrovsk, was replaced by the 68th Separate Jaeger Brigade. The report notes that "the rotation of military units is one of the most vulnerable defence areas in general, and for the Ukrainian army in particular, and the Russians took advantage of that."

During March and April, Russian forces gradually advanced westward, capturing Umanske, Yasnoborodivka and Netailove on the road to Pokrovsk. In mid-April, they focused their efforts along a railway line north of Avdiivka on February 17, which lies 55 km to the east of Pokrovka, allowing them to capture key settlements like Ocheretyne, Prohres and Zhelanne. The dense vegetation along the railway helped conceal Russian troop movements. The Ukrainska Pravda report highlights that "the Russians mostly deployed infantry in the area, it was the most effective tactic they could have chosen."

Map of the Pokrovsk salient as of September 16 /DeepState

A key turning point came when Russian forces captured Ocheretyne, an industrial town about eight hours hike to the west of Pokrovsk. Ukrainska Pravda describes Ocheretyne as "a particularly useful defence position" due to its urbanisation and industrial facilities. The capture of Prohres in July, the next town on the road towards Pokrovsk, further destabilised the Ukrainian defence, creating a domino effect that led to the encirclement of Ukrainian forces near Pokrovsk.

At one point, around 50 soldiers from the 31st Separate Mechanised Brigade were trapped between Prohres and Lozuvatske just to the north. Although some reports indicated that Colonel Andrii Usanov, the brigade’s commander, had not issued an order to withdraw, a battalion commander told Ukrainska Pravda that Usanov had "personally approved an exit plan devised by the commanders of the 1st and 3rd Battalions and provided them with artillery cover" in a “brilliant escape” that rescued all his men, including seven wounded. Despite this, Usanov was removed from his position for the brigade’s failure at Pokrovsk, despite loud protestations by his men.

Russian forces have covered most of the 65 km between Pokrovsk and Avdiivka and are now positioned just 8-10 km from Pokrovsk’s city centre. They have captured key areas around the northern and central parts of the salient and more AFR forces are closing in from the south.

AFR troops are advancing on Memryk, Ukrainsk and the administrative border of Selydove, all of which lie about 50 km to the south of Pokrovsk. According to the report, "the Russians will likely try to encircle Ukrainian forces once again by bringing their units together near Hirnyk and the meandering ridge above Krasnohorivka, further to the south of Memryk and east of Pokrovsk."

Several factors contributed to the collapse of the Pokrovsk front:

• Russian superiority in manpower and artillery: Commander Serhii Filimonov of the 108th Da Vinci Wolves Separate Battalion told Ukrainska Pravda that a defensive position manned by four Ukrainian soldiers "can be attacked by up to 80 Russians per day." The war in Pokrovsk is largely fought by infantry, with close-quarter combat resulting in significant casualties, mostly bullet wounds. The Russian forces on the front line in Donbas significantly outnumber the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU).
• Shortage of personnel: The lack of experienced and motivated soldiers has been a recurring issue. A soldier who spent six months on the front line said: "the backbone of the brigades was lost during the battles near Avdiivka, and the replenishments that arrived later left a lot to be desired… In Semenivka we had about 90% experienced people in the unit and 10% newcomers. Now we have about the same ratio, but the other way round. And the average age of the newcomers can even be 55+, not 45+."
• Inadequate fortifications: Many of the trenches and dugouts on the Pokrovsk front were poorly placed, often in the middle of open fields, visible to the enemy and impossible to resupply. The report notes that these fortifications "help the enemy advance more than they help us defend."

"When [Ukrainian MP Mariana] Bezuhla posts photos of empty trenches and asks why nobody was defending them, I know exactly why. Because it’s stupid to sit in a hole in the middle of a bare field. Sooner or later an FPV drone will fly right into your face," one FVP operator told Ukrainska Pravda angrily.

• Focus on the Kursk front: Some questioned why Ukrainian forces were concentrated on the offensive in Russia’s Kursk Oblast while Pokrovsk was falling. However, Ukrainska Pravda clarified that most of the brigades defending Pokrovsk had not been relocated to the Kursk operation. The only exception was the third battalion of the 80th Separate Galician Air Assault Brigade, which was moved to the Kursk front from Krasnohorivka.

“The mighty Air Assault Brigades – the 80th Galician, 82nd Bukovyna and 95th Polesian – which were and still are at the heart of the Kursk operation, could theoretically have slowed the Russians down as they advanced in the east. But first of all, given the lack of a stable front line and proper fortifications, plus Russian air superiority, it’s hard to say that this would have made sense,” Ukrainska Pravda reports. “Secondly, these are Ukraine’s most formidable offensive – rather than defensive – formations, and from a personnel management standpoint, they should be deployed as intended at least on occasion.”

Despite the new front in Kursk, Russian forces did not scale back their offensive in Donbas – quite the oppositive. The report states that "the number of combat clashes on the Pokrovsk front has slightly intensified," rising from 40 to 52 daily encounters since the Kursk operation began.

Clashes on the nearby Kurakhove front have also risen from 14 to 20 a day. Assaults on the Kupiansk and Lyman fronts also increased. The number of combat clashes on the Toretsk front – currently regarded as the second hottest after Pokrovsk – has remained almost unchanged. It’s only on the Kharkiv front, 250 km to the north of Pokrovsk, that the ferocity of Russia’s infantry attack has diminished, as this was one of the few places the Kremlin tapped for fresh forces to counter the Kursk incursion.

With Russian forces entrenched and pushing towards Pokrovsk, Ukrainian officers fear the city may face the same fate as Bakhmut, enduring months of brutal fighting before it is reduced to ruins and eventually falls into Russian hands.