“The elections were like a party, it was a celebration,” said Londa, her elbows resting on the counter of the khachapuri kiosk where she works in Dmanisi, in Georgia’s Kvemo Kartli region. On the opposite side of the town’s central square, the draughty Dmanisi museum boasts replicas of five 1.8mn-year-old hominid skulls which were dug up in nearby caves in 1991. This discovery put Georgia on the map as the motherland of the first Europeans, with Dmanisi as the flag bearer. Yet, in Georgia’s recent parliamentary elections, the increasingly anti-European Georgian Dream (GD) party took 75% of the votes here, without much arm twisting.

This is a depressing picture, but in some rural regions of Georgia, the near-unanimous support Georgia Dream enjoyed in the recent parliamentary election may not have been fabricated to the extent Georgia’s pro-Western opposition are claiming. In truth, for many rural dwellers, GD means stability, while regime change means war. 

The possible manipulation of regional votes by the victorious GD party is a central question in the aftermath of Georgia’s October 26 general election. The week since polling day has been defined by accusations of widespread fraud and a “stolen” election by the country’s pro-Western opposition and president, who refuse to accept the result, and whose calls for an investigation into alleged electoral violations have been backed by the international community.

Particular suspicion has arisen as to how the official winners, who took 54% of the votes, orchestrated major gains in Georgia’s poorer, more remote regions, whilst performing badly in larger cities and losing the capital, Tbilisi.

Foul play in the regions

In a country with a 60% urban population, GD enjoyed over half of its official countrywide total in rural areas alone, garnering 639,000 votes there, which analysts agree likely signals foul play. 

“The deviation from statistically expected results was widespread but most pronounced at specific polling locations in rural areas. These locations are likely to have had the most significant vote manipulation at the polling location level,” said Edison Research, whose exit poll on the evening of election day estimated the collective opposition had won 52%, and GD 41%, a very different picture from the official Central Election Commission results, which show the opposition took just 37% of the vote.

Independent data analysis, which first appeared on X and has now been picked up by the European democracy watchdog, Europe Elects, backs up opposition claims of fraud in the October 26 election, shedding light specifically on what may have gone on in rural areas. “In more rural municipalities, the governing GD racked up disturbingly high vote shares much in excess of the expected,” Europe Elects wrote on X. A chart measuring GD votes across Georgia reveals a “Russian tail” of approximately 400 anomalous locations where unusually high support for the government was recorded, indicating irregular voting distributions, and hinting at possible ballot stuffing or miscounting favouring the ruling party.

Moreover, both President Salome Zourabichvili and a number of Western politicians from outside Georgia have made claims of Russian interference in the election to help GD to its latest victory. 

Source: Europe Elects via X. 

According to official data from Georgia’s Central Election Commission, GD won comfortably in most regions of Georgia, but lost or was relatively close to losing in major cities. This suggests, firstly, the absence of a widespread, all-inclusive vote rigging scheme that GD could have potentially outsourced from abroad, and secondly, that the ruling party paid special attention to rural areas to either shore up legitimate support or manufacture non-existent support there.

The southern provinces of Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli, where CEC data shows GD enjoyed its strongest lead, provide ample evidence to support this second point. In Javakheti’s municipalities of Ninotsminda and Akhalkalaki, which are dominated by Georgia’s 5% Armenian national minority, GD enjoyed around 90% of the vote. In Dmanisi, a municipality of Kvemo Kartli and home to a mix of Georgians and Azeris, support for GD came out as 25% higher than at the local elections of 2021. Near unanimous support or a large jump in support has naturally drawn allegations of result forgery in these provinces, most likely with the help of Russia and its “special operation” to rig the Georgian elections.

Yet, my recent trip to both these regions revealed evidence which, while by no means erasing the possibility of external medalling, suggests that GD really didn’t require any direct assistance from Moscow to swing the elections their way. Instead, a mix of highly effective local campaigning and a strong presence by the ruling party, shortcomings by the opposition, the coercion of vulnerable and poor populations and electoral violations on polling day secured GD the result it wanted.

