Azerbaijan has welcomed the official results of the elections in neighbouring Georgia – brushing aside reports of widespread fraud – and has congratulated the ruling Georgian Dream party on its victory, which is seen as blocking the spread of Western liberal democratic ideas in the region.
Ilham Aliyev’s regime has reportedly instructed Azerbaijani media on how to frame the elections, telling them to depict the result as a defeat for the West’s attempt to destabilise the region.
According to monitoring by Mikroskop Media, the Azerbaijani Presidential Administration provided specific instructions to Azerbaijani NGOs and media on how to frame the Georgian elections. These directives encouraged emphasising the Georgian Dream’s role in fostering “peace, development, and tradition” and warned against opposition platforms that could align Georgia more closely with the West.
Points conveyed in Azerbaijani state-backed narratives included:
Outlets such as Respublika, AzerTac (both owned by the state), and Sharg published articles closely aligned with these instructions. Titles such as Respublika’s “Ruling ‘Georgian Dream’ Party Proves to Be the Leading Political Force in the Country” amplified the state’s narrative that Azerbaijani voters played a pivotal role in Georgian Dream’s success, aligning with Azerbaijan’s regional vision. Indeed, according to results, ethnic Azerbaijanis voted heavily in Georgian Dream's favour.
Ethnic Azerbaijani Rovshan Iskandarov, deputy chairman of the Marneuli City Council was recorded stuffing ballots in a video, which prompted Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili to tweet that it was "very immoral to use an ethnic minority to rig the elections".
In response, Iskandarov said that he acted in anger, taking the ballots and putting them in the box himself, asserting that his intent was not election fraud but a reaction to what he describes as a “deliberate provocation by the opposition”, referring to allegations that opposition representatives disrupted voting by preventing Georgian Dream supporters from placing ballots in the ballot box.
In parallel, Azerbaijani state-owned and aligned television channels aired content that reinforced an anti-Western sentiment, framing Western support for Georgian opposition as an existential threat. On AzTV’s Target programme, which aired on October 16, Azerbaijani MP Samad Seyidov openly criticized the West, describing its influence as “driving Georgian people toward disaster.”
He claimed that Western involvement, coupled with the financial backing of NGOs and social movements, was “eroding Georgian sovereignty and cultural values,” allegedly pushing Georgia toward social changes unpopular among conservative voters.
Editor-in-chief of state-owned media Xalq newspaper, Aflatun Amashov was photographed together with Georgian Dream MP David Sherazadishvili during his campaign. Nine days later, his newspaper released an interview with Sherazadishvili where he vowed to ban all opposition parties after gaining the constitutional majority.
REAL TV, another pro-governmental network, supported this view by linking the West to a “Russia-Ukraine scenario” in the South Caucasus. The channel aired segments suggesting that the U.S. and the EU were “plotting provocations” to destabilise Georgia, working through what they described as a “radical opposition.”
This broadcast, titled “The West is Increasing Pressure on Georgia – Trying to Bring the Russia-Ukraine Scenario to the South Caucasus,” framed the elections as a battle between Western-backed opposition and forces of regional stability, with the ruling party positioned as a safeguard against Western incursions.
ARB 24 echoed similar themes with the involvement of MP Hikmet Babaoglu, who suggested that Armenia, potentially backed by Western powers, might provoke unrest in Georgia following the elections. Babaoglu’s comments hinted at a scenario where Armenian citizens in Georgia could instigate civil unrest, further positioning the West as an instigator of regional discord.
Azerbaijani NGOs also replicated state-backed narratives through social media channels. Groups such as the Young Patriots Union and the Migration Development Public Union published posts endorsing the Azerbaijani government’s stance on the election results and calling for Georgian Dream to address issues faced by Azerbaijanis in Georgia.
These posts mirrored official government instructions, focusing on the role of Azerbaijanis in securing the ruling party’s victory and suggesting that the Georgian government should prioritise their concerns.
This alignment between Azerbaijani state policies and the Georgian Dream’s position has prompted varied reactions from Azerbaijani commentators. Kanan Rovshanoglu believes that Azerbaijan’s support for the Georgian Dream reflects a broader strategy to maintain the current balance of power in the South Caucasus.
He argued in Yeni Musavat piece that Azerbaijani officials believe that a pro-Western Georgian administration would destabilise the region’s delicate equilibrium, forcing Azerbaijan into a difficult position between the West and Russia. Rovshanoglu noted, “Baku fears that a shift in Georgia’s allegiance to the West would force Azerbaijan to make a choice, which could jeopardise its strategy of neutrality between global powers.”
Rovshanoglu argued that Azerbaijan has traditionally manoeuvred between Russia and the West, cultivating ties with both while avoiding full alignment with either. This balance is increasingly at risk as Georgia edges toward Western integration under its current administration, and since Armenia is already pivoting towards Europe, potentially pressuring Azerbaijan to clarify its geopolitical stance.
Mehman Aliyev, head of TURAN Agency, described the situation as part of a broader “Azerbaijani scenario” for Georgia, where Azerbaijani media and political entities encourage Georgia’s alignment with its southern neighbour rather than the West. Aliyev argued that Azerbaijani authorities viewed the Georgian Dream’s victory as a safeguard for their regional interests, particularly against Western policies that could encourage social liberalisation or policies favouring Armenia.
According to Aliyev, “The victory of Georgian Dream represents stability and predictability in the South Caucasus, which is crucial for Azerbaijan’s strategy. The Azerbaijani government sees this as a way to protect its own cultural and economic priorities in the region.”
Aliyev further suggested that the Azerbaijani government’s focus on Georgia reflects a concern for its security, viewing Georgia as a buffer against Western-led initiatives that might threaten Azerbaijani interests. “Georgia’s territorial disputes and economic dependence on the West pose a potential challenge for Azerbaijan, which prefers the regional order to remain balanced,” he said.
The Azerbaijani government’s support for Georgian Dream suggests a shift in Baku’s foreign policy, indicating a preference for deeper alignment with Russia and regional stability rather than Western-led democratisation initiatives. Azerbaijan’s recent support for Georgia’s ruling party underscores an interest in fostering a cohesive regional front, particularly in the face of a fragmented West, while keeping pro-Western opposition at bay.
The implications of Azerbaijani influence extend beyond the Georgian elections, shaping not only the future of Azerbaijani-Georgian but also Armenian-Georgian relations as it might also fear that a Western-oriented Georgia would be more relaxed with French restocking of the Armenian military.