Moldovans voted last month – admittedly by a narrow margin – to commit their country to pursuing EU accession. Yet a significant obstacle stands in Moldova’s path: the unresolved status of the breakaway region of Transnistria.

While businesses in the tiny separatist republic have embraced the opportunities that have come with Moldova’s increasing economic integration with the EU for more than a decade, its leadership is more interested in maintaining the status quo of de facto independence. That has been beneficial recently, as the illegal authorities in Tiraspol have been as committed as the legitimate government in Chisinau to maintaining peace in the country even as war rages in neighbouring Ukraine. Yet it is a hurdle that needs to be tackled before Moldova’s EU accession, that has left Moldovan officials exploring various options to ensure the entire country eventually joins the bloc. 

Transnistria is a narrow strip of land between the Dniester River and Moldova’s border with Ukraine. In the final years of the Soviet Union, tensions rose as Moldovan politicians began discussing unification with Romania. For Transnistria’s predominantly ethnic Russian population, this prospect was unacceptable, leading to a civil war in Moldova that ended with a ceasefire in July 1992. Since then, the self-declared Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR) has operated as a de facto independent state with Russian political, economic and military support, although it remains unrecognised by any country, including Russia.

This frozen conflict has hindered Moldova's pursuit of Euro-Atlantic integration and impeded its economic progress, just as similar frozen conflicts have done in Georgia. Both countries have remained in a state of unresolved tension, which Russia has exploited to maintain influence over them.

Moldova's EU aspirations

Moldova’s pro-EU government is aiming for full EU membership by 2030. President Maia Sandu and other officials have made clear that the whole of the country must join, and at the same time that the reintegration of Transnistria must take place peacefully. 

In an interview with bne IntelliNews in May, Moldova’s Minister of Economic Development and Digitalisation Dumitru Alaiba stressed: "Transnistria is an integral part of Moldova and will keep being so." 

“There will be a process of integration once the time is right,” he added, pointing out that economic integration has already happened, with most of Transnistria’s exports now directed to the EU. 

Sandu, meanwhile, insists that Moldova will not give up Transnistria. Last year, she commented that a two-step accession, with most of Moldova joining initially, followed by the territories on the left bank of the Dniester once the conflict is settled, is a potential option, though she insisted this would be a worst-case scenario. Ruling out such a scenario would only give Russia de facto veto rights in the EU accession process, the president told Moldovan public radio. 

Speaking to bne IntelliNews in Chisinau in October, several Moldovan government officials stressed that there are no options other than a peaceful reintegration of Transnistria. 

“First of all, it [reintegration] will happen peacefully and diplomatically. Secondly, we are pursuing gradual economic reintegration,” said one official. 

“The conflict needs to be solved or at least we need to show some progress related to Transnistria before joining the EU,” said Mihai Mogâldrea, deputy director of Chisinau-based think-tank the Institute for Public Policy (IPRE). 

“This can happen if Moldova facilitates and advances with the integration process of that region. For that to happen, Moldova needs to come up with a clear vision of how integration will happen … and implement a step-by-step integration process in terms of social and economic reforms, and full inclusion of the region in the legal space and policy environment of Moldova.” 

Economic integration

Many Moldovans think that the best way to resolve the conflict is to strengthen Moldova's economic appeal, creating conditions that would encourage the reintegration of the left bank of the Dniester.

Since Moldova signed its Association Agreement with the EU and joined the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) in 2014, the country's trade patterns have shifted dramatically. What was once a reliance on Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has transformed into a new focus on the EU, particularly in areas like wine and IT. Just 15 years ago, 70% of Moldova's trade was with Russia and CIS nations; today, around 60% is with the EU and another 10% with other Western countries.

For Transnistria, economic integration has similarly advanced, as the region already directs over 70% of its exports to the EU. With access to EU markets now available to Transnistrian goods, the region’s economy has started to align with that of Moldova. Products like Transnistrian cognac and wine carry "Made in Moldova" labels for EU export, and the Ukraine war has boosted the importance of EU markets and Romanian Black Sea ports as trade routes eastwards have been cut off. The closure of Transnistria’s access to Russia via Ukraine and the blockade of Ukraine’s Odesa port at the start of the war helped drive the region’s exports to the EU as high as 80% in the first half of this year.

As the reintegration office in Chisinau said in July in a comment on the latest trade figures: "This reorientation of commercial activities in the region towards the European Union markets has strengthened internal trade and bolstered logistical links with Moldova." Transnistria’s main export destinations now include Romania, Poland, and other EU countries. 

According to one official in Chisinau, the increased attractiveness of integration with Moldova proper goes beyond trade. 

Alongside the gradual economic integration, the official pointed to the 360,000 Transnistrian citizens who have Moldovan passports, allowing them to benefit from visa free travel to the EU, as well as the growing number of Transnistrians who commute across the Dniester, or who have applied for Moldovan driving licences and car number plates. 

“Moldova is becoming much more attractive proposition than being part of a grey zone, they know the alternative is being a Crimea, a Donbas,” said the official. 

Avoiding conflict

There is also an understanding that despite the long-standing tensions between them, neither Chisinau and Tiraspol want to be drawn into the Ukraine war or to destabilise the situation within Moldova. 