Festive atmosphere

“Maybe there were problems elsewhere, but here, no, it was a very calm day,” said Nino, who works in the department of culture and education of the Dmanisi municipal government office, in Kvemo Kartli region. The building faces Dmanisi’s central square and Londa’s khachapuri stand. “There were some votes for the opposition and people were allowed to support them, but votes were mostly for Georgian Dream,” said Londa, as she counted out change. From a side door, her son hurtled into the small kitchen, where two other women were preparing long, bean-filled loaves called lobiani. The pink-faced boy shyly introduced himself in English, before rushing off to race his friends around Dmanisi’s newly renovated park, which echoed with the happy shouts of children. 

The newly renovated park in Dmanisi, southern Georgia. 

Londa described a festive GD rally on the eve of polling day organised by Dmanisi’s mayor, GD representative, Koba Muradashvili, the local face of the ruling party. The caption “I voted for peace, progression and the development of my country and our families” accompanied a picture Muradashvili posted to Facebook on polling day of himself submitting his vote. The young and charismatic Muradashvili took up the mayoral post following the 2021 local elections in Georgia and is hugely popular in Dmanisi. The improvements the province has seen under his leadership is highly likely the reason behind the 25% jump in support for the ruling party there, as opposed to orders given within the Kremlin walls.

“The local government really takes care of people here, conditions have improved,” said resident Tamari, who was delighted to talk for twenty minutes on the subject, and highlighted in particular a drop in crime rates and higher pensions since GD took power in 2012. 

“We have a really nice mayor, he does everything,” agreed Londa, listing the pipes network, roads, health services and the bazaar as just a few areas where local authorities have invested time and money. GD’s efforts have paid off. “We won’t let this government go,” said Londa. 

From what local people said, it appears Muradashvili has succeeded in creating something of a utopia in Dmanisi over the past few years, and it is really no surprise that residents opted to keep him and gave GD their vote on October 26.

Boosting the quality of life will have won them success there, but GD’s conservative campaign pledges have also gained much traction in rural Dmanisi, where the voting population is dominated by the older generation. “I am with this government because they say no to men and men families, and transgender people,” said Tamari, who added that she sees no issue with the recent ‘Russian law’ — a reference to the ‘foreign agents’ law modelled on similar legislation in Russia — imposed by the ruling party, which many Georgians view as an attempt to crack down on civil liberties and silence dissent. 

GD’s anti-West rhetoric and promise to fend off European pseudo-values has also hit home. “We want to be independent and free from others, but European countries want to rule us, and our government protects us from this,” said Tamari. 

Elman, an Azerbaijani man in his 70s, was particularly adamant on the “correct” direction for Georgia; all GD needed to do was convert his Soviet-era suspicion of the West into a vote for its own anti-European campaign. “We don’t need the West, they’re crooks. Russia is the best for us, we want Russia. We lived together with them for 70 years, they’re a strong state,” Elman said. 

The final nail in the coffin for the opposition, if one was needed, was the widespread resentment towards former president Mikheil Saakashvili’s United Movement National (UNM), in power from 2003-2012, which is prominent among many of Georgia’s older generation who remember that period well. “Our local government gave the unemployed jobs and paid them GEL300 [$108],” explained Tamari. “The opposition said this is low, but why should they say that? When they were in the government they did nothing,” she said. 

When coupled with the total absence of any meaningful opposition campaign in many remote towns and villages, particularly where national minorities live, it is unsurprising GD were able to win people over so many in places like Dmanisi. “The opposition only helps a few individuals here who they know,” said Londa, “but Georgian Dream helps everyone!”

Georgian Dream posters on one Dmanisi resident's front gate. 

Vulnerable and isolated 

The depressing reality of both genuine and manufactured support for the ruling party is even starker in the Ninotsminda and Akhalkalaki municipalities, where GD won 87% and 90% of the votes respectively. These municipalities are home to the highest numbers of inhabitants of Armenian descent in Georgia – 95% in Ninotsminda and 93% in Akhalkalaki – and the strategic coercion of this more vulnerable and isolated demographic was key to how GD generated local support for itself.

