Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP, or ISIS-K), the terror group responsible for the attack on a Moscow concert venue in March that left over 140 individuals dead, is ramping up its media outreach in Central Asia. The group’s propaganda efforts are raising concerns about the possibility of a terror attack in the region.

The Moscow terrorist tragedy opened eyes around the globe to the seriousness of the trans-national threat posed by ISKP. The assault also marked ISKP’s third successful external operation within a span of less than three months, following the suicide bombing in Kerman, Iran, and the church shooting in Istanbul, Turkey. 

Several other plots were foiled across Eurasia during the same time span, along with the takedown of an alleged IS-linked network in June with operatives in New York City, Los Angeles and Philadelphia. Many of those connected in recent years to an ISKP attack or foiled plot are Central Asian nationals, with Tajiks featuring most prominently. Yet, despite the prominence of Central Asian citizens in ISKP operations, little attention has been given to the growing threat to Central Asia itself.

Over the last few months, reports of an increasing number of ISKP-related arrests point to the group’s growth in Central Asia. In late December 2023, for example, two teenagers were arrested after special forces disrupted an alleged plot targeting multiple locations in the southern Kyrgyz city of Jalal-Abad. A few months later, a car bombing incident in Tajikistan’s Kulyab Region was deemed a terrorist act linked to ISKP. 

In mid-June, Kyrgyzstan’s State Committee for National Security detained 15 individuals in Bishkek and elsewhere alleged to have ISKP connections, retrieving a “large quantity of literature.” The suspects are accused of posting videos online that provide tactical advice on the use of weapons and explosives. These arrests took place around the time that Kazakhstan busted a female cell said to be planning to attack a Western target, though authorities refuted the reports. 

These incidents signal a troubling extension of ISKP’s regional influence, building on its pre-existing propaganda campaign tailored for Central Asian audiences. In 2022, the group established official Tajik and Uzbek wings of its in-house Al-Azaim Foundation for Media Production. Additionally, it now has a functioning Russian-language arm. The Central Asia-facing campaign, which gained steam in 2020/2021, continues to find new means of conveying its messages, rolling out a new Tajik-language magazine shortly after the March 22 attack in Moscow.

Jihadism researcher Riccardo Valle noted to Eurasianet that ISKP is now “calling for similar actions to the Moscow attack.” The group, in Valle’s view, is also adding nuance to messaging concerning the Tajik government, hoping to incite supporters to violence by exploiting hostile sentiments related to specific policies, such as Dushanbe’s recent hijab ban.

ISKP also seeks to score propaganda points by calling attention to Dushanbe’s and Tashkent’s close relations with Moscow. Valle said ISKP is framing Uzbekistan as a Russian proxy and Tajikistan’s government as a “Russian puppet aiming to impose communism and eradicate Islam from the country.” These efforts by Al-Azaim are being leveraged by supportive, pro-ISKP propaganda outlets that are now beginning to publish in regional languages. Collectively, these initiatives illustrate the still-growing emphasis the movement is placing on Central Asia.

Central Asia has been fundamental to ISKP’s doctrinal shift in expanding its militant power projection, striving to position the group as the only vehicle available to disaffected extremists from the region capable of challenging entrenched governments. As part of its stepped-up outreach, ISKP has been engaging members of Jamaat Ansarullah, the Turkistan Islamic Party, and others, casting itself as an alternative for radicals who, it argues, are being constrained by the Taliban, and not allowed to take the fight to Central Asia.

ISKP’s Central Asia campaign is starting to shift, complementing propaganda with more work to expand its regional support base, recruit members and fundraise. This strategy started coming into focus after the rocket attacks into Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in 2022, which were declared the start of the Islamic State’s “great jihad to Central Asia.” Now that ISKP has developed the foundation of its Central Asia strategy and has successfully expanded its influence among radicals in the region, its propaganda machine is starting to move in ways consistent with the group’s previous external operations against Iran, Turkey and Russia. The same pattern is becoming apparent in Central Asia, in which ISKP floods the information space with propaganda as a prelude to direct attacks.

Lucas Webber is a researcher focused on geopolitics and violent non-state actors. He is cofounder and editor at militantwire.com.

This article first appeared on Eurasianet here.