Early in the war, rumours circulated about possible Russian incursions through Transnistria, but the Ukrainian army’s fierce resistance and the Transnistrian authorities’ unwillingness to escalate the conflict helped keep Moldova out of the war. The breakaway republic’s president, Vadim Krasnoselsky, said in May that "Transnistria does not want war" and praised both sides’ efforts to prevent conflict.

This mutual avoidance of escalation is driven, in part, by business interests. Transnistria’s economic elite relies on stability to maintain their wealth, and their extensive interests in the region would be at risk in the event of a military conflict.

Despite the recent steps towards economic integration, several people interviewed by bne IntelliNews in Chisinau, including both government officials and analysts, said that the conflict can only truly be resolved if there is new leadership in Tiraspol. 

Officials pointed out that while there are generally productive discussions on practical topics such as phytosanitary standards, the same is not true of issues such as human rights and democracy. 

The current Transnistrian leadership is seen as the key barrier to peaceful reintegration. Both the presidency and the parliament are controlled by Sheriff Holdings, a powerful conglomerate that wields huge influence in the tiny pseudo-state. Sheriff-backed politicians from the Renewal Party dominate Transnistria’s parliament, while the company controls supermarkets, petrol stations, a TV channel and even the Sheriff Tiraspol football club.

Freedom House, which rates Transnistria as “not free” in its annual Freedom in the World report, points out that the “ruling political group is aligned with powerful local business interests”. 

“Transnistria’s entire political establishment supports the separatist agenda and Russia’s role as the territory’s foreign patron. Figures who oppose the local elites linked with Sherriff Enterprises are subject to intimidation and have been mostly silenced in recent years … The Renewal Party has long controlled the legislature, and the 2016 victory of Vadim Krasnoselsky cemented its control over the executive branch,” according to the NGO. 

Just as the authorities in Tiraspol have resisted being drawn into the war in Ukraine or an extension of the conflict in Moldova, their interest in maintaining a lucrative status quo leads them to resist any challenge to Transnistria’s de facto independence, or urgings to introduce more political freedoms and protection for human rights. Accordingly, government officials in Chisinau and independent analysts agree that the current authorities in Tiraspol are unlikely to pursue democratic reforms or negotiate earnestly. 

“Progress can only be made if democratic elections are held in Transnistria, but with the current leadership, prospects are dim,” one analyst stated.

Russian influence declines

The relationship between Chisinau and Tiraspol also depends on regional geopolitics. 

Russia influence in Moldova has declined dramatically since its invasion of Ukraine. 

Initial fears that the Russian army might capture the Ukrainian black Sea port of Odesa then push on to Transnistria to join up with so-called “peacekeepers” in the enclave proved unfounded. 

Instead, faced with fierce Ukrainian resistance, as Russia has embroiled itself in a gruelling land war that has dragged on now for nearly three years. Transnistria is cut off from its main supporter by a hostile Ukraine. 

Another lever Russia had to wield over Moldova was its status as the country’s gas supplier. However, after a gas crisis created by Russia in autumn 2022, Moldova has had to find other sources abruptly, and no longer relies on Gazprom – though it does get most of its electricity from the giant Cuciurgan power plant in Transnistia that runs off Russian gas. 

“The Russians use all the channels they can [to influence Moldova]. In Moldova there are multiple sources of those because of the Soviet past,” said Lucjan Kubica, an expert on Russia and Eastern Partnership countries at the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (HybridCOE), in an interview with bne IntelliNews in October, citing Moldova’s energy dependence in particular. 

Similarly, Transnistria was a useful tool that enabled Russia to indicate “it would be so easy to unfreeze the conflict”. However, when it comes to the tools Russia has been using to pressure Moldova, “they recently started to lose them one by one”, said Kubica. 

Mogâldrea agreed that following the erosion of Russian influence, “We are right now able to manage much better the interaction with the authorities there [in Transnistria].” 

Thus emboldened, at the same time as waving the carrot of EU integration, however, the Moldovan government has recently started to be more assertive towards Transnistrian companies. 

Since January 2024, businesses in Transnistria have been subject to customs duties charged by the central customs authority – a step that Transnistria’s leader has complained will cost its companies as much as $5mn. In March, Moldova regained control of its eastern border with Ukraine, allowing it to check "everything that enters and leaves the Transnistrian region”, Foreign Minister Mihai Popsoi announced at the time. 

Outside the trade sphere, under a new law adopted in February, individuals who promote separatism face prosecution.

Strategies for reintegration

So what happens next? A leaked strategy, drafted by a consultancy firm and published by Spain’s El País – though not confirmed by the Moldovan authorities – suggests a timeline for Transnistria’s reintegration by 2038. 

According to the document, the process would begin with a referendum in Transnistria in 2027, followed by €4bn in economic subsidies to replace Russian gas. The plan, if adopted, would be phased over three stages and would cost around a quarter of Moldova’s current GDP.

Officially, Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration Oleg Serebrian confirmed earlier this year that Moldova is working towards economically integrating Transnistria by 2030. The government’s official policy seeks peaceful reintegration through economic incentives and a gradual alignment of governance structures, although the issue of Transnistria’s $10bn gas debt to Russia remains a looming challenge.

Overall, the hope is that Moldova will become increasingly affluent as it benefits from funding and increased investment in the run-up to EU accession, convincing the people of Transnistria of the benefits of reintegration. Yet there is no easy route to putting the country back together as long as the leadership of Transnistria see it as in their own interests to keep it divided.