“There were no real problems on election day in the Ninotsminda municipality, nothing more than usual … and there was no Russian interference here, I can tell you that 100%,” said Ararat, a news reader on Ninotsminda’s local radio station, Nor Radio. The station, which has an office in what local people call “the five-storey building in town”, has hit tough times recently since it refused to register as “foreign agent” in a public rejection of recent GD legislation. The only manipulation the presenter mentioned was that GD deliberately circulated rumours prior to polling day that the machines voters would use to submit their ballots electronically would record who they voted for, and therefore many ticked 41, the box for the ruling party, out of fear of repercussions. Ararat put the low turnout of opposition voters, in Ninotsminda at least, down to this.

However, he added, “The thing is, is that the ruling party were really active here. They went round the villages campaigning. Everyone voted for them so why would they need to fake any results?” 

“They had lots of skills and tools … they put all their efforts into winning,” added Kristine, a journalist for the Akhalkalaki-based outlet, JNews. “They used local government reps in the villages who lobbied for them, threatening, incentivising and buying people; their methods are the same everywhere, here in Akhalkalaki and in Ninotsminda. They also told every agitator they hired to bring 20 or so GD voters with them on polling day – that is an example of effective and well-organised work, I think. We have a very compact municipality; everyone here knows everyone and respects each other’s loyalty to the ruling party.” 

Ararat speculated that GD used the local population’s status as a national minority to its advantage, targeting places like Ninotsminda and Akhalkalaki where votes could be won easily and without much resistance. “National minority people worry about being liked, and they are not integrated into the rest of the community,” Ararat said, and Kristine mentioned the “high levels of fear” in Georgia’s Armenian and Azeri-dominated regions, making manipulation easy for the ruling party.

Georgian Dream is believed to have targeted national minorities in places such as Akhalkalaki. 

Kristine rejected Zourabichvili’s comment that an ‘Armenian carousel’ system was used in the recent elections, which involves one individual voting multiple times using fraudulent identification, and could have been the reason for such high GD support in Javakheti. “Did they not do that in Georgian villages and Georgian towns? So why is it being called the Armenian carousel? The result makes sense, the ruling party just worked really hard before the elections to get support here, and people voted for them,” the journalist said, adding that the ‘carousel’ style violation in Javakheti may have been far less extreme than in other areas.

Russian interference

The other question following the Georgian election is whether and to what extent Russia interfered to sway the result in GD’s favour. 

“We were witnesses and victims of a Russian special operation,” announced Zourabichvili the day after the election, alluding to a Kremlin-orchestrated, mass vote-rigging scheme implemented in Georgia that would ensure the loyal GD party retain power and keep the nation within Russia’s sphere of geopolitical influence. 

Speaking to Reuters the following day, the president appeared to backtrack on allegations of direct Russian involvement but did confirm her belief that “the methodology used and the support of most probably Russian [Federal Security Service] FSB types is shown in this election”. 

Anna Dolidze, one of the leaders of the opposition coalition Strong Georgia, made similar accusations of interference by Georgia’s neighbour to the north, stating that the GD government “overruled the majority’s will with Russian support”. 

Claims of Russian involvement have been echoed outside Georgia, notably in a recent press release by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), which stated that “Russia has implemented various methods from its hybrid warfare playbook to influence the recent Georgian elections”. Unlike President Zourabichvili, this report explicitly accuses the Kremlin of having a hand in GD’s victory, something the ISW linked to Moscow’s wider “efforts to reconsolidate control over the post-Soviet space through the ongoing elections in Moldova and Georgia”. EU leaders have also played the Russia card. “Russia is intensifying its hybrid operations in the EU’s neighbourhood. The recent parliamentary elections in Georgia and the EU referendum in Moldova are clear examples of such interference,” Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda stated.

Looking to Russia for the root of possible fraud in the election is both logical and politically convenient, but so far lacks any concrete, empirical backing. For what it’s worth, the Kremlin has denied meddling in Saturday’s vote, calling Zourabichvili’s allegations of a Russian operation “completely unsubstantiated” and instead accusing Western states of attempting to “pressure Georgian authorities and directly influence the course of the election campaign”. Georgia was granted EU candidate status last year, but its accession process was halted following “democratic backsliding” by the ruling party, and the EU has warned it will not resume until the government revokes certain anti-European legislation.

