EU foreign policy chief and former Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas recently unveiled a controversial White Paper on the “Future of European Defence: Readiness 2030”, but it received a very mixed reception from EU member states.

It calls for greater EU autonomy in security and defence, but acknowledges the US remains a key ally and keeps Nato at the centre of Europe’s defence plans. Kallas has been criticised for “still acting like a prime minister,” and failing to do the legwork of coordinating her ideas with other members to build a consensus, but instead releasing her own vision on an important and difficult topic. Łukasz Maślanka, political scientist at Poland’s Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), raised doubts as to whether the White Paper marks the beginning of genuine transformation or simply another ambitious blueprint that will fall flat on its face. Kallas recently tried to push members into contributing to a “voluntary” €40bn fund to support Ukraine that was immediately rejected before her scaled-down €5bn fund proposal was also rejected at the last EU summit for the same reasons.

The document is “an update of the assessment of threats and challenges to the EU’s security” and attempts to re-anchor the Union’s defence posture in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Importantly, it addresses what Maślanka calls the “gap left by the Strategic Compass” – a security doctrine drafted before February 2022 and outpaced by events before it was even published. The White Paper, he argues, “establishes a new point of reference for EU security policy” and redefines Russia as “a fundamental threat to Europe’s security”, citing not only Moscow’s aggression but also its nuclear deployments and mobilisation potential.

Placing Russia at the heart of the strategy is in contrast to the new US foreign policy floated by Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth in mid-March, which has downgraded Russia to a secondary threat, calls for the US to disengage from the conflict, and all other conflicts except for Taiwan, where the US needs to “prepare for war.”

Kallas’ concept is partly a reaction to the sharp change in direction by Washington as US President Donald Trump adopts a transactional multipolar world model that largely isolates the US from international affairs, which includes closing the US security umbrella that has protected Europe since the end of WWII.

However, even before Trump’s election, Europe’s defence sector is in crisis after decades of underinvestment, according to the report from former Italian Prime Minister and ex-European Central Bank boss Mario Draghi released last year.

Not enough money

The White Paper highlights the contradictions within EU defence strategy: the bloc remains tethered to the US-led Nato for its hard security guarantees, while simultaneously seeking greater independence from a US increasingly distracted by strategic competition elsewhere. Trump has raised doubts that the US would come to Europe’s collective defence under Article 5 of the military treaty if attacked by Russia, as the member states have “not contributed enough” to Nato. Trump has called on Nato members to raise their defence spending to 5% of GDP, up from the 2% mandated by the treaty; currently only Poland meets that target.

The centrepiece of Kallas’ new plan is the proposed €150bn SAFE (Security Action for Europe) instrument – an EU joint borrowing facility designed to boost procurement and readiness. As Maślanka points out, this is not a standalone move but part of a broader financial architecture under the “ReArm Europe” initiative recently launched by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, which also allows member states to increase defence spending by up to 1.5% of GDP without triggering sanctions under the Stability and Growth Pact.

If fully utilised, these measures could unlock up to €800bn in additional defence investment – a figure that has become, in Maślanka’s words, “a symbolic benchmark for the entire plan – albeit one that somewhat misleadingly suggests a higher level of EU commitment than is actually the case.”

Fitch Ratings’ analysts poured some cold water on the EU spending plans, reporting that Brussels doesn’t have the money and will be able to invest €500bn at most on defence spending in the next five years, according to Fitch Ratings estimates, citing fiscal constraints and high debt levels in several member states, Reuters reports.

Political fences to jump

And there are serious political obstacles to overcome as well. The SAFE instrument excludes non-EU defence products, which Maślanka warns “could prevent member states from filling critical capability gaps – such as replenishing air defence ammunition – if the equipment is manufactured in the UK or the US.” This protectionist clause is meant to strengthen Europe’s defence industrial base, but it may complicate efforts to meet urgent operational needs. Thanks to that decades-long underinvestment, the EU doesn’t actually produce everything it needs and remains heavily dependent on US imports of parts and technology.

