The Turkish central bank’s net FX position excluding off-balance sheet derivative items is estimated to have deteriorated by about $26bn since March 19, according to calculations by @e507.
In the early morning hours of March 19 (Wednesday), the country’s ruling regime detained Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoglu. On the day, the change in the central bank’s net FX position was positive as the regime intervened in the local currency via public banks.
On March 20 (Thursday), intervention reflected in the central bank’s financials to the tune of a $11bn decline. The position deteriorated by $3bn on March 21 (Friday), $12bn on March 22 (Monday) and $1.2bn on March 25 (Tuesday).
Chart: Daily change in the central bank’s net FX position (net of off-balance sheet items), estimates by @e507.
Turkey’s "orthodox" economic management does not provide information on the interventions made in the currency markets. The intervention volumes are estimated via the central bank’s financials.
The interventions are conducted via public banks. The sums that are burnt through can be reflected in the central bank’s financials with time lags.
Turkish central bank's net FX position | |||||||||
A.1_FOREIGN ASSETS (Thousand TRY) | P.1_TOTAL FOREIGN LIABILITIES (Thousand TRY) | Net (A.1-P.1) | USD/TRY Buying | Net USDmn | 2. Aggregate short and long positions in forwards and futures in foreign currencies | 3. Other (specify) | Net (minus) swaps | Cumulative change (USD bn) | |
Dec 30, 2022 | 2,445,956,714 | 2,124,854,617 | 321,102,097 | 18.70 | 17,173 | -67,762 | -3,243 | -53,832 | |
Apr 28, 2023 | 2,277,778,749 | 2,459,484,877 | -181,706,128 | 19.43 | -9,353 | -55,748 | -3,273 | -68,374 | |
May 31, 2023 (Presidential elections) | 2,027,939,331 | 2,445,400,390 | -417,461,059 | 20.66 | -20,203 | -52,628 | -2,336 | -75,167 | |
Jun 27, 2023 | 2,864,639,361 | 2,950,556,460 | -85,917,099 | 25.82 | -3,327 | -57,163 | -2,976 | -63,466 | |
Jul 31, 2023 | 3,101,850,551 | 3,097,283,604 | 4,566,947 | 26.93 | 170 | -57,336 | -3,089 | -60,255 | |
Aug 29, 2023 | 3,134,911,149 | 3,029,200,325 | 105,710,824 | 26.58 | 3,978 | -69,534 | -2,812 | -68,368 | |
Sep 29, 2023 | 3,401,758,038 | 3,066,441,887 | 335,316,151 | 27.38 | 12,248 | -74,286 | -2,673 | -64,711 | |
Dec 29, 2023 | 4,206,687,781 | 3,403,832,713 | 802,855,068 | 29.44 | 27,273 | -69,353 | -3,056 | -45,136 | |
Mar 29, 2024 (Local elections) | 4,057,007,074 | 3,834,312,295 | 222,694,779 | 32.26 | 6,903 | -76,653 | -4,338 | -74,088 | |
May 30, 2024 | 4,675,489,675 | 3,476,230,575 | 1,199,259,100 | 32.25 | 37,188 | -39,291 | -4,680 | -6,783 | 67 |
Jun 28, 2024 | 4,762,091,401 | 3,700,003,784 | 1,062,087,617 | 32.83 | 32,355 | -24,565 | -3,264 | 4,526 | 79 |
Jul 31, 2024 | 4,967,794,204 | 3,565,009,078 | 1,402,785,126 | 33.08 | 42,401 | -23,112 | 0 | 19,289 | 93 |
Aug 29, 2024 | 5,142,259,219 | 3,967,022,626 | 1,175,236,593 | 33.92 | 34,644 | -22,339 | 0 | 12,305 | 86 |
Sep 30, 2024 | 5,276,985,424 | 3,690,124,446 | 1,586,860,978 | 34.12 | 46,507 | -21,247 | 0 | 25,260 | 99 |
Oct 31, 2024 | 5,563,833,663 | 3,731,622,343 | 1,832,211,320 | 34.18 | 53,607 | -16,649 | 0 | 36,958 | 111 |
Nov 29, 2024 | 5,525,197,095 | 3,687,874,634 | 1,837,322,461 | 34.58 | 53,133 | -19,879 | 1,398 | 34,652 | 109 |
Dec 31, 2024 | 5,538,776,105 | 3,594,647,626 | 1,944,128,479 | 35.28 | 55,105 | -22,334 | 1,476 | 34,247 | 108 |