This defence by the Kremlin is, of course, weak. As the past 10 years of Ukrainian history show us, Russia has form where imperialist crusades are concerned, and it wouldn’t be unlike President Vladimir Putin, who has been in power for nearly 25 years, to instrumentalise the recent elections in Georgia to secure further geopolitical gains in the South Caucasus and supplement Moscow’s existing, Ivanishvili-shaped influence in Georgia, 20% of which Russia occupies. 

The Moscow-leaning GD party, for its part, would likely welcome Russia’s hand in warping the election results to its advantage. The ruling party have taken an increasingly pro-Russian, anti-West stance in recent months, forcing through the “foreign agent” law and anti-LGBTQ propaganda law, which mirror identical bills passed a decade ago in Russia. Georgia’s biggest trading partner is currently Russia, and strong business links between the two countries have grown stronger since the mass emigration of Russians to Georgia since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze has described his country’s stance on Russia as “pragmatic and principled” without “excessive hatred and aggression”, suggesting strategic management of a powerful neighbour, as opposed to submission to a Kremlin operation which would hand GD its fourth term on a plate.

Russian style

“It is very easy to speculate,” the chair of the Georgian independent think-tank, Geocase, Victor Kipiani, told bne IntelliNews. “I personally do not believe someone from the Kremlin has been instructing GD on a daily basis.” In his opinion, Georgia’s fate as a ‘prisoner of geography' prompts a relationship with Russia resembling more a ‘marriage of convenience’ than a puppet and puppeteer situation. As he sees it, a reduced Western presence in its near abroad is beneficial to Russia to ensure the ‘strategic depth’ which historically has been so crucial to its survival. 

With regard to Russia’s involvement in Georgia’s recent elections, Kipiani suggested that any fraud would have been carried out internally, adding that “at this point speaking about Russian stooges or GD being directed by the Kremlin is a bit of an exaggerated statement”.

Certainly Russia-style violation methods were used at multiple polling stations on October 26. Numerous videos surfaced of ballot stuffing, voter intimidation and bribery, breaches in voter privacy and other practices which undermine the democratic process. International and local election observers have commented on both the pre-election period and election day in Georgia, with the OSCE highlighting an “uneven playing field”, “entrenched polarisation”, “pressure on voters” and “frequent compromises in vote secrecy”. Tatia Kalatozishvili, who was observing the voting in Jorjiashvili in Kvemo Kartli, thinks such repression can be traced back to only one suspect. “The methods are clear, this much falsification and fraud is the result of Russia,” she told bne IntelliNews.

Soft power 

Speaking in Ninotsminda, Ararat called Zourabichvili’s claims of direct Russian interference in the voting “absurd”, but he did acknowledge the soft power the Kremlin wields in this region of Georgia. “There are no families here which don’t have relatives living and working in Russia – this is a fact,” the presenter said. 

“Akhalkalaki lives off Russian money,” Kristine said, matter of factly, “it’s not okay to support anything else.” “Many people here support Russia because of their circumstances, they depend on Russia for their family’s income,” added her colleague Rima.

Georgian Dream's office in Akhalkalaki. 

The frequent movement of Javakheti’s population in and out of Russia, coupled with locals’ poor or non-existent knowledge of Georgian, meaning they get their news from Russian or Armenian channels, has led to a Russian information sphere forming in this area of Georgia, Kristine explained. “Ordinary people can’t think critically,” the journalist said, pointing out the window of the JNews office, which unfortunately is on the floor above the ruling party’s Akhalkalaki HQ, to a familiar GD banner which depicts six opposition leaders, including Mikheil Saakashvili, on leashes, and the legend ‘No to war! No to agents!’ Little in-flow of new ideas, isolation from the rest of society, and low education levels in the Javakheti region have solidified the information vacuum and permitted the ruling party’s campaign messages to resonate particularly strongly, as people are powerless to question them. 

The ruling party’s war vs. peace tagline, far from a political choice, functioned in Akhalkalaki as a trigger of a basic human instinct to choose a path devoid of conflict and destruction, and GD had the image of Ukraine as a convenient example of what to not vote for on hand. “The ‘peace’ message would have worked on any community,” said Kristine. “People don’t want to fight, they want to live in peace, and this psychological game really impacted the election results.” 

A fear of change is also part of the picture and is embodied by a cheese and fish seller in the small village of Poka in the Ninotsminda region, which looks out over Paravani lake, the largest in Georgia. “If I don’t vote for 41 my shop will close.” said the vendor. “I just have a feeling. 

