Brazil’s President Bolsonaro finished his visit to Moscow yesterday, the first by a Brazilian president since 2017. The trip was scheduled in December, and went ahead despite the private but active opposition the US State Department. Mr Bolsonaro was accompanied by both his foreign and defence ministers, who met their Russian counterparts in a four-way discussion.

Russian/Brazilian trade is not large – $2bn in sales from Brazil and about $8bn from Russia (largely fertilisers), compared with GDPs for the two economies of an almost identical $1,800bn. After the meeting President Bolsonaro announced that fertiliser imports from Russia may be expected to double, but that apart, the small value of two-way trade suggests that these talks had less to do with economics than with geopolitics and defence.

Brazilian/Russian defence co-operation began in 2005 with work to improve Brazil’s VLS1 satellite launch rocket system, which at that time had a very patchy record of launch successes. In 2008 Brazil bought 12 Mi35 (Hind) attack helicopters, and Brazil became a partner in Russia’s GLONASS satellite navigation system. Five years later, after extended discussions, Brazil agreed a $1bn purchase of surface-to-air missile systems, which eventually firmed up into a smaller order for Igla MANPADS (the Russian version of the Stinger).

Against this hesitant history Brazilian Defence Minister General Walter Braga Netto announced that Brazil and Russia had discussed military-technical co-operation, including the acquisition of Russian defence technology. Further details of the discussion were not released, but they are likely to have touched on sonar equipment, command systems and weapons for the new 6,500-tonne class of four nuclear attack submarines that Brazil has just begun to build.

The first of these boats, Alvaro Alberto, was formally ordered in November 2021 after a long design process delayed by budget constraints. Brazil’s FM Franco Franca was quoted by Tass after the meeting as saying: "Defence co-operation is becoming one of the most important fields of our co-operation". Brazil has so far used France’s NAVAL Group as its key adviser on the design of its first SSN, but no information has reached the public domain on what weapons and sonar systems will be installed. Russian systems and weapons prices are likely to undercut French equipment by around a half.

However, the acquisition of Russian weaponry is not uniformly supported in the Bolsonaro administration. On 8 February Brazil’s Vice President Antonio Mourao stated in a newspaper interview that “…We do not purchase Russian weaponry…The main reason for that is Brazil’s ‘major non-Nato ally’ status. Frankly speaking, I consider this hardly possible. I don’t see optimism among Brazil’s military circles about any kind of deal in this sphere”.

The most likely first expression of a new Russia/Brazil defence co-operation is a flying visit to Brazil of two Tu160 long-range strategic bombers. Moscow has used these in the past to place a geopolitical marker in play, most notably with flights to Venezuela in 2018, Nicaragua in 2013, South Africa in 2019, and flights by four Tu22 Backfire bombers to Syria this week. The next level of signalling is a warship visit. There is no record of any past visits to Brazil by a Russian warship, but we can probably expect one after the Ukraine “crisis” has passed.

One result of the visit was Foreign Minister Lavrov’s announcement that Russia wishes Brazil to be given a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Brazil is one of four states regularly mentioned as potential permanent members (the others are Germany, Japan and India). Appointment of a new permanent member would require alteration to Article 23 of the Atlantic Treaty, which in turn is subject to veto by current permanent members, rendering the creation of any new permanent members unlikely.