Jan 31, 2025 | 6,004,202,789 | 3,804,080,543 | 2,200,122,246 | 35.76 | 61,520 | -10,324 | 3,834 | 55,030 | 129 |
Feb 28, 2025 | 6,091,906,671 | 3,944,582,247 | 2,147,324,424 | 36.38 | 59,023 | -10,609 | 2,889 | 51,303 | 125 |
Mar 14, 2025 | 6,325,878,571 | 3,901,199,445 | 2,424,679,126 | 36.54 | 66,366 | -11,091 | 2.596 | 55,278 | 129 |
Mar 17, 2025 | 6,363,122,732 | 3,946,515,879 | 2,416,606,853 | 36.61 | 66,002 | ||||
Mar 18, 2025 | 6,368,731,117 | 3,929,446,366 | 2,439,284,751 | 36.59 | 66,661 | ||||
Mar 19, 2025 | 6,403,041,748 | 3,955,647,958 | 2,447,393,790 | 37.98 | 64,432 | ||||
Mar 20, 2025 | 6,313,473,157 | 4,182,508,464 | 2,130,964,693 | 37.92 | 56,204 | ||||
Mar 21, 2025 | 6,262,527,231 | 4,190,883,023 | 2,071,644,208 | 37.85 | 54,733 | ||||
Mar 24, 2025 | 5,894,637,157 | 4,201,446,446 | 1,693,190,711 | 37.86 | 44,722 | ||||
Mar 25, 2025 | 5,948,778,416 | 4,217,801,329 | 1,730,977,087 | 37.91 | 45,662 |
Table: The central bank’s on-balance sheet FX position declined by $21bn from $67bn on March 18 to $46bn on March 25. This is certain.
On the off-balance sheet side, the central bank’s reserve swap (the central bank gives USD in exchange for lira) stock with local lenders declined by $6bn from $11.5bn on March 18 to $5.1bn on March 25. This figure further declined to $3bn on March 26.
Also on the off-balance sheet side, lira settled forward contracts stock rose by $2bn from zero on March 18 to March 25.
As a result of the interventions, the central bank’s net FX position is estimated to have declined to $31bn as of March 25. This figure saw minus $60-70bn at the heights of pre-July 2023 "unorthodox" policymaking period.
Chart: The central bank’s net FX position (net of off-balance sheet items), estimates by @e507.
No threat to regime
Since the detention of Imamoglu (made the ex-mayor by the authorities on March 23) a week ago, the Erdogan regime has struggled to stabilise the financial markets.
On March 19, the USD/TRY rate jumped into the 42s from the 36s during the morning hours. Since then, the regime has been drawing one of its trademark “straight lines” on the USD/TRY chart, at around the 38-level this time.
“Someone who does not have $100bn worth of Turkish lira to sell against USD would fall short of wounding Turkey’s central bank,” bne IntelliNews noted on March 20.
“For Turks, it is also not easy to buy dollars… the banking system will simply get in their way. When they rush to the exchange offices, they will see even higher spreads. If they collectively attempt to withdraw their money from the banks, they will face capital controls,” this publication added on March 23.
So, "reserves burnt" makes for good headlines but the Imamoglu tumult on the financial markets has yet to pose a threat to Turkey’s ruling regime.
Although the regime is signalling that it is panicking, a huge slap that would change the course of events is not expected from the market side.
In the medium term, after the Imamoglu dust settles, Turkey’s ruling elites will again give market-friendly signals and their customers within the finance industry who have stuck with them over the long term will not reject their highly profitable offers.
Ramadan holiday comes to rescue
Next week, on Monday (March 31) and Tuesday (April 1), there are public holidays marking the end of the Ramadan religious feast.
So, ahead of the regime are two more trading days this week to keep the lira afloat prior to the few days that will provide a break to draw breath.