Moreover, Maślanka flags potential resistance from fiscally conservative or debt-averse countries – particularly in Southern Europe – which may “block the proposal” in favour of more traditional eurobond models. “Kallas’ €5bn Ukraine fund proposal was blocked not by pro-Russian governments in Hungary or Slovakia, but by Spain, Italy and France, who cited budgetary concerns and a lack of transparency as the main reasons.”

Ukraine support ambitious

Typically for Kallas, one of the EU’s leading Russia-hawks, the White Paper’s support for Ukraine is more ambitious in rhetoric than in substance, says Maślanka.

While it calls for continued military aid, including 2mn rounds of ammunition in 2025, EU-level efforts remain hamstrung by political division and a lack of investment. An earlier deadline to prove 1mn shells by March 2024 made by former EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell was missed and only some 200,000 shells were actually produced by that time. Hungary’s veto on the new spending has also frozen disbursements from the European Peace Facility.

“The only concrete form of support for Ukraine under the ReArm Europe plan is the possibility of using SAFE-funded loans to purchase weapons for Kyiv,” Maślanka said. Even that may be of limited use, given the scarcity of available weapons on the EU market and restrictions on sourcing non-EU systems. Von der Leyen admitted in her ReArm speech that the Russian military industrial complex is currently outproducing Ukraine and all of the collective EU in arms production, which remains hopeless behind.

In institutional terms, the White Paper falls short of proposing a European defence union that could solve some of these problems. Europe’s defence sector remains extremely fragmented and items like the 155mm shells are generically similar, but typically each country introduces local variants that make them incompatible with other countries’ delivery systems. At the same time ,the cost of European production is typically five to ten times higher than Russian production, adding an additional financial burden to fighting the war with Russia. Europe still does not have anything resembling Nato’s integrated structure.

“[The White Paper] clearly states that Nato remains the cornerstone of collective defence,” Maślanka writes. Its ambition is instead to help member states meet their capability goals within the Alliance and strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB).

The White Paper outlines a series of regulatory and market reforms aimed at fostering a “single market for European defence products”, though many of these measures – such as the proposed Buy European principle – remain aspirational at best, as building an integrated European defence sector production platform remains entirely theoretical for now.

The real test, as Maślanka underlines, will be less about declarations and more about delivery: “The pace of legislative work on the proposed mechanisms, their actual collective implementation and the decision on continued funding of military aid to Kyiv.” Until then, Readiness 2030 remains a vision, not a reality – a necessary course correction that exists only on paper; not yet the decisive concrete policy step that the EU’s security environment demands.

ReArm programme

Von der Leyen’s ReArm Europe plan, presented as part of the Readiness 2030 initiative, lays out a comprehensive strategy to strengthen the EU’s defence capabilities and support its industrial base in response to growing security threats.

At its core, the plan proposes to unlock up to €800bn in defence investment over the coming years. This headline figure is based on a combination of national and EU-level financing tools, aimed at addressing both immediate shortfalls and long-term strategic needs. The initiative centres on five main pillars:

1. Fiscal Flexibility – The European Commission proposes to temporarily relax EU fiscal rules to allow member states to increase defence spending without breaching the Stability and Growth Pact. This would enable governments to invest up to 1.5% of GDP more in defence, potentially generating around €650bn in additional national spending over four years.
2. EU Defence Loans – A central element of the plan is the creation of a €150bn Security Action for Europe (SAFE) loan instrument, backed by the EU budget. These joint loans would be used to finance strategic defence projects, such as missile systems, ammunition, and military mobility infrastructure. The focus would be on encouraging collective procurement and strengthening interoperability between member states.
3. Repurposing Existing EU Funds – The Commission proposes to allow member states to redirect portions of existing EU funds, such as cohesion funding, toward defence-related projects. This flexibility would help bridge capability gaps and finance projects aligned with EU security goals.
4. Expanded Role for the European Investment Bank – The plan calls for removing existing restrictions that prevent the EIB from financing military-specific projects. By expanding its remit, the EIB could support both dual-use and purely defence-focused initiatives, boosting capital flows into the sector.
5. Mobilising Private Capital – The final component involves encouraging greater private sector involvement in defence through regulatory reforms, public-private partnerships, and financial incentives. The Commission aims to shift longstanding taboos in some member states around defence investment and ensure that private capital can be channelled into Europe’s military-industrial base.