As Washington recalibrates its global posture in an era marked by strategic rivalry with Beijing and resurgent Russian adventurism, calls for a reimagining of American engagement in Greater Central Asia could hardly be more timely.

A detailed proposal from analysts at the Washington, DC and Stockholm-based Central Asia-Caucasus Institute (CACI) outlines a comprehensive strategy aimed at anchoring America’s presence in this critical transregional junction—one that straddles the spheres of influence of China, Russia, and the West, not to mention other significant players including Iran and Turkey.

Greater Central Asia is not just a vast geographical space set between major powers, it is fast becoming an arena in which their interests collide and converge. The proposed strategy offers not just a regional play, but a global gambit—linking American economic interests, security concerns and geopolitical competition under a single, coherent framework.

At the heart of the proposal is a redefinition. The traditional Soviet delineation of Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan—is deemed “no longer valid.” A broader conception is urged, one that includes flanking states Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Afghanistan and Mongolia. This region, the CACI analysts contend, must now be recognised as “Greater Central   Asia,” a term that reflects the economic interdependencies, historical continuities and emerging political unities of these states.

Washington’s prior efforts in the region have lacked strategic coherence, note the proposal authors, who write: “While [past strategic] documents contain important affirmations, they are less true strategies than lists of unrelated projects deemed worthy at the time.” The new vision aims to correct this by establishing both governmental and non-governmental mechanisms for enduring engagement.

Among the more actionable proposals: appoint a Special Presidential Envoy for Greater Central Asia at the National Security Council; create a US–Greater Central Asia Business Council; and back a new regional security framework to support intelligence sharing and counter-terrorism.

These steps would reflect a belief that “the United States must therefore work with, rather than on, the region’s governments.” It’s a line that’s been hyped by both the European Union and by China     , among others at “milestone” summits held with the five “Stans” since, with Russia distracted by its war in Ukraine, competition to curry favour with Central Asia moved up the agenda. Russia, only too aware of the burgeoning rivalry for trade, investment and influence in Central Asia, will present its own latest perspective and ‘offer’ on relations at a summit with the Central Asian five called for Tajik capital Dushanbe in October.

For the US, economic incentives for building up its involvement in Central Asia, and Greater Central Asia, are not in short supply. With abundant reserves of uranium, lithium and rare earths—vital to the energy and technology revolutions—countries like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are poised to become global suppliers of critical resources.

“U.S. interest in gaining priority access to these resources for itself or its allies is paramount,” the analysts observe.

The race to explore and extract Central Asia's rare earths is picking up pace (credit: gov.uz).

Just as crucial are the transport corridors—especially the so-called Middle Corridor or Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR)—that promise to reshape Eurasian trade dynamics. These routes offer America an opportunity to foster alternatives to China's infrastructure-focused Belt and Road Initiative, thereby reducing Beijing’s economic leverage over the region.

But Washington’s ambitions cannot—and should not—aim to mirror Beijing’s cheque-book diplomacy or Moscow’s heavy-handed militarism.

“The U.S. cannot hope to invest economically in Greater Central Asia at the level of, for example, China’s Belt and Road (BRI) or even Turkey’s proliferating projects. Nor can the U.S. guarantee the region’s security with boots on the ground, significant military intervention, or membership for the states of Greater Central Asia in larger security organizations,” the analysts say. Instead, they suggest, Washington must leverage its soft power, institutional expertise, and private sector dynamism. Supporting region-wide programmes for educational and professional advancement, boosting English-language media and deepening ties with emerging elites through scholarships and training are all pragmatic avenues with outsized influence.

In a further recommendation on driving a business expansion with Central Asia, the analysts say the American government should “aggressively champion the U.S. private sector’s interests in the region: There are significant existing American investments in Greater Central Asia across a range of industries, from oil and gas to the IT sector, and the region is an increasingly attractive market for American industrial and consumer goods. The U.S. should enhance the economic viability of the region by promoting U.S. corporate investment in and management of trade corridors that link the region with Europe and South and Southeast Asia, as well as ports and transit point in all directions. It should also welcome imports from the region in carefully defined areas.”

Security is a shared concern for the region and all the major powers. Islamic terrorism with an international reach that can proliferate in and via Greater Central Asia remains a “prevailing concern”. Afghanistan, long viewed by Washington as a problem to be managed, must now be seen as essential to the long-term regional architecture, the analysts conclude, reminding that “over the millennia, Afghanistan has been an integral and at times even dominant part of Greater Central Asia” and stressing that this historical perspective is vital for recalibrating US policy from containment to inclusion.

The report offers a sobering reminder of the stakes: “Six states of Greater Central Asia are surrounded by major powers, four of which—China, India, Russia and Pakistan—are nuclear powers. A fifth, Iran, actively aspires to that status.” In such a volatile environment, maintaining a strategic equilibrium is not a luxury—it is a necessity.

In a region vulnerable to “divide and conquer” tactics by outside powers, the US can be a stabilizing force—if it embraces the role with humility and purpose. The analysts call for “facilitating the creation of exclusive region-wide structures” that empower Central Asian voices rather than override them. Success, they argue, lies not in dictating terms but in supporting an indigenous trajectory toward economic integration, political agency and regional identity.

Crucially, this strategy calls for engaging friendly powers—including Europe, Japan, India and Turkey—to forge a multilateral platform of shared interests. Such convergence would provide ballast to the US effort, reducing dependency on unilateral action while amplifying its strategic weight.

In the long arc of US foreign policy, Central Asia has often been treated as a geopolitical afterthought. That, it seems clear, can no longer stand.

The CACI analysts conclude: “The advancement of democratic norms and human rights concerns may follow, as they have in other societies, but the U.S. must not make their achievement a condition for engagement or a test to be passed beforehand.” Engagement, in this case, is not merely a choice—it is a strategic imperative.