“They’re in power now, I knew they would win power again, why go against them? People live well here, we don’t have war, no one’s giving us a hard time and our local government is very good,” he continued, rooting around in a crate of freshly caught fish. “What is a new party going to give us? If Saakashvili came again everything would be bad for us, he doesn’t like Javakheti,” said the seller, highlighting just how vague and misinformed some rural dwellers’ understanding of the current political situation really is, and exposing the major holes in the pro-Western opposition’s campaigning.

The local journalists I spoke to unanimously agreed that, much like in other rural regions of Georgia where GD received very high levels of support, the pre-election period in Javakheti was characterised by the distinct lack of active campaigning or even a presence by the four opposition coalitions. 

“The opposition parties didn’t do any work here”, said Ararat; “Number 5 (‘Unity’) literally did nothing, they didn’t even bring banners. Instead of arguing with GD they should have laid out their plan more clearly.” With no support from other parties, it is no wonder vulnerable communities in Javakheti were unable to resist the ruling party’s tried and tested methods. 

“If you do nothing, you get no results, am I right?” said Kristine, who described the sum total of opposition activity in Akhalkalaki as “sitting, smoking, hanging around in their office”. “I don’t know how they could have expected good results,” Kristine said.

“None of the opposition party leaders ever came to talk to our region to meet people or tell them their plan should they get elected. People here have no idea about what other parties exist; they’ve only ever heard of GD,” said Rima. 

While he does not doubt that foul play by GD did take place, Geocase chair Victor Kipiani also admits that the opposition could have played the pre-election period more to their advantage, not just in the rural regions but on a broader campaign level. “Their fragmentation was the wrong decision,” Kipiani said, adding that the opposition failed to hit “clear targets” GD left open for them – not challenging Ivanishvili’s false perception of a “peaceful” Georgia where 20% of the territory of occupied by Russia, for example. The opposition should also have alerted voters to the ruling party’s increasingly autocratic style more explicitly, he added.

Election day violations 

Not all GD’s support in Javakheti arose organically, of course. As US President Joe Biden mentioned in a recent statement condemning GD’s alleged election fraud, the vote was “marred by numerous recorded misuses of administrative resources”. As the local journalists put it, this essentially meant stirring up fear among those working in public services, such as teachers, who the ruling party instrumentalised as mouthpieces, threatening to take away their jobs should they refuse to spread support for GD within families and communities. 

As analysis by Europe Elects shows, some manipulation of the vote almost certainly took place, which generated irregularities in vote distribution. But in the cases of Ninotsminda and Akhalkalaki, election violations or even result manipulation were strategies that bolstered a pre-existing base of solid support.

Ararat personally experienced how the local election commission members in Ninotsminda stood by and watched as he inserted his ballot into the machine face down. The thin voting paper immediately revealed his choice of party, particularly as the GD option was at the bottom of the list, and the opposition coalitions at the top. 

Rima was translating for European election observers ENEMO in the Ninotsminda municipality on polling day and, although overall she described the mood on the day as “calm”, she witnessed frequent violations. These included older people receiving “assistance” from others to cast their votes, paid agitators stationed outside precincts, and GD representatives posing as opposition election observers, who Rima assumed were also being paid to be there. “I thought ‘what’s going on here’, it was like everyone had been bought,” said Rima, adding that “everyone was just doing whatever they wanted to.” 

Official CEC data from Ninotsminda shows that, of around 14,000 eligible voters registered in the municipality, roughly 10,000 voted. Yet, Georgia Dream were somehow able to harvest 12,000 votes from this region alone, and there is nothing to say manipulation on this level was not enabled by something, or someone, bigger.  

As determined as Georgia’s political opposition and civil society are to disprove GD’s stolen victory, it appears they now face an uphill battle. The Central Election Commission stated on October 31 that a recount at around 12% of polling stations, involving 14% of the vote, “didn’t lead to a significant change to previously announced official results”. “Final tallies only slightly changed at some 9% of recounted polling stations,” a spokesperson said. 

This plunges Georgia into uncertainty, and the situation appears desperate, as a future under the thumb of autocracy crystallises before the eyes of those who had hoped for better.