A brief halt in operations at Joint Venture Inkai (JV Inkai) — a major uranium-producing enterprise co-managed by Kazakhstan’s national atomic company Kazatomprom and Canada’s Cameco — in January triggered investor concern and a short-lived dip in share prices.

Subsequently, in an analysis published by the Central Asia–Caucasus Institute, Sergey Sukhankin, a senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and the Saratoga Foundation, wrote that although the Inkai incident was brief and largely overlooked, it illustrated broader structural trends threatening the future reliability of uranium supply chains to the West.

Specifically, Sukhankin wrote that “certain Kazakhstan-based analysts have voiced suspicions that the underlying cause of the operational halt at Inkai was pressure exerted by Russia, allegedly in response to Kazakhstan’s post-2022 efforts to alter the logistics of its uranium exports by decreasing reliance on Russian transit routes and instead utilizing the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (commonly referred to as the Middle Corridor) as an alternative to exporting uranium through Russian territory.”

Sino-Russian control

Kazakhstan produces more than 40% of the world’s unenriched uranium, positioning it as a critical global supplier. However, the country’s uranium industry remains significantly influenced by Russia and China — two powers whose relations with the West continue to deteriorate.

Although Kazakhstan has been putting some efforts into diversifying transit routes, including via the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), more than a third of its exports continue to flow through Russian territory.

Sukhankin added that Russia’s Rosatom maintains direct or indirect control over five of Kazakhstan’s 14 major uranium sites. This entrenched presence limits Kazakhstan’s room for manoeuvre, regardless of its formal commitments to logistical diversification, he said.

The analyst also questioned the viability of the Middle Corridor, noting political shifts in Georgia — a key transit country on the route — and technical concerns raised by Cameco, which has labelled the route “neither reliable nor predictable.”

When it comes to West-bound Kazakh uranium exports, Cameco has labelled the Middle Corridor route that avoids Russia as “neither reliable nor predictable” (Credit: Commonspace.eu).

Simultaneously, China’s footprint in Kazakhstan’s uranium sector is growing. Sukhankin pointed to the recent transfer of uranium assets from Rosatom-affiliated Uranium One Group to a Chinese state-owned entity as an example of China’s expanding influence in the sector, though he also noted that the move could be purely a geopolitical tool.

“Notably, Stanislav Pritchin of the Central Asia Department at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences has drawn attention to China’s established practice of acquiring 'unpromising' oil and natural gas deposits. In his view, such acquisitions function as instruments for expanding China’s strategic presence within the host country,” he wrote. 

Nonetheless, China already receives over half of Kazakhstan’s uranium output with some experts estimating that China may account for 60% of Kazakh uranium exports. This significantly limits availability of Kazakh uranium for Western markets and may lead to future supply constraints. 

Looking ahead, Sukhankin warned of a potential marginalisation of Western firms, describing the risk of a bifurcated uranium market, where the global uranium sector is splitting into two camps — one oriented towards the West, the other led by China and, to a lesser extent, Russia. Kazakhstan appears to be increasingly being pulled towards the latter.

Even if Kazakhstan’s leadership has signalled its intent to maintain foreign partnerships, geopolitical realities suggest the Central Asian nation may slowly drift toward the Sino-Russian sphere of influence.

Western partnerships?

It is worth noting that Kazakhstan has been recently increasingly pushing for uranium supply deals in the West, with examples including a long-term uranium supply deal signed with the Czech Republic’s CEZ and a bid to supply uranium to Turkey. 

These options, however, as noted in Sukhankin’s article, may not be significant and would still rely on Russia-controlled uranium supply routes.

US President Donald Trump’s recent chaotic tariff moves saw a 27% tariff applied to Kazakhstan’s exports to the US. That prompted Astana to send a delegation to the US to pursue exemptions on key exports such as uranium and oil. Though Kazakh authorities are confident that such exports will eventually not be subject to the tariffs, the development further supports Sukhankin’s point, as Western markets appear to be growing more inaccessible and alienating compared to the proximity of Russia and China and the existing infrastructure that makes Kazakhstan’s uranium exports possible.  

Another elephant in the room holding Kazakhstan’s uranium partnership prospects hostage is the country’s decision to construct its first nuclear power plant, possibly followed by two more plants. Kazakhstan has attempted to paint a picture of neutrality by announcing that the first plant will be built by an international consortium including firms from France and South Korea. However, it is widely believed that Rosatom will take the lead on the project. As such, the ex-Soviet state is unlikely to untie its hands from its former colonial master’s influence at any point in the future.