Central Asian leaders sent German Chancellor Olaf Scholz a clear and consistent message during his three-day visit to the region: “To get, you’ve got to give.”

The five Central Asian heads of state gathered in the Kazakh capital Astana on September 17 for a meeting with Scholz, with discussions focusing on expanding trade between the West and Central Asia. Germany is particularly interested in boosting natural gas imports from the region as part of a continuing pan-European Union effort to pivot away from Russian energy. No specific deals were announced at the meeting’s conclusion, but all sides were upbeat about the future, holding out the possibility that agreements can be reached in the not-too-distant future.

“Exchanges between our societies have never been so close, and they are constantly growing,” the DPA news agency quoted Scholz as saying.

The meeting’s host, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, reciprocated the goodwill, saying “the thorough exchange of views that took place reinforced the mutual interest of the leaders in further deepening cooperation.” He also emphasised that energy issues will play a “key role” in guiding relations.

Tokayev’s remarks during the meeting offered a rough roadmap for future trade relations. He indicated Kazakhstan and other regional states would be more than happy to help Germany, along with other EU states, meet its energy needs. But Central Asia is looking for something more than just money in return for energy exports.

Describing Germany as a world leader in “the field of economic and technological innovation,” Tokayev said Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states want to tap into German knowhow with the aim of promoting the “localisation of production and the production of products with high added value.” Among the economic sectors he mentioned that could benefit from German technology transfers were finance, agriculture, transit logistics and information technology.

Tokayev also made it clear that Kazakhstan sought German expertise, along with investment, to develop Central Asia’s green energy agenda, specifically mentioning an initiative undertaken by Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to develop solar- and wind-power plants to generate electricity for export to the EU. “We invite our German partners to consider the possibility of participating in this strategic project,” Tokayev dropped a not-so-subtle hint.

Before visiting Kazakhstan, Scholz stopped in Uzbekistan, where a similar “give-get” dynamic governed his talks in Samarkand with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. The chief outcome was a politically expedient deal under which Germany can send would-be Afghan migrants to Uzbekistan for eventual repatriation to Afghanistan; in return, Berlin agreed to accept Uzbek skilled workers to fill employment opportunities in Germany. 

“With our agreement … we are enabling people with great talents to enter our country. Also, we committed to un-bureaucratic processes so that those who cannot stay in our country must go back,” Scholz wrote on his X channel.

For Scholz, the agreement shows that his embattled Social Democrat-led government is addressing the migration issue at home. Simmering dissatisfaction with the government’s handling of migration has caused an erosion of popular support for his coalition and was widely cited as a major factor in the strong performance of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) Party in recent state elections. 

The deal is also a win for Mirziyoyev, whose administration is trying to shift Uzbekistan’s economic orientation from being mainly a producer of raw materials to a manufacturer of finished goods. As part of the overhaul, the government is attempting to reorganise the country’s labour market, in particular labour migration, by creating more opportunities for skilled workers abroad.

By extension, the German-Uzbek agreement can potentially benefit the militant Taliban leadership in Kabul, which, since regaining power in 2021, has sought to gain international recognition of its rule. Tashkent, of late, has sought to engage the Taliban, aiming to stabilise conditions along Uzbekistan’s southern border, as well as gain some say over the completion and operation of the controversial Qosh-Tepa canal project. As part of its engagement drive, Uzbekistan has agreed to process comparatively small amounts of Afghan crude oil to help meet domestic needs in Afghanistan. The Uzbek government also recently agreed on a investment deal worth potentially up to $2.5bn with the Taliban.

If the Taliban accepts the return of Afghan nationals sent from Germany to Uzbekistan, the militant movement would demonstrate that it can act as a responsible international actor, potentially helping its efforts to legitimise its rule.

This article first appeared on Eurasianet here.