As Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon prepares to step down in favour of his son Rustam Emomali, a spate of arrests indicate that his regime is investigating a planned “uprising” that is “nothing more than a figment of the regime’s imagination”, a Carnegie researcher has suggested.

“All summer, Tajikistan has watched as, one after another, prominent politicians and public figures have been arrested for allegedly conspiring to carry out a coup,” wrote Galiya Ibragimova, an analyst at the Berlin-based Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in a commentary released on August 20.

She added: “The criminal case itself is classified, so the available details are scarce. Indeed, there are many indications that this ‘uprising’ is nothing more than a figment of the regime’s imagination. After three decades at the top, President Emomali Rahmon is preparing to hand over power to his son Rustam Emomali, and it seems likely he is seeking to purge anyone who could feasibly threaten the transition.

“One of the oddest parts of the coup allegations is the list of detainees, who range from politicians and activists loyal to the regime to opposition figures, former soldiers, ex-ministers, and those with hardly any public profile. It’s not at all clear what could have united such a disparate bunch and supposedly led them to conspire with the Tajik opposition abroad.”

"Heir" to the presidency Rustam Emomali with his father and president Emomali Rahmon (Credit: Tajik Presidential Administration).

The alleged ringleader was parliamentary deputy Saidjafar Usmonzoda, the former head of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, which plays the role in the regime of an in-system opposition party that never attracts much support.

Tajik prosecutors have claied that Usmonzoda plotted with National Alliance, a coalition of opposition groups located outside the country.

His arrest, observed Ibragimova, came as a surprise given that he has long been seen as loyal to Rahmon.

Alleged ringleader: Saidjafar Usmonzoda (Credit: Khovar).

Others arrests have included those of Hamrokhon Zarifi, a former foreign minister who was close to Usmonzoda; Ahmadshoh Komilzoda, a prominent journalist who serves as first deputy chairman of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan; 73-year-old Akbarsho Iskandarov, an acting president from the 1990s viewed as no longer involved in politics; and field commanders from Tajikistan’s 1992–1997 civil war, namely Yaqub Salimov, Salamsho Muhabbatov and Nazrullo Naimov.

Genuine opposition figures have also been detained. They include the deputy leader of the Social Democratic Party of Tajikistan, Shakirjon Hakimov.

“Even the idea of someone trying to topple Rahmon raises questions,” said Ibragimova in her commentary. “Not only do the president and his close relations control almost all aspects of public life in Tajikistan, but the armed forces, security forces, and bureaucracy are also loyal to him. Rahmon’s son Rustam heads the upper house of the Tajik parliament—the second most senior position in Tajik government. He is already assembling a team to take over from his father.

“Rahmon’s eldest daughter, Ozoda, is presidential chief of staff, and her husband, Jamoliddin Nuraliev, is an influential banker. Some of the president’s other daughters are also in top jobs: Rukhshona is a career diplomat, while her husband is the influential oligarch Shamsullo Sohibov (who controls transport, trade, media, and finance); Tahmina and her husband, Zarifbek Davlatov, own a firm with a monopoly on airline tickets; and Parvina oversees the pharmaceutical sector.”

Of course, pointed out Ibragimova, not all of Rahmon’s children “are thrilled about Rustam being elevated to the top job. In particular, it’s clear that Ozoda and Rukhshona also strive for political power. However, they all understand that if the presidency were to pass to someone outside of the family, they would lose everything. For this reason, the closer the transition comes, the more the family is closing ranks. It would be madness to organize a coup right now.”

Looking at claims that the political opposition—both at home and abroad—were involved in a conspiracy to topple Rahmon, the analyst said this was “also difficult to fathom”. As president, she noted, Rahmon has destroyed or exiled almost all of his opponents. The opposition in exile, Ibragimova contended “is not a serious threat either: not only do they have very limited resources, they have next to no influence inside Tajikistan”.

Ibragimova summed up: “It’s hard to imagine, therefore, that the ‘coup’ has no connection to the regime’s preparations for the transition of power. While Rustam Emomali has been in politics for many years, some fear he is not ready to assume the presidency. He’s regularly accompanied by his father at official events, and when he’s shown on television, his words are often replaced by a voiceover so that his voice is not heard, prompting speculation over his public speaking skills. Emomali Rahmon is accordingly preoccupied with ensuring a smooth handover.”

The analyst concluded: “Ahead of the power transition, Rahmon is evidently trying to minimize risks. Even so, it’s difficult to imagine everything will go to plan. The experience of neighboring Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan shows that inheriting a whole nation is a process fraught with unexpected complications. Even if Tajikistan’s transition goes smoothly, Rustam Emomali will still need to retain power. The big question is whether he’s up to the task.”

Potential enemy of planned succession? National security chief Saimumin Yatimov (Tajik presidential administration).

In another consideration of how Rahmon—a member of the Danghara clan—might seek to stabilise the regime environment for son Rustam Emomali ahead of the succession, Ibragimova added observations on Mahmadsaid Ubaydulloyev—an apparent member of the Farkhor clan who was mayor of Dushanbe from 1996 to 2017 and, according to rumour, secretly supported the opposition and harboured presidential ambitions—and Saimumin Yatimov—head of the State Committee for National Security and known as an influential member of the Farkhor clan.

Noted Ibragimova: “Both Ubaydulloyev and Yatimov are very familiar with the ugly side of the Rahmon regime, which makes them dangerous. In particular, there is bad blood between Yatimov and Rustam Emomali, who seriously wounded the security chief when he shot him in 2022, apparently for refusing to obey an order. Many believe that, ultimately, Rahmon is likely to remove Yatimov.

“Even Rahmon, however, cannot just fire the powerful Yatimov. A more logical approach would be to make Yatimov realize his vulnerabilities—for example, by arresting Usmonzoda, who not only comes from the same clan, but is related by marriage to Yatimov. In this way, Yatimov is given to understand he could also come under suspicion.”